The continuing fighting between Al Houthis and Salafists in Yemen’s Saada province poses tremendous challenge to the national dialogue conference and could simply derail the transitional process, designed by the Gulf initiative to facilitate the creation of a more representative government in the war-stricken country. In fact, the conference has so far failed to reach agreement on fundamental issues such as the rules of power-sharing, the formation of a national unity government, and how transitional justice can be pursued.
The Saada province — a stronghold of Al Houthis — lies in the northern part of Yemen, on the Saudi borders. It houses the Scientific Centre of Traditional Salafism, founded by Shaikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadii in the area known as Dammaj. For decades, Salafist and Zaidi centres, where Al Houthis receive their religious education, have coexisted. Yet, when Houthi groups took up arms against the central government in 2004, the area witnessed clashes aimed at pushing the Salafists out of Dammaj on the grounds that they are attracting takfiris (infidels) from outside Yemen.
Dammaj has a population of around 15,000 people; about 4,000 of them are foreigner students. They live in the Scientific Centre where they pursue their religious education. Scientific Salafism does not interfere in politics, does not condone rebellion against the ruling authorities and most important it does not tolerate violence. However, pressure to nudge them out of the region encouraged many to take up arms and defend themselves. The Houthi attack in Dammaj attracted Salafist jihadist organisations to the conflict, further polarising the already very tense situation.
Political objectives
After seizing Saada, the Al Al Houthis tried to assert their influence by subjugating the major tribes in the region. By so doing they have in fact encouraged the emergence of a strong tribal-Salafist alliance intended to balance the military power of the Al Houthis. And with the symbolic military presence of the Yemeni army in the area, the central government does not seem to be in a position to influence the outcome of this conflict. [The latest clashes have resulted in at least 260 deaths after a new ceasefire brokered by the government fell apart.]
The Al Houthis, who chose the time for this confrontation, have strived to achieve a number of political and military objectives. Most important among these is to evade the implementation of the commitments Al Houthis made to the national dialogue conference. The foremost of these commitments are: surrendering heavy weaponry to the state, renouncing violence, integrating themselves into the political process, and allowing the state to practice its sovereignty in every inch of Yemeni territory. By increasing the military pressure in Saada, the Al Houthis are also trying to increase their political gains by claiming the position of vice-president and the integration of their armed militias into the army and police forces.
Al Houthis have benefited from a number of favourable local and regional conditions to pursue their objectives. President Hadi’s term in office is approaching its end and political differences amongst the ruling elites have accordingly reached a dangerous point, affecting the political and security situation in the entire country.
Regionally, the Al Houthis hope to benefit from the US-Iran rapprochement, Washington’s mild response to the interference of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in the Syrian conflict, and the widening schism between Saudi Arabia and the US. Al Houthis are also trying to take advantage of the regional and international efforts to circumscribe “radical” Sunni groups, including Salafists. To an extent, Al Houthis are trying to depict their confrontation with the Salafists in Dammaj as part of the US war on terror in Yemen, the region and the world.
The war in Dammaj could go in different directions. The Al Houthis could win and hence purge the area of their opponents. Yet, considering the current balance of power and the strong alliance between the Salafists and the tribes, this possibility seems unlikely. A second scenario entails a long war of attrition, wherein Saada could turn into a new front for both armed jihadist groups and Iranian-backed militias.
A third scenario would entail a settlement in which the Al Houthis withdraw from Dammaj and return to the national dialogue without conditions for fear of sectarian polarisation in Yemen and the region, thus tipping the balance of power against them. Finally, a settlement could be reached and stipulate the withdrawal of Al Houthis from Dammaj in return for certain concession, such as granting them local autonomy and high positions in the state military and political apparatuses. But this would also require the implementation of the national dialogue’s requirements, most important among them is surrendering heavy weapons.
In a country that already suffers from problems that are extremely difficult to overcome, the current conflict in Saada puts the very fate of Yemen at question. Six previous rounds of conflicts between the Al Houthis, on one hand, and the state and the tribes on the other have led to bloodshed, propelling Yemen into more chaos, and misery. Perhaps it is time for all the parties to accept a comprehensive national settlement that is built upon the principle of coexistence in a state of citizenship and law. This can only be achieved through the National Dialogue Conference that everybody must strive to make successful.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon, Damascus.
