After two years of intensive negotiations and clinching a deal between Iran and the P5+1 (United States, Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) last July, on January 16, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was at long last implemented. In exchange for the removal of United Nations, European Union (EU) and the most onerous US sanctions, Iran agreed to significantly roll back its nuclear programme and accepted intrusive inspections and monitoring regimes.
The news captured headlines around the world, as it signalled the conclusion of one of the most complex international disputes since the beginning of the 21st century, primarily between two actors — Iran and the US. According to many observers and policymakers, including US President Barack Obama, a continuation of the US-Iran conflict over the latter’s nuclear programme would have led to a devastating war. Many experts believe that the materialisation of the JCPOA will open a new chapter in US-Iran relations. The swift release of the American sailors, who had mistakenly entered Iranian territorial waters on January 12, has been viewed by those experts as the direct result of a new diplomatic relationship established by the nuclear accord between the two countries.
Another recent example referred to as evidence pointing to a shake-up in US-Iran ties is the release of four Iranian-Americans as part of a prisoner swap deal with Tehran, which coincided with the Implementation Day of the JCPOA. As optimism for better US-Iran relations runs high, a closer look at the new climate reveals a complex dilemma that the US foreign policy apparatus may face, perhaps sooner rather than later.
Before discussing the quandary, four facts should be considered.
First, just a day after the announcement of the removal of sanctions, on January 17, the US Treasury Department unleashed sanctions against 11 individuals and companies involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. The move by the Americans was in reaction to an Iranian missile test carried out in October that violated UN Security Council resolution 2231. While the UN endorses the JCPOA, it restricts Iran from developing missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
The sanctions did not target any Iranian governmental institution in particular. However, the nature of the move, and more importantly, the American officials’ statements related to it, is worthy of note. Adam J. Szubin, acting Under-Secretary of the Department of Treasury, said: “We have consistently made clear that the United States will vigorously press sanctions against Iranian activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — including those related to Iran’s support for terrorism, regional destabilisation, human rights abuses and ballistic missile programme.”
The second fact is that if the US considers Iran’s support of Hezbollah as tantamount to sponsoring terrorism, and subject to punishment — which is Washington’s official position — then there may be problems. Iran’s hostile stance towards Israel is entrenched in the country’s foreign policy for religious, historical, political and socio-psychological reasons.
As a result, Iran’s support of Hezbollah will not diminish. On the contrary, Iran may intensify its support of Hezbollah due to an expected economic breakthrough in the post-sanctions era.
Political dissidents
The third fact is with regard to the issue of human rights and how it has been a centrepiece to the US-Iran conflict from the very early days of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Americans maintain a critical stance towards Iran’s crackdown on political dissidents, restrictions on freedom of speech, as well as social and political liberties. Indeed, a portion of the still-existing US sanctions, unrelated to the nuclear issue, are justified by the US as a reaction to Iran’s alleged human rights violations. In this respect, Iran accuses the Americans of hypocrisy, highlighting their long record of supporting dictatorships around the world, including the regime of the former Shah of Iran.
The fourth fact is that the grounds for escalation of tension between Iran and the US is inherent in the nature of the two regimes. Any accident or incident has the possibility of escalating from what might ordinarily be a mere intra-nation spat into an all-out feud.
For example, the humiliating coverage of the recent incident of Iran’s capture of American soldiers, kneeling on the ground with their hands on their heads, sparked anger within all political departments of the US. The US Secretary of State, John Kerry, said that the footage made him “very angry and very frustrated”. He added that “we can all imagine how a similar situation might have played out three or four years ago”. Adding to the fury were the statements made by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) Deputy Commander Hussain Salami: “The American sailors started crying after arrest ... Since the end of the Second World War, no country has been able to arrest American military personnel,” he remarked.
The move said two goals. The first was to humiliate the US, particularly while its president, in his annual speech, claimed that “America is the strongest nation in the world. Period”.
The second goal was to remind the US that the conclusion of the nuclear crisis would not result in the Iranian moderates determining Iran’s foreign policy or that the hostilities between Iran and the US had come to an end.
By putting these facts together, it could be concluded that the likelihood of escalation between the US and Iran is considerable, particularly in the post-Obama era. Each of the American presidential candidates, with the exception of Bernie Sanders, has openly expressed a strong pro-Israel and unfriendly attitude towards the Iranian government.
Now, here is the dilemma faced by America.
Principal purpose of tradeoffs
The imposition of new, stinging sanctions — such as restrictions on dealing with the Iranian banking system or importing oil from Iran — will create two major problems.
The first problem is that sanctions will jeopardise the survival of the nuclear deal with Iran. Following the realisation of the JCPOA last July, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a letter to the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, wrote: “During the eight-year period, imposition of any sanctions at any level and under any pretexts (including the repeated and fabricated pretexts of terrorism and human rights) by any of the negotiating countries will be considered a violation of the JCPOA.”
This would therefore oblige the government to “stop JCPOA activities,” he added.
The second problem is that the imposition of a fresh round of severe sanctions will undoubtedly jeopardise the Iranian moderates’ current, strengthened position. They will be pushed to the margins by the radicals — a result the Americans do not desire.
Now, on the other hand, if the US is not able to use the weapon of sanctions, it would not be able to confront Iran’s moves — most likely initiated by the radical faction of the Iranian government that is viewed by them as a threat to their interests and their hegemony within the region. Their hands will be almost completely tied.
The Americans will thus eventually face a perplexing question: How can we deal with two Irans without jeopardising both the nuclear deal and the newly-strengthened position of the moderates, while at the same time preventing the hardliners from dictating their policies within and projecting their influence outside Iran? Kerry’s statement regarding the American sailors’ plight at the hands of Iran indicates the beginning of the realisation of this dilemma. Kerry told CNN that “the footage was released by the Iranian military or Revolutionary Guards, not the government”.
In any case, with respect to Iran, a complex game is awaiting the US foreign policy apparatus, regardless of which party or president comes to power.
Shahir ShahidSaless is a political analyst and freelance journalist writing primarily about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs. He is also the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, published in May 2014. He lives in Canada.
