A process that is difficult to believe in

The peace process in the Middle East is again in the spotlight. The new administration in Washington appears determined to find a peaceful resolution to the century-old conflict. The voluble new president wasted no time upon assuming office, promptly designating the avuncular George Mitchell - a veteran negotiator of the Irish conflict - as a special envoy tasked with achieving reconciliation.

The sequence of events does not portend well for the long and delusive quest for peace in the Middle East. The new peace process has come after a bloody war in Gaza and an Israeli election that has dashed any hope for a settlement.

Arguably, the spectre of peace has caused the Israelis to tilt at windmills. The War on Gaza was launched in December 2008, following a ceasefire that held between June 19 and November 4.

On November 4, Israel carried out an incursion into Gaza and killed some Palestinians, which in turn brought about Palestinian retaliation. The date was not without significance, however: The US was busy with its historic presidential election, but more importantly, Barack Obama would emerge as the victor with a clear peace agenda.

The Israelis saw the writing on the wall, and wailed. Peace would inevitably mean some compromise with Hamas, the majority party in the Palestinian territories.

Such an eventuality, despite Hamas now acting more responsibly on the issue of the ceasefire, sent jitters through the Israeli ruling coalition. It's a case of déjà vu: The Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Hamas of yore, accepted a US-mediated ceasefire in Lebanon in 1981.

Quiet prevailed in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for almost a year, despite Israel's incessant violations. Many observers, including some Jewish commentators (Noam Chomsky, Yehoshua Porath, and Avner Yaniv), pointed out that the idea of the PLO gaining political respectability as a result of observing the ceasefire and, even worse, building momentum for the peace process, rendered the Israeli government of Menachem Begin apoplectic.

Porath wrote that the invasion of Lebanon "flowed from the very fact that the ceasefire had been observed" by the PLO - a "veritable catastrophe" for Israel's leadership.

The War on Gaza, in this context, was not to protect Israeli citizens in southern Israel. That, according to Nancy Kanwisher, who studied the situation methodically, had already been achieved by the ceasefire.

Her conclusion is a resounding indictment: "Indeed of the 25 periods of nonviolence lasting longer than a week, Israel unilaterally interrupted 24, or 96 per cent, and it unilaterally interrupted 100 per cent of the 14 periods of nonviolence lasting longer than nine days."

The war was orchestrated to eliminate Hamas as a factor in the anticipated peace process under the aegis of the incoming US administration. Like the war on Lebanon a generation ago, this was "the war to safeguard the occupation of the West Bank", to borrow Avner's description.

Israelis are not mincing their words on this score. Dov Weissglass, Sharon's senior adviser, unequivocally declared: "The disengagement [from Gaza] is actually formaldehyde."

"It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians& this whole package that is called the Palestinian state has been removed from our agenda indefinitely."

Martin Kramer, a pro-Israeli blogger, wrote during the war: "If Hamas remains a player, the biggest risk to Israel is that the mechanism created through diplomacy& ends up legitimating Hamas."

"The temptation to 'engage' Hamas has grown in Europe, and even among some Americans, ever since the Hamas victory in the 2006 legislative council elections."

The Israeli election brought the most right-wing coalition to power. Kadima and partners most likely sold their war to Washington as a necessity to avert Likud and rightists from coming to power.

All they have to show for 1,300 Palestinians killed, and much mayhem, is one extra seat. The new government - with its chief diplomat in the catbird seat, who began his career as a bouncer, and possesses the mien of an undertaker, on top of his contumelies - isn't exactly be in the running for a Nobel Peace Prize. If that is the case, what were all these political manoeuvres for then? They were exactly that: political manoeuvres. For Washington, the peace process will serve few purposes. The desultory exercise is a prerequisite for reaching out to Muslims, which is Obama's strategy.

Secondly, Washington can clearly see that Netanyahu's rickety government will not deliver on peace, and hopes either to bring down the government, or to force a reshuffle that would see the inclusion of partners more open to peace.

Netanyahu sees the peace process as a way to kick the can down the road. The Israeli government has a bigger fish to fry - that is, the Iranian nuclear programme.

The Obama administration is presumably holding out on Iran, or better, linking progress on Iran to progress in the peace process. Surprisingly, all members of the administration are singing from the same hymn sheet, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel included.

The peace process will be reborn for want of a better alternative for the umpteenth time and Netanyahu might be forthcoming in order to eliminate the Iranian threat. However, it will be a process that goes on forever.

To be sure, the Middle East peace process is the apotheosis of Bill Clinton's smoking without inhaling. People have been led up that garden path too often to believe in it.

Dr Albadr S.S. Alshateri is a UAE political analyst and writer.