What Zarif’s resignation means for Iran’s future

Days after Iran’s newly elected president nominated him as Minister of Strategic Affairs — a role seemingly tailored to appease him — Mohammad Javad Zarif resigned from the yet-to-be-formed government, criticising its failure to represent minorities, women, and youth.

Zarif, who was briefly active in electoral politics to replace the previous president with a Republican candidate, cited this lack of inclusivity as a deal-breaker.

The reformist movement, sceptical of their conservative counterparts and seizing upon the brief nomination window, had successfully placed Masoud Bazeshkian and his support team, including Zarif, into power amid significant political confusion.

Zarif’s abrupt departure is open to multiple interpretations. Firstly, the conservative majority parliament was tasked with confirming the new ministry’s appointments, a process Zarif likely anticipated would reject his candidacy, potentially harming his political future.

A favourable political climate

Secondly, amid escalating tensions following Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination, fears of an impending conflict with Israel — and by extension, the West — might lead to a governmental deadlock, prompting Zarif to step back, perhaps waiting for a more favourable political climate.

Zarif is also a published author, with two significant works to his name. His first book, “His Excellency Ambassador,” is a Q&A compilation about his diplomatic tenure in New York, translated into Arabic. His second book, “The Energy of Patience,” details his experiences as a foreign minister from 2013 to 2021. Published this year in Farsi and already in its third printing, it suggests a receptive audience for Zarif’s perspectives in Iran.

Known among hardliners as one of the “New York Boys,” Zarif and his group maintain Western leanings without explicit declarations. In recent years, he has expressed his views through lectures and writings, advocating for a revolution that, while rooted in religion, transcends literal interpretations of sacred texts.

His ideology, which might be described as a “religious Iranian nationalist movement,” champions the oppressed without directly engaging in their struggles.

Iran’s military interventions in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine are seen as draining Iranian resources without yielding significant economic or political benefits. In his book The Energy of Patience, Zarif argues that while the Iranian revolution can have moral influence, it should not rely on military means. He advocates for Iranian diplomacy to adopt a strategy of “smiling lips and conscious malice.”

Zarif contends that leadership blind to the lessons of the past is doomed to repeat its mistakes, echoing sentiments from Henry Kissinger’s Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy, which says that leaders who do not study history are doomed to fail. Whether this is a coincidence, or a reflection of similar methodologies is open to interpretation.

Although Zarif aligns broadly with the nationalist-Islamist currents, his interpretation of geopolitical dynamics sets him apart. For instance, he attributes Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait to the Iraqi regime’s frustration over Iran’s refusal to renegotiate the 1975 treaty signed with the Shah, a quest for maritime access that illogically led to the Kuwait invasion, according to Zarif.

Iran’s period of sanctions

Zarif also contends that despite the significant resources Iran has invested in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, the returns have been economically insufficient compared to countries like Turkey. He notes that while Iran supported Iraq during its isolation, post-Saddam Iraq did not reciprocate during Iran’s own period of sanctions.

For example, despite Iranian support, Syria endorsed an Arab League statement condemning the alleged occupation of Gulf islands. Zarif criticises Iraqi Shiite leaders for not backing Iran in dialogues with the West and states, “Iraq and Syria will not be our allies against the Arabs.”

This raises a good question: Are there supporters of the Iranian nationalist movement inside Iran?

The answer appears to be mostly yes. Zarif and the “New York Boys” are active in universities and among the elite, suggesting that we might be witnessing the early stages of a shift toward a national state model, albeit gradually, while still upholding revolutionary principles.

Zarif seems to be banking on the awareness of Iranian youth, who are inspired by the successful experiences of their neighbours and wish to replicate them in Iran.

Final Note: All possibilities remain open for Iran if it chooses to engage in armed, direct, and prolonged conflict in the Middle East.

Mohammad Alrumaihi is an author and Professor of Political Sociology at Kuwait University