Enough hysterics — Trump’s foreign policy needn’t be reckless

The global funk over United States’ President-elect Donald Trump’s nascent foreign policy — from Senator John McCain’s declaration that his Russia policy is “unacceptable” to hysterical over-interpretations of his intentions regarding China and trade — will not last long. On Thursday, as Trump met Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in New York — the inevitable “normalisation” of the new US administration started in earnest. Trump had declared that Japan should spend more on defence to share the burden of containing China more evenly, but there will be no rude demands. At the very most, at the next summit, or the one after that, Trump may suggest that a greater Japanese effort would be welcome. Because Abe has actually done much to strengthen Japan and do more for the alliance, the two leaders will find an understanding easily enough. [Abe, the first world leader to meet Trump after the latter’s election victory, described America’s president-elect as a “trustworthy leader” after their meeting on Thursday. Abe, speaking after a hastily arranged 90-minute meeting at Trump Tower in Manhattan, told reporters: “The talks made me feel sure that we can build a relationship of trust.” However, he would not disclose specifics because the conversation was unofficial. Trump, in a brief entry on his Facebook page, accompanied by a photo of the two men, said: “It was a pleasure to have Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stop by my home and begin a great friendship.”]

As for China and its maritime expansionism, Trump’s other policies matter more than his China policy in and of itself. Disengagement from Afghanistan and Iraq — no more troops will go in and those that are there will soon return home — and a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Ukraine would release US military resources for the containment of China. That will facilitate a more muscular response to China’s spat with the Philippines on South China Sea, aggressive patrolling around Japan’s southernmost islands, and periodic intrusions into Vietnamese waters. US President Barack Obama’s White House staff kept refusing US Pacific Command suggestions for “freedom of navigation” patrols through the South China Sea, in the hope that verbal persuasion alone would stop Chinese incursions.

In diplomatic circles, it was reported that America’s National Security Adviser Susan Rice opined that Beijing was “shapeable”, as if China were a very small country with not much of a history. Trump is unlikely to share such illusions and he appears not likely to stop Pacific Command from doing its job of “keeping the sea lanes open” — the polite expression for denying Chinese territorial claims over coral reefs, rocks and shoals.

If Trump’s Russia policy is successful, it will reduce tensions and thus the need to send more US forces to Europe to strengthen the Nato alliance. But subject to that, Trump has said many times that he will press for more fairness in alliance’s burden-sharing, especially by Nato’s richer members. Some in Europe have already said any such attempt by Trump will instead prompt the establishment of Europe’s own united armed forces, finally overcoming objections from all sides. That would indeed be a curious response, because it would mean spending very much more than what Trump would ask for. The more likely outcome is that Trump will get his increases — perhaps to the agreed-upon 2 per cent of gross domestic product.

That said, no distinctive Europe policy is likely to come from Trump. His vocal support for Brexit clearly showed his Euroscepticism. Like an increasing number of Europeans, he appears to view the European Union as a failed experiment devoured by its own bureaucracy and the euro monetary system as destructive to economic growth. On the other hand, no American president can say much on the subject once he is in office, and he can do even less, because the US has no say in Europe’s own institutions. Yet, even a silent Trump will encourage Eurosceptic politicians everywhere, perhaps tipping the balance in some countries, incidentally keeping the argument focused on liberty versus bureaucracy, as opposed to authoritarian or racist arguments.

Moreover, the Trump administration is not likely to start religious quarrels and will probably not abandon established diplomatic doctrines on sovereign immunity — despite it being violated by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, passed in late September over Obama’s veto, which allowed lawsuits in US courts against other nations.

Against all this, there is something much more important: In his eagerness to reach a nuclear accord with Iran, Obama disregarded Israeli and Saudi Arabian security concerns and treated their objections with icy contempt. By contrast, Obama’s officials acted like excited teenagers with their Iranian counterparts. The Saudis took it personally as a betrayal — Washington consorting with its enemies against its friends. Although Trump will not repudiate the Iran accords he so loudly criticised (he can’t do so alone, as it’s a multilateral agreement), he will stand strong against Tehran. His officials will not tolerate any deviations from the nuclear deal, will not move towards lifting the ballistic missile and terrorism sanctions and if Iran’s Revolutionary Guards try to humiliate Trump with naval provocations as they did with Obama, the US Navy will sink a small boat or two and US-Saudi relations will be splendid once more.

For many, it was Trump’s criticism of recent trade treaties that was most alarming. A belief in free trade these days is something of a religion and that made Trump an apostate. Yes, Trump would not sanction the Trans-Pacific Partnership that seeks to remove many customs barriers between the 12 nations that have signed the agreement, but that is as far as his apostasy will go: He will not withdraw the US from the Word Trade Organisation, and he will not cancel any existing trade treaty, including the North American Free Trade Agreement he kept attacking during the campaign. That treaty is US law like any other treaty and presidents cannot change the law; only Congress can, and it will not. On the other hand, Trump will certainly invoke the existing anti-dumping trade barrier provisions that his predecessors were very reluctant to use, for example to protect the US steel industry from the flood of Chinese steel. True, that would allow the Chinese to retaliate against the dumping of US exports — except there is no such thing. Look instead for fiscal measures to discourage US industries to migrate abroad, offset by the lower corporate tax that will reduce the incentive to offshore anyway. So, yes, Wall Street was right to oppose Trump and industrial workers were right to back him.

It is all very reminiscent of former US president Ronald Reagan’s arrival. Nobody believed that America could renounce coexistence — going totally against the establishment consensus — but Reagan did that, simply refusing to endorse detente. The outcome was not a nuclear war or the end of the world, but rather the end of the Soviet Union. This time, there is something else to end: The enormously costly pursuit of wars in countries where the US keeps failing.

— Washington Post

Edward Luttwak is an author whose books include The Endangered American Dream and The Rise of China vs The Logic of Strategy.