How to deal with the Taliban is a central question confronting Pakistan. By force of arms first. Or by negotiating and if negotiations don’t work, by deploying force.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government is following the third option. When negotiations broke down due to yet another terrorist incident, targeted retaliation resulted in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the dominant part of the Taliban, declaring a one-month ceasefire. A few hours later, an attack on the Islamabad district court, allegedly by a little-known Taliban group not accepting the TTP’s ceasefire, illustrates the difficulties of this process.
The government is criticised for lack of resolve in launching and sustaining decisive action to tackle and defeat the Taliban within their home ground in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (Fata) and their supporters elsewhere. This was also not effectively pursued in the preceding 15 years of military and civilian rule. The new government’s policy has been cautious. One can argue whether this is correct and to what degree. There are a number of reasons behind this caution. Terrorism — with its civilian, military, paramilitary and police causalities — has become so widespread that its repercussions impact the whole of a fatigued society. There is apprehension that unprepared action accentuating this trauma will be as counterproductive as inaction.
Over the years, since president Zia-ul Haq’s policies, although religious parties have not gained electoral support or modernised themselves as in Turkey, society has taken on a more religious hue. The erosion of governance and growing disparity between the rich and poor has meant that for the common man, while there is little sympathy for the Taliban, support is waning for a state that has not been delivering educational opportunities, economic growth or equitable taxation. There is no political consensus for fighting before giving negotiations a chance. In the province most affected — Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), bordering Fata — the ruling party Tehreek-e-Insaf, led by Imran Khan, is a prime supporter of negotiations, as are the religious parties.
“If the Americans want to talk with the Taliban to ensure peace, why should we not do the same in Pakistan?” is a widespread refrain, though not shared by all.
The military too is conscious of the need for political and public consensus to back use of force, as was forthcoming a few years ago when the Taliban in Swat, which was a settled area unlike Fata, overstepped the space they had been given.
Strategists also are divided. A few days ago, a highly regarded retired air force deputy chief, who had served as the ambassador in Sri Lanka, wrote that the single-minded policy of the present Sri Lankan president to defeat the long-standing LTTE insurgency, rather than accepting ceasefires they had used to regroup, provided a doable example for Pakistan. On the same day, another intellectual — a retired army chief — argued to the contrary, stressing that Pakistan was not an island. The flanks of the insurgency lay along a long and porous border with Afghanistan, supported by traditionally hostile powers and wherever military action had been taken, the civilian authority had been unable to step in to assume control and restore government services. There are other cross-border complications. The Taliban in Pakistan have different objectives from the Taliban in Afghanistan, who are fighting to oust foreign forces and then to reassert control. But their linkages provide each other with synergy.
While how to proceed is on everyone’s mind, including civilian and military policy-makers, a question which deserves more thought is: What exactly are the objectives of the Taliban? While they talk of bringing Sharia to the whole of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and of their opposition to the drone strikes, their real objectives remain opaque. It is likely that extreme demands are a negotiating position as they realise that they have limited support even within largely urbanised KPK and elsewhere, which is why they use hit-and-run attacks. The government would not accept an erosion of the writ of the state; and the use of force ultimately is to its disadvantage.
Their fallback position may be to demand a quantum of autonomy where they exert influence, an area where this has been the practice since British times. As they have no indigenous economic base this will be allied to a further demand for financial subventions, also with its precedents in Fata. On its side, the government’s counterinsurgency objectives will be to divide the Taliban between those that can be negotiated with and contained and those whom they need to go after — although making that distinction will be very difficult.
It is too early to say how the process will play out as any major or series of terrorist attacks could precipitate a military campaign. However, one thing is clear: It is not just the Taliban who hope to regroup through talks. In terms of law and order, intelligence coordination, digital movement tracking of people, financing and vehicles, and road choke points, the attack on the Islamabad court, like many before, highlights that the government too must get its act together. This will be needed to reduce the kinetic impact of the consequences of a breakdown of talks and also to deal with the potential of the Taliban outside Fata to strike at will.
Overarching is the need for better governance to raise resources to provide educational and economic opportunities to reduce the pool of potential recruits.
Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder is a retired Pakistani diplomat.
