Bridging India-China rift

The sooner the better that India and China accept their inevitable strategic competition but limit that by working overtime on tactical cooperation. Two tactical areas needing immediate Chinese and Indian intervention are a fix for the world economy and overcoming terrorism from Afghanistan and Pakistan, affecting them both.

The Asia-Europe (ASEM) meeting on October 24 in Beijing, where Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was feted as a star economist by the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, sets the ball rolling for Asian ideas to spearhead the rescue of international finance. In December, India will host the second counter-terrorism joint military exercise with China.

China fears the Indo-US nuclear deal. Unable to stop it in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), it has not said "no" to Pakistan's matching demand for it, only constrained by certain international opposition of it and by grave doubts of Pakistan's stability. But the Indo-US deal, far from expanding India's deterrent, constraints it by obligations not to test and not to provoke a nuclear arms race with Pakistan. Indo-US military-to-military ties also raise Chinese hackles. China (and Russia) expressed concern over the 2007 Malabar war games in which India, the US, Australia, Singapore and Japan participated.

Only days before Manmohan Singh's ASEM visit to Beijing, China was found lobbying against India along with the so-called "Coffee Club" countries that include Pakistan, Italy, Egypt and Turkey. Even as Manmohan Singh was proceeding to Beijing, the Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, told Parliament that progress on India's border dispute with China was not "very bright".

What causes India to erratically defy China? Very likely, a gross oversimplification and magnification of India-US relations since the nuclear deal and growing military-to-military ties. If indeed the US is building up India as an Asian counterweight to China, as some in the Indian establishment believe, it is going about it a queer way by severely circumscribing India's deterrent capability through the nuclear deal. Frankly, in the NSG waiver for India, the US and China were on the same side. US newspapers leaked that the US privately assured opposers that India would be bound not to test and would be denied enrichment and reprocessing rights and technologies.

Rather than flex phantom muscles, India would be well-advised to objectively assess its true strengths, and deal with China on a level of its comfort.

And rather than erratic defiance, India should solidify anti-terror links with China. India and China have a real opportunity to pool their talent and assist the world out of the economic crisis. But all this is done better with plain acceptance on both sides of strategic competition, which can then be gradually minimised.

N. V. Subramanian is the Editor of NEWSInsight (www.newsinsight.net), an Indian public affairs magazine. He recently published his second novel, 'Courtesan of Storms' (Har-Anand: New Delhi, 2008).