Last week, Nigeria’s Boko Haram sent suicide bombers to strike inside Chad and Cameroon, claiming 45 lives. In the past, the group’s agenda has been largely local, but following its merger with Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) it is likely that there is an economic as well as ideological imperative behind this new drive to extend its reach — oil.
In March, Boko Haram rebranded itself ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’. Since then, the low-profile adopted by the group’s leader, Abu Bakr Shekhau, suggests the group was taking its orders directly from Daesh. One of the main reasons why Daesh has been so successful is its oil strategy. Al Qaida was greatly weakened by financial sanctions, the source of its funding being largely the personal wealth of Osama Bin Laden and donations from foreign organisations and individuals. Daesh learned from the mistakes of its predecessor and determined to establish independent income streams.
Since 2013, the group has deployed much of its military effort to overrun oil fields and installations in eastern Syria and northern Iraq. Initially, Daesh operated its oil assets clandestinely, selling crude on the black market, but nowadays — in line with its claim to statehood — it runs its trade with the efficiency of national oil corporations, recruiting specialist personnel and operating an overt distribution system. Whereas administration is generally devolved to local wilayats or provinces, all oil operations are overseen by the central Shura and guarded by the Daesh police force, the Amniyat, which also ensures that all revenue is accounted for.
Daesh oil installations produce up to 40,000 barrels per day, which are sold at competitive prices ($20 to $45 a barrel; Dh73.5 to Dh165.5) to whole sellers and middlemen. Daesh control a significant proportion of oil production in both Iraq and Syria, where daily life depends on diesel-powered generators and machinery; this puts them in a strong position locally.
As yet, neither coalition air raids nor Russian fighter jets have managed to inflict any serious damage on Daesh oil sites and to do so would be politically hazardous, further jeopardising national assets (which the West, Russia and China all have interests in). This will also adversely affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens.
Daesh is earning an estimated $1.5 million per day from oil alone. Add to that the taxes collected from the 10 million people who inhabit Daesh territory, roadblock ‘tariffs’, ransoms and revenue from the sale of antiquities. No wonder it is the richest terror group the world has ever known and has substantial financial reserves to fund its military activities, purchase weapons and ammunition, pay salaries, bribe informants and provide basic social services to its ‘citizens’. All of this enables them to consolidate their own position and buy local loyalty.
As Daesh turns its sights to Africa, it is reasonable to suggest that it will seek to apply its oil strategy there too. Libya sits on the continent’s largest oil reserves at 46.6 billion barrels; since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and in the absence of a central government, it has become a hotbed of extremism in various guises with Daesh seizing control of several cities in the north and announcing the creation of its ‘Libya Province’ in November, 2014. In March, 2015, Daesh fighters took control of 11 oilfields in Libya and earlier this month attempted to seize the Es Sider and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, which are the country’s main oil ports.
With much of the Sahel to the south either lawless or held by Daesh-allied militant groups, the traffic of extremism is relatively easy. In August, Boko Haram sent hundreds of fighters to boost Daesh’s efforts in Libya. Given the importance of oil revenue to its ambition to establish a ‘Caliphate’ across the Middle East and much of Africa, Daesh will be looking to expand its portfolio of oil wells.
Nigeria has proven oil reserves of 37.2 billion barrels, with 40 per cent of its oil exports going to the US. Niger, Chad and Cameroon are also significant oil producers. While Boko Haram has yet to seize any important oil installation, it has issued specific threats to refineries and pipelines in the Niger Delta and Lake Chad and its recent incursions into Cameroon and Chad were in oil-rich regions. Since March, the group has also been implicated in the theft of millions of dollars worth of crude.
When Nigeria’s new President Muhammadu Buhari took office on May 29, 2015, he promised that Boko Haram would be “stamped out” by December. With two months to go for that deadline, this seems highly unlikely and the group has killed 1,600 since Buhari’s election. This bluster and lack of pragmatism on the part of regional governments is certainly part of the problem — as is rampant corruption — and the regional Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) consisting of soldiers from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Benin and Cameroon remains largely ineffectual due to lack of consensus and weak leadership.
The US last week announced it would deploy trainers — along with drones — to Cameroon, where they will help troops improve border security and intelligence collection but, as in Syria and Iraq, the West is wary of doing more. Anti-western sentiment, the legacy of colonialism and the (justifiable) perception that the West is eager to exploit African resources while the people starve, boosts recruitment to extremist groups.
Much of North and Western Africa is now at risk, with Boko Haram last week urging Al Qaida affiliate Al Shabab to switch its allegiance to Daesh. The world was caught napping when Daesh seized its first territories in Syria and Iraq. It is time to wake up to this new threat on the African continent.
Abdel Bari Atwan is the editor-in-chief of digital newspaper Rai alYoum. He is the author of The Secret History of Al Qaida; A Country of Words, his memoirs; and Al Qaida: The Next Generation.
