As soon as Storm Huda swept across much of the Middle East, the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem received a fair share of terrible weather. The polar storm was somewhat uncommon in that part of the world. Also uncommon was the valiant response of the Palestinian National Authority(PNA) security forces to it. They sprung to the rescue in ways that, generally speaking, were unusually considerate.
Trained by the US and other American allies in the region, PNA forces are often affiliated with security coordination with Israel, and frequent crackdown on Palestinian protests. And also torture. Their human rights violations are well documented.
The charm offensive, however, followed another battle, which is led by PNA President Mahmoud Abbas, internationally. Indeed, a week earlier, on January 2, Palestine’s United Nations envoy, Riyad Mansour formally requested membership at the International Criminal Court (ICC).
“We are seeking justice for all the victims that have been killed by Israel, the occupying power,” he said.
Mansour offered little by way of explaining why Palestine’s membership of the Rome Statue (through which the ICC is governed) was delayed in the first place; of why no justice was ever sought for thousands of victims in Gaza, and many in the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem, although such membership would have been granted much earlier.
In fact, in 2012, Palestine’s status at the UN was upgraded, from an observer entity to an ‘observer state’. The move was largely symbolic, but it had one practical benefit — the coveted membership at the ICC. Finally, a measure of justice was possible.
Yet, for two years, Abbas delayed. Not only did Abbas hesitate and carry on with the same tired charade of a peace process, but he seemed keen on ensuring that Palestinian unity, even if achieved politically, remained pointless and ineffective. The delay shielded Israel from possible accountability in its major offensive against Gaza in 2008-09, and delayed investigation and due justice for the victims of the last summer offensive, dubbed Operation Protective Edge. In both wars, over 3,600 Palestinians, mostly civilians were killed. The wounded were about 20,000.
Certainly, Abbas had numerous chances to admonish Israel in the past, or at least exert some pressure and push for accountability. Instead, he kept his faith in Washington, playing the wait-and-see game of Secretary of State John Kerry centred on a single premise: pleading with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to change his ways and freeze colony construction, which never happened.
Conventional analysis suggests that Abbas’ ICC move was the direct outcome of the expected failure of a UN Security Council resolution that was put to vote a few days earlier. The US, Israel’s main political guardian was, naturally expected to veto the resolution, which would have imposed a deadline on Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian territories. The US used the veto, and only eight member states voted in approval. A day later, Abbas signed the application for the ICC, among others; the following day, the application was formally submitted.
But a ‘shift in strategy’ it was not.
Confusion and contradictions
Clarity at last; right? Wrong. Statements followed Abbas’ exercise of the ‘nuclear option’, were muddled and confusing.
Abbas’ spokesman, Nabeel Abu Rudeina promised that another resolution would be presented to the Security Council soon.
Two days later, Abbas clarified his strategy, which was “totally opposed” by Hamas as “political foolishness”.
“We’ll go again to the Security Council, why not? Perhaps after a week,” Abbas told officials at a conference in Ramallah on January 4. He stated that his authority intends to “submit the resolution again, a third time or even a fourth time.”
The ambiguity continued. On January 5, chief negotiator, Saeb Erekat echoed an earlier threat by Abbas himself (made in April 2014) to dismantle the PNA. Senior Fatah official, Jibril Rajoub rebutted in an interview with the Monitor saying the exact opposite: “The PNA will never be disbanded. The PNA was and will remain a national achievement and national necessity. Dissolving it is not on the agenda of the political leadership.”
The non-strategy
The current political strategy of the PNA, or lack thereof, reflects the unique qualities of Abbas himself, and is a testimony to his impressive abilities to find the right political balance, ultimately aimed at assuring his survival at the helm.
So what is Abbas up to exactly? Since the late 1970’s, Abbas began his quest for an elusive peace with Israel, which ultimately lead to the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993. It was Abbas himself that signed the accords on behalf of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).
Let alone Oslo failed to meet a single deadline including the final status agreement, which was meant to actualise in May 1999; it introduced a bizarre culture of revolutionaries-turned-millionaires, operating within the confines of militarily-occupied Palestinian territories.
Year after year, the corrupt PNA maintained its privileges as Israel strengthened its occupation. It was a massive barter that seemed to suit the interests of Israel, selected Palestinians, and of course, the US itself, which, along with its allies funded the whole scheme.
Despite his ‘flexibility’, late leader Yasser Arafat still had political boundaries that he would not cross. Thus, in 2003, Abbas, the ‘moderate’ was imposed on Arafat by both Israel and the US as a prime minister, a post that seemed to have been invented with the sole purpose of containing Arafat’s control. Following a brief power struggle, Abbas resigned. Shortly afterwards, Arafat died from possible poisoning, and Abbas returned to power, this time unchallenged.
Abbas’ mandate, starting January 15, 2004, should have ended in early 2009. But he decided to extend it by another year, and another, and has since then ruled over the fragmented, occupied nation, with the help of Israel, without a shred of legitimacy, except what he, and his supporters bestow on him.
It has been almost exactly a decade since Abbas ruled over Palestinians. They were years of tragedy, political failure, economic crisis, disunity, and unprecedented corruption. Yes, the 80-year-old leader has survived, partly because Israel found him the most compromising of all potential Palestinian leaders (he wouldn’t end security coordination with Israel even after he himself described as the genocidal war on Gaza); the Americans too wanted him to remain in his post, for there is yet to be an alternative leader.
At best, Abbas was a political manager, whose management strategy is predicated on finding political balances, and catering to those with greater power and influence.
Following the expiration of Kerry’s deadline of April 29, 2014 aimed at reaching a final status agreement, and another major Israeli war on Gaza that ignited massive anger in the West Bank, Abbas’ burden was too heavy to bear.
To create distractions, and to deny the Gaza resistance any claim on victory, he began to hunt for his own ‘victory’, which he would then promote back in Ramallah, amid major fanfare and celebration by his supporters.
And after much delay and haggling, Abbas was forced by sheer circumstance to resort to the ICC, not to criminalise Israel, but to win political leverage among his people, and to send a message to Israel, the US and others that he still matters.
The problem with Abbas, however, is bigger than Abbas himself. The ailment lies in the very political culture and class that sustained and benefited from political corruption for over 20 years.
Ramzy Baroud is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author of several books and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. He is currently completing his PhD studies at the University of Exeter. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (Pluto Press, London).
