Obama's 'good war' may backfire

For Barack Obama, Iraq is the bad war and Afghanistan the good war. The president-elect has promised to cut back American involvement in the former and wage the latter with vigour, committing more troops and money. Paradoxically, Obama's solution for Afghanistan could worsen its problems.

The 31,000 American troops in Afghanistan are being supplemented with others from Iraq, and if Obama implements the plans he has outlined, the total could double within 18 months. But additional soldiers are unlikely to help create a stable government, curb the drug trade or reduce corruption.

During the first six months of 2008, the number of Nato and US troops in Afghanistan nearly doubled. But as the military presence of the US and its allies has increased, the Taliban has begun launching larger, more frequent attacks, particularly in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Oruzgan.

Moreover, they have moved beyond these southern bastions and established themselves in most of the country. Kabul, the capital, has become more dangerous, and the Taliban operates with impunity in the adjacent provinces of Wardak and Logar.

Obama's advisers know that the war is going badly and that simply increasing troop levels won't be enough. Indeed, they acknowledge that the insurgency cannot be crushed militarily and hint at talks with "moderate" Taliban. But they also believe that there must first be a change in the military situation; that's why they want more firepower.

The Obama administration will need to understand that the road to success in Afghanistan starts in Pakistan. As long as the Taliban can count on havens, supply centres and training camps in tribal areas across the border, it will continue to fight. Its aim is not so much to win as it is to endure until support for the war erodes within Nato.

The commonplace assumption - one shared by Obama's team - is that Pakistan's government can be goaded into going after the Taliban. But there is little to support that hope.

The US has been working with Pakistan for years to eradicate Taliban support along the border, with little to show for it. In a sobering discovery, the General Accounting Office recently found that $2 billion of the American aid that Pakistan received for counterinsurgency since 9/11 remains unaccounted for.

Pakistan's army and intelligence services probably will continue doing what they have been doing: assuring the US that they have the will and wherewithal to get serious, and launching ineffectual operations intended to keep American hopes alive.

Much is expected from Pakistan's newly elected president, Asif Ali Zardari. It's premature to pass judgment (he took office only in September), but the record of elected Pakistani governments in bending the military and the intelligence agencies to their will is hardly inspiring.

Security establishment

As Pakistan's security establishment sees it, the influence it amassed in Afghanistan up to 9/11 is in jeopardy. The Karzai government, deeply suspicious of Pakistan, is close to India, which has re-established itself in Afghanis-tan, providing economic aid and helping build roads designed to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan. Worse, the United States favours India's efforts.

But Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency holds an ace. It knows that the United States cannot abandon Pakistan as long as Al Qaida and the Taliban dwell in the tribal areas adjoining Afghanistan.

Obama has no good choices in Afghanistan. Expect the good war to be a long and costly one.

Rajan Menon is a professor of international relations at Lehigh University and a fellow at the New America Foundation. He is the author of 'The End of Alliances'.