A Question of Answers: China's attitude to India changing

In the last week of April, Defence Minister George Fernandes held a wide range of discussions with top Chinese leaders, including Prime Minister Wei Jingbao and Chairman of the Military Commission Jiang Zemin. It was clearly seen as a prelude to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's possible state visit to China sometime in July.

Relations between India and China have not been rosy, but they have been improving. The suspicion and hostility which marked Sino-Indo ties, especially after India's nuclear tests in May, 1998 has now receded.

According to China-watchers in New Delhi, relations between the two countries improved when the then Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh visited China in 1999.

India has always been concerned by the strategic alliance between China and Pakistan as well, but the strict neutrality observed by China during the 1999 Kargil conflict was seen as a positive Chinese gesture in New Delhi.

In an interview with Gulf News, C. Uday Bhaskar, deputy director of the New Delhi-based Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and a long-time China-watcher, talked about the significant change in the tone and tenor of Indo-China relations, and about Chinese perspectives and concerns in the wake of the successful American war in Iraq.

Excerpts from the interview:

What is the Chinese response to the American military victory in Iraq?
The Chinese are very much concerned by the manner and swiftness of American military triumph in Iraq now, and in Afghanistan towards the end of 2001. They are worried by the conspicuous American military presence in Asia, especially in the Central republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

It is for them the first time since Alexander the Great, that a Western military has penetrated into the heart of Asia. And the Chinese are studying the implications of the American victory in the economic - especially access to energy sources - and strategic spheres.

What is of greater concern to China is the American talk of spreading democracy and pluralism across Asia. The Chinese have always prized their own distinctive value system, and they see a cultural threat in the American rhetoric of imposing its own version of democracy on the rest of the world.

Are the Chinese concerned about the North Korean crisis after Pyongyang declared that it possesses nuclear arms?
There is acute discomfiture in Beijing's top circles about North Korea's declaration. The Chinese are doing all that they can to resolve the issue, and keep it from developing into a full-blown crisis.

What is the attitude of the Beijing leaders towards India?
It has become quite positive. The irritation caused by Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton in May, 1998 citing China as a reason for the Indian nuclear tests, has now been pushed into the past. What seems to have marked the change is the visit of Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh to China in 1999.

And the Chinese also maintained a scrupulous neutrality during the Kargil conflict. The Chinese are happy about the growing trade between the two countries, which has now reached an impressive $5 billion in the last few years, and has grown 19 times in the last five years. The trade figure could touch $10 billion in the next three years.

Is there a change in China's attitude towards Pakistan in the context of India-Pakistan relations?
Pakistan has always looked to China as an all-weather ally, and Islamabad derived much confidence from the close ties between Pakistan and China. But Beijing is unlikely to tilt towards Pakistan against India as it was inclined to do sometime back. And that is a crucial shift in stance on the part of China.

Do the long-winding Sino-Indo border talks serve as a model for India-Pakistan talks?
The Joint Working Group (JWG) model which is working so well in India-China talks may not be the exact model to be replicated for India-Pakistan negotiations, but the approach adopted by India and China towards differences is applicable.

Indian and Chinese negotiators have kept the most contentious issues of border demarcation on the back-burner as it were, which will be taken up much later. But having said that, it is important to state the differences in situation as well. The border areas on which India and China differ are either uninhabited or sparsely populated. And the border areas do not figure prominently on the domestic agenda of the country.

In the case of India and Pakistan, it is not the same. Kashmir is much too conspicuous both in India and Pakistan. But it would be good to adopt the approach. That is, manage the irresoluble problems, and do not hope for quick solutions.

What is the Chinese view of the Indian claim for permanent membership of the UN Security Council?
The Chinese are completely silent about it, as they are about India's nuclear capability.

Is China agreeable to India becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-isation (SCO)?
The Chinese want to keep the SCO in their own sphere, and they do not want India to be a part of it. The Chinese were also opposed to India becoming a member of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF).

Are the Chinese open to the idea of an India-Russia-China alliance to check American influence in Asia?
The Chinese do not consider it a serious option. As a matter of fact, the Chinese leaders want to have independent ties with both Russia and the U.S. They do not count India as a major power, and they consider Japan to be an American lackey. The Chinese believe that they are the only Asian power.