The Gulf order is changing: What strategic think-tanks say

Reassessing Gulf security: The shift from US reliance to regional cooperation

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A US military CH-47 Chinook helicopter hovers above a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz.
A US military CH-47 Chinook helicopter hovers above a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz.
@CentCom | X

Gulf diplomacy has taken on new urgency as Iran and Oman work to secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

The talks focused on safe passage, maritime security and keeping international trade moving. They also showed both countries trying to lower tensions in a region still affected by war.

Iran and Oman have reached a mutual understanding on proposed shipping routes. But the plan still needs formal approval and implementation. It is not yet a permanent, fully operating agreement.

According to Oman's Foreign Ministry, their discussions covered:

  • Regional tensions and diplomatic options to prevent further escalation.

  • Efforts to revive dialogue and negotiations.

  • Security of maritime corridors.

  • Uninterrupted international shipping and trade.

  • Maintaining diplomatic communication channels.

The ministers emphasised "dialogue, mutual interests and respect for state sovereignty".

They also stressed the need to move beyond temporary de-escalation towards sustainable agreements that would prevent another confrontation.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi during their Tuesday (Nov. 17, 2026) meeting in Muscat. Oman has long played a constructive role in regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. Muscat has been the venue for intensive diplomacy between the two countries, aimed at easing regional tensions, securing safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and reviving negotiations.
‘Inclusive framework’

It builds on their previous meeting: on October 26, 2026, Albusaidi publicly called on Gulf countries to take “collective responsibility” for their own security.

In a telephone conversation on Nov. 5, the two sides then discussed practical, political and technical arrangements to restore “unhindered”  navigation through Hormuz.

Albusaidi's proposed "inclusive" regional framework envisions bringing together all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, alongside Iran and Iraq.

That is a significant position: a security arrangement that includes Iran, rather than treating it exclusively as an external threat. 

It's one page in a voluminous narrative about a region in a flux, one that's been sliced and diced by geo-strategic analysts.

Recent think-tank assessments

A number of recent think-tank assessments are particularly relevant.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): The Gulf at War

In its October 30, 2026 strategic dossier, The Gulf at War: Geopolitical, Defence and Geo-economic Dimensions, the London-based IISS identified several developments reshaping Gulf security:

  • Growing doubts about the reliability of US security guarantees.

  • Continued dependence on American military technology, defence integration and military power.

  • Differences among Gulf states over how to balance engagement with Iran against deterrence.

  • Increasing interest in diversifying defence and strategic partnerships.

  • A reassessment of the vulnerability of Gulf infrastructure and energy exports.

The IISS assessment is important. It does not conclude that American influence is disappearing. Instead, it describes a region reconsidering its dependence on Washington while continuing to rely on American capabilities.

Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, is seen flying over the Strait of Hormuz in a CH-47 Chinook (photos published by @CENTCOM). The US military updated oil flows via Strait of Hormuz to ~1.5 billion since the summer, implying a rate of >14.5m b/d in recent weeks.

Chatham House: The Gulf after US/Israel-Iran war

A September 2026 analysis published by Chatham House argues that the pre-war Gulf security order is “unlikely to return unchanged”.

Following Iranian missile and drone attacks, the think-tank points to the “vulnerability” of US forward deployments and military installations.

Chatham House argues that Washington may respond by adopting a different military posture, including:

  • Fewer and less visible military bases.

  • More dispersed deployments.

  • Greater reliance on precision-strike capabilities.

  • A surge in production of Improved missile-defence systems.

  • Expanded use of artificial intelligence in military operations.

The analysis suggests that the US could retain substantial military superiority while changing how it maintains its presence in the region.

This is an important detail: a reconfigured American security presence is not the same as an American withdrawal.

And a surge in US production of key defensive weapons would create new realities.

There are certain realities to consider:

Superiority is not the same as presence

For much of the last decade, the US kept about 30,000 to 50,000 troops in the Gulf. Stimson Center, a US-based security think-tank, argues that this "model" was built for a post-Operation Desert Storm era, also marked by near-overwhelming US superiority and a much weaker Iran.

Now, Iran’s missiles and drones can strike accurately across the Gulf, though the US Air Force has been able to operate across Iran and destroy much of its air defences.

Foreign Policy goes further: the Gulf bases are now less a symbol of strength than a set of fixed targets Iran knows how to attack. The proposed alternative is access, not presence. The US would be able to surge forces when needed without keeping them permanently exposed. That means prepositioning weapons, equipment and fuel at select sites, keeping other supplies afloat, and rehearsing surges. Stimson Center's main prescription: Don't rebuild America's Gulf bases.

Reconfiguration is not retreat

Dana Stroul argues in Foreign Affairs that Tehran’s willingness to threaten its Gulf neighbours means the US must keep a military presence and keep backing partners’ self-defence.

Defense Priorities says the Gulf states are unlikely to pivot to another security provider soon, since their arms and training are deeply tied to the US.

