Beirut: Six months of conversations and discussions among junior members of the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led to a long awaited meeting Tuesday night between Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun, two rival Christian political leaders who finally buried the hatchet and issued a 16 points “declaration of intent” that covered the gamut, even if the statement remained murky.
According to Aoun, Geagea’s visit came as a “surprise,” while the LF leader set the tone in his inimical approach to practice Lebanese-style “shock and awe.” He stated that neither side was happy with the direction that the intra-Maronite rivalry took, and pledged to open a new page in their ties, for the sake of Lebanon.
“This meeting,” he avowed “is not the end of our dialogue, but only the start,” noting that the relationship would “start at zero and the real work will begin from here onward.” “We are going to exercise our full efforts so this attempt doesn’t fail,” he said, adding: “Issues that we agree on will be good and any differences we have will be put aside for a later stage.”
For his part, Aoun confirmed that the gathering was a “gift to Christians” concerned with renewed confrontations, as he clarified all decisions were in their hands though he also contradicted himself when he underscored that commitments made to other parties, meaning Hezbollah and March 8 allies, would not be abandoned.
In the event, 16 common points were highlighted in the joint declaration, topped with a call to elect a “strong president” for Lebanon, someone who would simultaneously represent Christians and be accepted by Lebanon’s Muslim communities. Inasmuch as the two parties agreed to strengthen state institutions and uphold the constitution, one was at a loss to comprehend why the FPM hindered the election of a president throughout the past year, as it boycotted—along with March 8—24 parliamentary sessions to fill the highest state institution, including the session Wednesday.
According to Simon Abu Fadil, a well-connected local journalist, the two leaders did not tackle the presidency directly, with Aoun affirming that “in the end, the decision is ours” when he was asked about the subject during a brief encounter with reporters. Both sides stressed their “commitments to dialogue among all parties,” meaning between Hezbollah and the Future Movement, and underlined “their faith in Lebanon, the coexistence formula and the Constitution.” Naturally, these were principled positions that few could contradict though boycotting parliamentary sessions and routinely criticizing the armed forces, the sole remaining functioning institution, did not strengthen constitutionalism.
Still, and notwithstanding undeniable shortcomings, the LF and the FPM crossed two major hurdles. First, they agreed not to “resort to arms or violence and to support the army because it is the institution that can preserve sovereignty and national security.”
Indeed, this FPM concession was a blow to the party’s alliance with Hezbollah whose leaders seldom ruled out such means to resolve differences, as was the cases on May 7, 2008. Supporting the army and reinforcing legitimate security forces so that the latter could impose law and order was no small accomplishment at a time when Aoun routinely anticipated the military’s demise if it did not open new fronts in the Northern Arsal region.
Second, and equally important was the FPM concession to recommit to “the Document of National Accord that was endorsed in Ta’if,” which called for “avoiding anything that would manipulate the stipulations of the Constitution.” In the past, Aoun repeatedly blamed the political crisis in the country on “the limitation of the presidential powers” after the Ta’if Accords and “the lack of participation by all the Lebanese factions” in the country’s political life.
While both sides perceived Israel as an enemy, rejected the naturalization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and called for a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, they reiterated their desires to limit the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war too. Beyond these broad points of agreement, however, many wondered whether such understandings would now lead the LF and the FPM to go beyond a “declaration of intent.”
It was unclear, for example, how this declaration would be balanced with the 2006 FPM-Hezbollah “Memorandum of Understanding” that emphasized normalized relations with Syria. Likewise, it was vital to clarify how this latest commitment to accept and respect UN and League od Arab States resolutions, squared with the dismissal of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or with avowed criticisms of Resolution 1701 that called for the dismantlement of all militias in the country.
