Indian tiger and red dragon in a romantic mood

At 4,290 metres above sea level, the Nathu La pass, the high point of the fabled Silk Route, has been closed since 1974 after Sikkim was annexed by India and became a part of the Indian union. But the first visit by an Indian prime minister to China in ten years this week raises the very real possibility of India breaking through the snowbound fastness of this remote Sikkimese border outpost into the vast emptiness of Tibet and ultimately, China.

This was once a vital link in the old Silk Route that swept from the Pacific to the Atlantic. And in many ways, the re-opening of Nathu La could open the doors to the Forbidden City, where the welcome mats were out for Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his team, even if the trumpets were more muted than the men from Delhi would have liked.

Certainly, the hoopla over whether India had really recognised Tibet as part of China, and whether China had actually recognised Sikkim's accession to India quickly became a metaphor for Chinese-Indian relations – the Indians want forward movement but whether the Chinese want the same, and in equal measure, is another question.

The Indians had to be satisfied with the fact that a Nathu La border check-point would rubber stamp entry and exit from India and China, and not Sikkim and China, an "implicit" recognition of the fact that Sikkim was now part of India, rather than a more overt acceptance on paper.

The memorandum on border trade signed on Monday at the Great Hall of the People, only said in its preamble that the two countries "agreed to opening another pass on the India-China border for trade."

Similarly, India's purported key concession on Tibet, is not vastly different from its earlier language. In the document signed by the Chinese premier Wen Jinbao and Vajpayee, (the first time two leaders of these nations have ever signed a joint declaration), India carefully nuanced Tibet's description – the 'Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China'.

In the 1954 border agreement, and subsequent 1998, and '91 joint communiques, the characterisation changed only marginally, from "Tibet Region of China" to "Tibet is an autonomous region of China".

The annexation of Tibet by China has in truth, never been opposed by the Indian government. In fact, India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, took a pragmatic position on the issue, preferring to keep the doors open to Tibetan refugees fleeing Chinese oppression, even as the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetans, kept his lines open with Beijing. What the Chinese did not like, and can do little about, is the platform that India provides to the charismatic Tibetan leader.

The twin moves therefore seem a face saver - the concessions that were needed to smooth the path forward, while ignoring the still unresolved border dispute. China has shown no interest at all in sorting out where the border should lie between the two countries, despite 15 rounds of meetings since 1988.

In the western sector, China's writ runs through Aksai Chin, and another 2,700 sq miles ceded to it by Pakistan. In the east, the boundary between India's Arunachal Pradesh and China, the McMahon line, is not recognised by the Chinese.

During Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi's ice breaking visit to Beijing, the Chinese offered to accept the McMahon line in return for Indian recognition of Chinese suzerainty of Aksai Chin. Since then, the two countries have exchanged maps, but on the ground, little has changed, although China has moved to delineate its boundary in 20 other disputes with other countries.

Certainly, there is a dichotomy here, a yin and yang that characterises relations between the two Asian powers.

While a part of India's determined efforts to engage its larger and more powerful neighbour is to romance the dragon, draw it into its economic embrace by taking relations to a higher level of trust and reciprocity, there is another part of India's China consciousness that remains deeply uneasy, if not downright wary of Chinese intent.

Underscoring that unease is what has gone on behind closed doors before Vajpayee and his Chinese counterpart Jiabao signed the MOU, which in itself almost didn't get signed as the two sides quibbled over the wording. Indian officials say they were unable to get Chinese reassurances on their major area of concern - Chinese armaments to Pakistan.

They admit that given the Asian superpower's strategic encirclement of India, and Chinese anger at the Indian defence minister's impetuous comments about China's "enemy number one" status after India went nuclear in '98, it would be foolish to expect any movement on that score.

India has underlined, however, that in the wake of September 11, and the growing threat from the spread of terror, in the hands of fundamentalists like the Al Qaida and their tool, the Taliban, arms sales, particularly in the missile and nuclear fields should be more prudent.

Analysts see the gradual opening of China towards India as an acknowledgement that the message may have gone home. China, not only has a nascent Tibetan independence movement on its hands, but increasingly, a restive Uighur populace, who have known links with rigid Islamic movements, ranging from the Taliban in the Pashtun belt bordering Afghani-stan-Pakistan and closer home along the border with the Central Asian states.

It has aggressively populated Tibet with Shan Chinese in a bid to change the demographic component of its western wing, but it needs a friend in moderate India to ensure that stability is maintained.

Also, while the economic powerhouse that is China is on the up and up, growth has been limited to the eastern rim, the cities of Shanghai and the economic zones. China's economic miracle can only sustain itself if it reaches into the Indian sub-continent. China is not comfortable with India's joint patrolling of the Malacca Straits with the U.S.

But in many ways, it's circumspect stand when Pakistani troops precipitated a crisis in Kargil, and its persistent calls for Delhi and Islamabad to mend their fences are in keeping with its philosophy of putting economics before politics. In persuading Myanmar to deny refuge to Naga rebels, it has shown India good faith, while keeping the Chinese listening post open in Coco Island as insurance.

So while the Chinese play checkers on Sikkim, it's pertinent that Vajpayee chose to draw attention to statesman Deng Xiao Ping's remark to Rajiv Gandhi on his visit: the 21st century can only be the Asian century if India and China combine to make it so. Nathu La is the first step in that direction. Perhaps, this time, the dragon is listening.