Qatar has a deep and intertwining connection with the Afghan Taliban that goes back to 2013 and even long before that. Over time, Doha has sought to position itself as the interlocutor in an attempt to get the Afghan peace process going and in order to draw the different warring factions together.
After 2013, Qatar became a sort of “middle home” to Taliban officials, who were brought to Qatar after a long search for them by the United States and the Afghanistan government. The idea was to engage them so that peace and stability could be restored in the country.
Eventually, it emerged that the Taliban had agreed to meet in Qatar. A “Taliban office”, that would serve as a point of contact with the government back home, was soon established in Qatar.
However, the office became a bone of contention as soon as it came into being.
The Afghan government was upset because “the political bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” was embossed on the office, giving the impression that this was an embassy representing the country. It also became clear the peace process was reaching nowhere. It was deadlocked, with the Taliban simply playing for time.
Therefore, there was no longer any need for Doha to continue to host them. The Taliban presence in Qatar became an excuse. And today, it is “unclear” whether the office remains open or not.
The Taliban presence in Qatar became even more frustrating when the “war on terror” was launched because they had long been on the US terror list and were seen as aiding and abetting Al Qaida and providing a safe heaven for its leader Osama Bin Laden, who was finally killed by the Americans in Pakistan.
At the Riyadh summit in May 2017, US President Donald Trump re-emphasised his commitment to go after extremist groups like Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Al Qaida, Taliban, Hamas and Hezbollah — all of whom had relations with Qatar.
Under the new US administration, Taliban were no longer seen as potential peace partners to be wooed — a position that was perhaps in keeping with the views of the Afghan government, which was never too pleased with incorporating Taliban in the political process and structure of the country.
Today, it can be safely argued that as one door was closed on the Taliban (that ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s), another one remained opened, or was at least kept ajar through Qatar. Given the dangers of extremism in the region, this was a move fraught with risks.
Qatar lies strategically in the Gulf close to Saudi Arabia in its hinterland, Bahrain to its north and the UAE to its south. The Gulf powers are correct to express their anxiety over Doha’s willingness to host extremist voices in their neighbourhood.
If Taliban’s Doha office can now be shuttered, it will show Doha’s commitment regarding the ceasing of support to such groups, refusing to host them on its territory and stopping bank-rolling them.
Qatar’s Taliban connection is particularly serious. Their existence in Qatar may be a way for opening up greater channels to finance them and turn them into a threat to topple the government of Afghanistan and once again assume power.
If Qatar cracks down on the Taliban, it will be an effective signal to the other groups that Doha has reportedly financed over the years. The move will also be a serious indication that the foreign policy of Qatar is tipping over and aligned with the rest of the Gulf.
The quartet of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt must keep a close watch because on the other side, Iran is also courting the Taliban — no doubt for its own political ends.
Marwan Asmar is a commentator based in Amman. He has long worked in journalism and has a PhD in Political Science from Leeds University in the UK.