Not everyone shares this reading. Defence Security Asia argues that Iran’s attacks could force a historic retreat from the Gulf. Currently, the US still has over 50,000 troops and two carrier strike groups in the region.

A bunker full of Shahed-136 drones shown in an IRGC propaganda video. These one-way drones, known as "AK-47s of the sky" are low-cost platforms designed for "swarm" attacks and mass produced by Iran.

Production could change the equation

In the first six weeks of thew US/Isreal war with Iran, the US burnt through more than 1,000 interceptors, including more than 40% of its prewar Patriot stocks and about half its THAADs.

Other estimates are higher.

One puts THAAD use at about 80%, a number that would take about three years to backfill at pre-war production rates. The US also fired over 1,000 Tomahawks in a few weeks, but can produce only 90 to 100 a year.

A surge in output is under way. One Army contract is worth up to $9.8 billion for about 1,970 PAC-3 MSE interceptors.

Technology forms a big part of winning a war, and keeping the peace. Foreign Affairs Forum urges production "surge" and deployment for the following:

It adds that dispersal itself cuts demand for interceptors.

Without that, the US pays far more to defend bases than Iran pays to attack them.

However, the laws of physics and economics also apply (to say nothing about logistical challenges, or the reported shortage of "critical minerals" used in defence).

Production can take years, though analysts disagree on this: One expert warned that long-term readiness concerns are “profound” and that it is impossible to defend everywhere.

There's also the so-called "asymmetric economics" to consider: One-way attack drones such as Iranian Shahed-type UAVs typically cost a few thousand dollars, whereas traditional interceptor missiles cost millions.

Cheaper interceptors can handle drone swarms and short-to-medium-range threats, saving expensive missiles for ballistic and high-speed cruise threats.

Drone and missile exchanges across the Gulf — including recent alerts and interceptions involving Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Strait of Hormuz — keep demand high for sustainable air defense options.

The central strategic question: Can Gulf countries secure themselves?

The traditional Gulf security architecture rests on several interconnected pillars. The US maintains a significant military presence, including the US Navy's Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. 

Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, while Kuwait provides important facilities and operational access. Saudi Arabia also maintains extensive defence cooperation with Washington.

These arrangements provide intelligence, surveillance, air defence, logistical support and deterrence.

However, the 2026 conflict exposed vulnerabilities in this model.

Iran demonstrated that missiles, drones and “asymmetric mosaic defence” capabilities could threaten military installations, energy infrastructure and commercial shipping despite the presence of sophisticated defence systems.

A visitor looks at Lockheed Martin’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM-lower) and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS-upper) missile at the Perth Convention and Exhibition Centre in Perth on October 6, 2026.

This has created a dilemma for Gulf states:

  • Maintaining US military partnerships offers protection and advanced defence capabilities.

  • Hosting foreign military installations can also expose countries to retaliation during a regional war.

  • Engaging Iran could reduce tensions but requires credible guarantees about sovereignty, shipping and regional security.

  • Developing an independent regional security system would require cooperation among countries with competing interests and different threat perceptions.

  • Iranian attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain, alongside renewed threats to commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, have continued even as Washington pursues economic pressure and limited military strikes rather than another major campaign.

While Oman's proposal for an "inclusive" Gulf framework deserves attention, there are challenges to consider. An agreement between Muscat and Tehran cannot automatically become a GCC-wide security arrangement.

Can the Iran-Oman plan replace the US-led Gulf security system?

It's a long shot, say think-tanks. There are three major obstacles.

First, regional trust: 

Gulf governments would need assurances that Iran would respect their sovereignty, maritime interests and critical infrastructure. Diplomatic engagement alone cannot provide those guarantees.

Second, military capabilities: 

A maritime corridor and joint mine-clearance project are technical arrangements. They cannot replace the intelligence, surveillance, air defence and naval capabilities currently provided by the US and its partners.

Third, international law: 

The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway governed by applicable international maritime law. 

The proposed framework would, therefore, have to accommodate the rights of other coastal states and international shipping.

Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the regime of “transit passage” applies to international straits. Long and short: Prevailing international order prevents coastal states from simply establishing "exclusive" control over international navigation through a bilateral agreement.
A Gulf security system in transition

Oman is positioning itself as a diplomatic bridge between competing powers.

The most important development is not necessarily the emergence of an Iran-Oman alliance.

It is the growing debate over whether Gulf security should remain primarily dependent on external military guarantees or evolve towards a more “inclusive” regional arrangement.

Iran is seeking greater influence over the future management of Hormuz and a regional security structure that recognises its interests.

Meanwhile, the Gulf states are reassessing the costs and benefits of their existing security partnerships.

Washington, for its part, has strong strategic reasons to retain its military relationships, including protecting energy routes, deterring adversaries and maintaining influence over a region critical to global markets.

The Nov. 17 meeting in Muscat is important, but it is not evidence that the Fifth Fleet or the US security umbrella is about to disappear.

The emerging contest is over who gets to shape the next Gulf security order — Washington, Tehran, or the countries that share the region.

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