Asia’s power map is shifting beyond a US–China contest

The Lowy Institute’s 2025 Asia Power Index, released on November 26, 2025, offers one of the most comprehensive assessments of how influence is distributed in the world’s most strategically dynamic region. The Index — which evaluates 27 countries across eight power indicators — underscores a critical reality: Asia’s transformation is not defined by a simple narrative of American decline or Chinese ascent. Instead, it depicts a more intricate mosaic in which middle powers are consolidating their weight, regional institutions are deepening, and the China–US rivalry serves as an important, but not exclusive, driver of regional change.

The 2025 Index highlights four major continental shifts. First, the United States remains Asia’s most powerful actor, though its overall score has plateaued for the third consecutive cycle. Second, China retains its position as the region’s second-most influential state, yet the pace of its rise has slowed. Third, India, Japan, and Indonesia continue to carve out distinct roles as consequential actors. Finally, Southeast Asian middle powers — particularly Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines — show measurable improvements in military capability and diplomatic activity, affirming the sub-region’s long-term strategic importance.

Dispersed power hierarchy

These findings suggest that Asia’s power hierarchy is becoming more dispersed and contested. While the United States and China remain the two dominant poles, the rest of Asia is developing more agency than at any point in the post–Cold War era.

One of the most notable insights from the Index is the continued resilience of Japan and India, the region’s third- and fourth-ranked powers. Japan maintains strong scores in diplomatic influence, defence networks, and economic capability, even as long-standing demographic constraints temper its long-term outlook.

India’s rise in the rankings stems from sustained economic momentum, technological capacity, and its strengthening of strategic partnerships, particularly within the Quad and across the Indian Ocean.

Power diffusion is real

Lowy’s methodology confirms that power diffusion is real. As India and Japan deepen engagement with Southeast Asia, they soften the perception that the region is trapped in a China–US contest. This dynamic broadly aligns with Singapore diplomat Kishore Mahbubani’s long-standing observation that Asia is increasingly shaped by Asian agency rather than great-power imposition.

The ASEAN middle powers likewise continue their upward trajectory. Vietnam and Indonesia improve their military and economic rankings, while the Philippines shows a sharp rise in defence diplomacy following the revival of strategic ties with the United States and Japan.

Collectively, these states are no longer passive observers. Their expanding role complicates strategic calculations for both Washington and Beijing and signals that multipolarity in Asia will be increasingly layered rather than symmetrical.

US still on top

While the United States still ranks as the region’s most powerful country, the Index’s granular indicators reveal where China continues to erode aspects of US primacy, particularly in economic influence, connectivity, and trade weight.

China decisively leads the United States in economic relationships across Asia — a category measuring trade flows, investment, and supply-chain integration. Its extensive regional economic footprint gives it structural leverage.

The United States, however, retains a commanding lead in military capability, alliance networks, and forward-deployed assets. Its Indo-Pacific architecture — stretching from Japan and South Korea to Australia and the Philippines — remains the backbone of American influence.

China’s modernising navy, missile forces, and expanding maritime presence are nonetheless, narrowing the capability gap.

Diplomatic front

On the diplomatic front, the United States retains a slight lead due to its sustained engagement in regional institutions and long-standing partnerships. China’s diplomacy is broadening but often undercut by coercive economic pressure, limiting its appeal.

The United States also scores highest on resilience, a measure of long-term structural capacity, whereas China’s demographic decline and debt overhang weigh heavily on its future potential.

In summary: China is rising, but unevenly; the United States remains ahead, but not comfortably.

Four trajectories

Drawing from Lowy’s detailed data and broader academic interpretations, four trajectories emerge:

First, we will see more crowded Asia, not a bipolar one. The steady rise of middle powers suggests Asia is moving toward a layered multipolarity rather than a stark China-US binary. This aligns with Mahbubani’s belief that Asian states will resist pressures to be absorbed into rival blocs.

Two, economic architecture will be the true battleground into the next decades. China’s lead in trade and connectivity therefore carries profound strategic weight.

Three, military risk will rise amid economic interdependence. The 2025 Index reveals exactly such convergence in the Western Pacific, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation — even if neither side seeks conflict.

Four, we will see decades of middle-power alignment when Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines will be particularly influential. Their choices — in diplomacy, defence cooperation, and economic diversification — will significantly shape whether Asia maintains strategic balance or gravitates toward rivalry.

The Asia Power Index does not predict Asia’s future, but it offers the clearest empirical map of how the region is evolving. Its core message is unmistakable: the United States remains ahead, China is steadily eroding aspects of that lead, and Asia’s middle powers are emerging as the decisive actors of the next quarter century.

The Index suggests a region where competition will intensify but does not necessarily destabilise the area. Much will depend on how states invest in diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic restraint.

The next 25 years will determine whether Asia becomes the principal theatre of great-power rivalry — or the laboratory of a new, shared prosperity.

Sajjad Ashraf served as an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore from 2009 to 2017. He was a member of Pakistan Foreign Service from 1973 to 2008 and served as an ambassador to several countries.