Since his election in November 2008, US President Barack Obama has adopted an inward-looking policy, focusing on fixing the economic troubles of his country. This approach constituted a break from the policy of his predecessor, which pursued a more militaristic foreign policy agenda. To deal with issues that could constitute a threat to US intrinsic national interests, Obama, therefore, increased his reliance on regional allies. The inclination towards cutting down military expenditures was also an integral part of a general trend to decrease America’s commitments. America’s regional allies interpreted the withdrawal of one of the two US aircraft carriers in the Gulf on February 2013 as an indication of the declining importance of the region and the Middle East in general in US strategy, especially after the discovery of large quantities of shale oil and gas in the US. According to most estimates, the US is expected to become the world’s largest natural gas producer by 2015 and the largest oil producer by 2017. Indeed, the seeming American loss of interest in the region is, in fact, an indication that the US no longer wishes to embark on direct military confrontations in the region as long as its fundamental interests are not threatened.
The Arab revolutions of the past two years have forced Washington to revise its Middle East policy but to an extent. Obama’s original policy was to return to the old, familiar Middle East, which required maintaining the status quo and cooperating with Arab autocrats. The Arab Spring took the US, just like everyone else, by surprise, forcing a revision of policy seeking to adapt to the ongoing changes — as opposed to encouraging them. The position of the US towards the Syrian revolution was formulated in a context where the US was not working on promoting change, but equally did not attempt to prevent it. The US tried rather to adapt to change, adopting a strategy that would not draw the US into direct military intervention; yet, it would enable it to control the outcome.
The Geneva Agreement of June 30, 2012, was an interpretation of this general foreign policy trend, allowing change to take place, but under favourable conditions; i.e. forcing Bashar Al Assad out, but preventing Islamists from taking power. The reluctance of the White House to fully support the Syrian opposition means that the US does not want to see a military solution to the Syrian crisis, but it is also not working hard enough to bring about a political solution to it.
The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, the dominance of Islamist trends within it, the absence of an acceptable alternative to the Al Assad regime and America’s bitter experience in Iraq, have made the US move closer to adopting the Russian position, which seeks to find a political solution that will preserve the current structure and institutions of the Al Assad regime — the security apparatuses and the army in particular. US Secretary of State John Kerry has repeatedly stated that “coordination with Russia in the Syrian crisis is the lesser of evils”. Former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, was even more direct when she said: “We must guarantee the preservation of the state institutions.” This explained why the US was quick to welcome the initiative of Muath Al Khatib, former head of the Syrian ‘National Coalition for the Forces of the Revolution and the Opposition’ on February 5, 2013, which essentially agreed to negotiations with regime representatives.
The US is absolutely sceptical about the current course of the Syrian revolution and its armed factions. It is also concerned about the repercussions of a military victory by the opposition, which could lead to chaos, the sprouting of extremist groups and the absence of a strong central authority. Such outcomes will threaten regional security and key US interests — especially Israel.
These factors have defined the US position towards the Syrian revolution, but have also hindered the emergence of a coherent policy. The more the US tries to distance itself from the Syrian crisis, the less its ability to influence the course of events become. Instead of adopting a proactive approach with multiple options in mind to face any emergency, the US policy will eventually be shaped by the evolution of the situation on the ground in Syria, mainly the deteriorating human situation.
In addition, the US has already been branded by most revolutionary forces in Syria as an enemy of the Syrian revolution. Its lack of support for the Syrian revolution and its indifference towards the human cost of the conflict have left deep bitterness among many Syrians. This will make the Syrian crisis one of the most serious foreign policy challenges for the Obama administration in the coming years.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is the dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon, Damascus.
