At least 35 suspected insurgents were killed in air strikes on Friday in Afghanistan. Coinciding with the week of the 16th anniversary of the US-led invasion, the bombing comes as the country stands at a critical crossroads.
While fragile gains have been made since the Taliban’s fall in November 2001, the nation still faces a daunting array of economic, security and political risks. And in a major reversal of his previous campaign pledges, United States President Donald Trump recently announced his plans to entrench US military involvement in the country.
His “new regional approach”, which has strong elements of continuity of former president Barack Obama’s strategy, is aimed at “getting the Taliban to the negotiating table”. The Trump team has made clear that Pakistan is central to this approach, with India playing an upgraded role too. The US president also said week before last that, within Afghanistan, combat limits on US soldiers “have been removed” and there appears intensified emphasis on air strikes. It was announced last week, for instance, that the number of air attacks carried out by US and Nato forces in September hit a seven-year high with some 751 bombs dropped — a 50 per cent jump since August.
The single biggest challenge still facing the Afghan government is the internal security situation. Since 2009 alone, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has recorded some 23,000 conflict-related deaths and 41,000 injuries, with some 70 per cent of the people in major cities residing in makeshift camps, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council.
In the midst of this chaos, many Afghans are leaving the country. In 2015 alone, more than a quarter of a million refugees and migrants arriving in Europe were from the country, second only behind Syrians, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
US military officials have asserted that the balance between the Taliban and Afghan-government led-forces has effectively become a stalemate, despite the foreign military losses by the end of 2014, which amounted to some 3,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has emphasised this point, asserting that “we may not win, but neither will [the Taliban]”, underlining that the Trump team wants to make battlefield victory impossible for the Taliban.
Currently, the foreign force includes around 8,500 US military personnel, which will be raised by around 4,000 troops under Trump’s plans, and Washington has also asked Nato to contribute about 1,000 extra troops to the theatre too. This foreign footprint remains vital towards ensuring training and cohesion for the approximately 350,000-strong Afghan police and military personnel, which may otherwise disintegrate. Fears have been repeatedly raised that the present foreign force — currently around a 15th of the previously 150,000-strong combat presence — is not big enough. US Senator John McCain has, for instance, said that the international drawdown has left the country vulnerable to a Taliban upsurge.
Hence, the reason why another priority of the Afghan government has been advancing reconciliation and peace talks with the Taliban. This is a process where influence of neighbouring powers — especially Pakistan — could be the key.
On the economic front, the news is not good either, despite the massive foreign aid committed to the country. Reconstruction has been slow, unemployment remains above 40 per cent and more than a million Afghans are internally displaced, with well over three million more refugees believed to be in Pakistan and Iran.
While it is estimated that Washington has spent more than $100 billion (Dh367.8 billion) on Afghan reconstruction since 2001, more than the cost of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after the Second World War, this has not been optimally utilised. It is reported, for instance, that around four-fifths of funds have been given to US organisations in military/security and maintenance contracts and consultancy projects. It is also clear that, since 2001, the economy has not been diversified enough from drug exports such as opium and heroin, despite the fact that the country has abundant natural resources — gas, minerals and oil — with an estimated value of some $3 trillion.
A related problem is corruption with Transparency International ranking Afghanistan as the third most corrupt state in the world.
In the midst of this difficult picture, there remains cause for optimism, not least because numerous fragile gains remain in place from the unseating of the Taliban regime in 2001.
One qualified success is the country’s fledgling democracy. Despite the problems afflicting the country, its national unity government has survived several years after a landmark power-sharing agreement was reached in 2014 between President Ashraf Gani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. This followed a disputed presidential ballot between Gani and Abdullah when up to a million votes were thrown out for fraud. The creation of the national unity government, and the election of Gani, represented the first democratic transfer of power in the country’s history. While there have been significant tensions between Gani and Abdullah, that could still explode, the fact that the national unity government has not collapsed has helped consolidate the legitimacy of the new post-Taliban political system.
Other gains include Afghanistan’s accession to the World Trade Organisation and wider moves to revive economic links with the outside world, including the modern Silk Road — a new rail route connecting the country to China and Central Asia, and an electricity grid project across Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, there are greater numbers of children (especially girls) enrolled at schools — reportedly some ten million; there is greater recognition of women’s rights, and spread of technologies such as the internet and cell phones across the country.
Taken overall, Trump’s recommitment to Afghanistan comes as it stands at a major crossroads. While fragile gains have been secured since 2001, there remains a prospect of significantly greater political and economic instability if the reconciliation process with the Taliban cannot now be advanced through efforts of the Afghan government, neighbouring countries and other powers.
Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
