Beirut: Multinational terrorist activities, whether associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil), Jabhat Al Nusra, Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq or any number of such organisations that competed with Al Qaida under Osama Bin Ladin and Ayman Al Zawahiri, allegedly drew succour from Saudi Arabia.

Although Riyadh supported several anti-communist groups at the end of the Cold War that fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and, more important, sought to isolate and defeat them — especially after it rescinded Bin Ladin’s citizenship in 1994 — accusations persisted that the Kingdom harboured many Islamist militants, oblivious to future consequences after any militants returned from Syria and Iraq.

In fact, and in the aftermath of the USS Cole bombing in Yemen on October 12, 2000, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and especially after the May 12, 2003 assaults in Riyadh, Saudi leaders intensified their efforts to pursue those who volunteered to fight, confiscated their cash and froze their money trails, as well as organised intensive re-education camps to alter existing mindsets.

Still, as military activities in neighbouring Iraq and Syria intensified, Saudi authorities concluded that a more robust counterterrorism framework was necessary, which was the reason why fresh measures were adopted to combat deviancy.

Since March 2014, the Kingdom has waged a growing fight against Islamist militants, has given the UN $100 million to set up an anti-terrorism centre, and warned young Saudis who went to either Syria or Iraq to quickly return home for a full pardon. Those who refused were now considered fugitives who faced arrest and prosecution.

In what were unprecedented moves, Riyadh blacklisted the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, along with the kingdom’s branch of the Shiite movement Hezbollah, Isil, and Al Nusra. It explicitly upped jail terms for Saudi citizens caught fighting abroad to 20 years, and vowed to punish “extremist religious and ideological groups, or those classified as terrorist groups, domestically, regionally and internationally”.

King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz was clear in his royal decree as he criminalised taking membership in, supporting, fighting alongside, sending financial support, or even sympathising with any of those groups “through speech or writing”.

Of course, while most Saudis backed their monarch, a few clerics who sat on the fatwa council objected. Fearful, they anonymously backed Isil on social media outlets like Facebook or Twitter, though such phenomena were not limited to Saudi Arabia.

The State’s decision to go after Islamist militants was deemed long overdue by the majority of clerics who served throughout the country, while leading non-religious authorities seldom minced their words to condemn irresponsible clergymen.

A prominent member of the Shurah [Consultative] Council, Mohammad Zulfa, declared: “We were wrong when we opened the doors of our schools and universities to foreigners who allowed such ideas to reach our youth.”

He added: “We, unfortunately, realised that too late.”

Clerics who issued fatwas that encouraged Saudi youths to be involved in conflict areas were now under extensive scrutiny though all concerned realised that the process to re-educate such “experts” was a long-term proposition that required patience and perseverance. Remarkably, and while Riyadh was relentless in its efforts against Islamist militants, it was vital to note that Syrians, Lebanese, Iranians, along with hundreds of Western nationals, including French, British and American citizens, among others, were apparently fighting with Isil. Some have even postured that Isil has been working with the Bashar Al Assad regime by selling him oil from Deir Al Zor.