The G20 was established as a forum for the world’s leading economies to come together and discuss global economic and financial issues, following the 2008 financial crisis. But when it comes to the Syrian war, the G20 summit meetings have turned into something that resembles the great-power concerts of the 19th century, with leaders of preeminent powers in the international system discussing the political future of smaller states.
The G20 summit of June 2012, held in Mexico, was followed two weeks later with the Geneva I communique, in which, the United States, Russia, China, Turkey and other international and regional powers agreed to a political framework for solving the 15-months-old crisis in Syria (without any Syrians present in the meeting room). That framework became the foundation for all later discussions on Syria. In September 2013, the entire world held its breath when US President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin met during the G20 summit in Saint Petersburg. The US had been threatening a military strike against the Syrian government, but the two leaders reached a deal to dismantle Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, thus averting American military action and perhaps a wider conflict.
On the contrary, the November 2015 G20 summit in Antalya, Turkey, saw an eruption of disagreements between the US and Russia on the one hand and between Russia and Turkey on the other. Less than a week after the summit concluded, Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian bomber over Syria, unleashing a vicious feud between the two countries that lasted for months.
Earlier this week, the world was again waiting for the outcome of an Obama-Putin meeting, to be held on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China. In late July, there were many signs of an impending agreement between Russia and the US over Syria. Back then, the Syrian government forces had besieged opposition-held parts of Aleppo, while Russian Forces began delivering aid to neighbourhoods under siege — highlighting Russia’s dominant position in Syria’s second largest city, once eyed by Turkey and perhaps other powers as well. Putin appeared to hold all the winning cards. The proposed deal was to include Russian-American military cooperation in Syria against Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and Jabhat Al Nusra, signalling an American acquiescence to Russian operations in western Syria, where many America-backed groups operate dangerously close to Jabhat Al Nusra, in addition to a Russian share in deciding the fate of Eastern Syria, America’s primary playground. The lesser aspect of the deal was to give a serious push to political negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition. In the month that followed, no apparent deal crystalised and opposition forces were able to break the government siege of East Aleppo. The siege was re-imposed hours before Putin and Obama met. The same month also witnessed the start of operation ‘Euphrates Shield’, with Turkish forces driving deep into Syrian territory to fight Daesh and, more importantly, to fight America’s allies: The Kurds.
These complications on the ground and the failure of US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, after weeks of Russian and American technical discussions, to arrive at a conclusive agreement in their meetings in Geneva meant that without a climactic effort on the part of the two leaders meeting in Hangzhou, a deal could not be finalised. Alas, Putin and Obama were not able to paper over the remaining disagreements. The American president said that both sides were not able to close existing “gaps of trust”. Putin was less gloomy, telling reporters that Russia was still up for a “full format recovery of relations with the Untied States”. Kerry and Lavrov will meet in the coming days and weeks in an attempt to hammer out an understanding, but a positive outcome seems highly unlikely, because the real “disagreements” are far from the issues of humanitarian assistance and the shape of the political solution in Syria.
Obama, put simply, and rather cynically, does not have any incentive to give Putin a “win” in Syria. The American president, now nearing the end of his term in office, seems to have given up on whitewashing his “Syria legacy”. He knows that no agreement could bring a final halt to the bloodshed, or spare him later criticism for not intervening more forcefully in the conflict. On the contrary, the proposed agreement will only bolster Russia’s position in Syria and perhaps strengthen its hand elsewhere, especially in Ukraine. The Americans are not keen on relieving either the Russian or the Syrian forces in western Syria. In fact, it is in America’s interest to keep its main competitors mired in the fight against Jabhat Al Nusra in the far less important Idlib, away from the strategic struggle for the oil-rich eastern and northeastern areas of Syria (bordering Iraq). As for the fight against Daesh, today, Obama is mainly concerned with disengaging his Turkish and Kurdish allies, trying to prevent a flare-up that may threaten the entire US strategy in Syria. Furthermore, with its allies in Syria colliding, a major breakthrough (mainly a push on Raqqa) is not possible and America’s focus has shifted to the battle for Mosul. Coordination with Russia in the fight against Daesh is therefore rendered moot.
Putin would rather cut a deal with Obama, instead of waiting for a new American president. No matter who wins in November, he or she will definitely spend weeks (if not months) forging a new strategy towards both Russia and Syria, which will likely be an assertive one at first. Yet, Putin is not desperate to cut a deal with Obama. He has secured urban Aleppo and contained the bulk of opposition forces in Idlib, making Russia an indispensable stakeholder in any future humanitarian operations and political solutions.
The stage is now set for Syrian forces, with Russian air cover, to replicate its success in Palmyra and advance against a major Daesh stronghold, thus enshrining Russia’s role in the global war on terror (and inching it closer to the Iraqi theatre).
Finally, with Turkey drawn into Syria, Russia will exploit contradictions between America’s allies to advance its interests. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can no longer antagonise Russia, now that his troops are deep inside Syrian territory and within range of direct Syrian and Russian fire (or indirect fire through Kurdish proxies). The Kurds, on the other hand, disillusioned with the American position on the Turkish operation and the fate of Manbij, could see in Russia an alternative avenue for support.
Deferring a decision on resolving the Syrian crisis to the next American president and the Turkish military intervention in the north will only lead to an expansion of the conflict in Syria. Putin will double down, trying to create a fait accompli for the next US president, while exploiting the Turkish-Kurdish dynamic to the maximum. Meanwhile, Daesh is beaten but not down yet, while a Jabhat Al Nusra-controlled Idlib continues to fester into another sRaqqa, meaning, Syria will suffer the presence of both groups for years to come.
With no end in sight in this vicious war, the average Syrian will continue to pay a heavy price for the reckless cynicism of great powers.
Fadi Esber is a research associate at the Damascus History Foundation, an online project aimed at collecting and protecting the endangered archives of the Syrian capital.
