Monarchy remains a distant dream in Iraq

In 2000, the world stood by and remarked at how Bashar Al-Assad succeeded his father, the late Hafez Al-Assad and became president of Syria. Since then, that practice has surfaced worldwide. George W. Bush became President of the USA, Joseph Kabila became President of the Congo, and Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of ex-President Ahmad Sukarno, became President of Indonesia.

Other offsprings, the sons of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Egyptian President Gamal Mubarak, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and Libyan leader Sayf Al-Islam Al-Gaddafi, are also grooming for leadership in their respective countries. Perhaps it has become more feasible for republican regimes to secure succession from father to son (or daughter) than former monarchies.

Recently, two royals have been in the international spotlight as potential candidates for their countries' former monarchial system: ex-King Ahmad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and the Prince of Iraq, Sheriff Ali Ibin Al-Hussein.

Zahir Shah, who returned to Kabul earlier last week after 29 years in exile, is too old for the job and apparently, would rather serve as a symbol of state to his people than an actual sovereign. The case of Sheriff Ali, however, is different.

Sheriff Ali

Sheriff Ali was born in Baghdad in 1956 during the era of his cousin King Faisal II. In July 1958 the military overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and butchered all of its leaders, including Faisal and his uncle Abdul Illah.

Ali, still a baby, managed to escape with some royals and has since lived in London. He created the Constitutional Monarchial Movement, which surfaced following the 1990-1991 Gulf War and joined the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a opposition coalition that is funded, supported, and based in the U.S.

Ali conducted numerous visits to Washington, allied himself with exiled Iraqi politicians, and marketed himself as the new king of Iraq. Almost everyone, including the Iraqi people themselves, had never heard of Sheriff Ali before. He was too young when leaving Iraq in 1958 and for political reasons, has never been to Baghdad since.

The Hashemite royal, whose chances of succeeding as a leader were high two years ago, faces serious challenges today. First, propaganda for his cause comes from the United States, at a period of boiling Arab anger against America. No one, not even the Iraqi people who are at odds end with their regime, would welcome a U.S.-imposed king in Baghdad.

The U.S. media has marketed Ali as the Hamid Karzai of Iraq, but the parallel between both men is different. Karzai is more of a seasoned statesman than Ali, has greater popularity among his people and does not rule in a country entrenched in anti-U.S. sentiment.

American man

Other problems facing Sheriff Ali are discordant rule within the opposition movements and the lack of proper organisation. The INC, which relies on funds from the U.S., was virtually crippled in December 2001 when President Bush decided to cut down on expenses and lower expenditure on the Iraqi opposition.

Ali, who is still to spend the $97 million approved by Congress in 1998, urged Bush to re-consider. Another setback the Hashemite royal would face today would be legitimate Arab backing. In 1990 he might have succeeded in rallying a united Arab front behind his leadership, when Iraqi-Arab relations were at its worse, but matters are different today.

Iraq has made its peace with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and most Gulf countries. Even Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's traditional ally, has expressed its reservations about a U.S.-imposed leadership in Baghdad.

The Syrians have categorically refused the post-Saddam model, and President Bashar expressed his feelings openly in a February 2001 interview with the Jordanian weekly al-Majd saying, "Today they want to remove President Saddam, tomorrow they will want to remove Bashar."

Libya and Egypt, both which have exiled royals living abroad, would feel threatened by the return of Sheriff Ali. This would prompt the families of former King Idris and King Farouk, who have long been making demands to a throne, to voice similar demands.

Iran, which has its own reservations about a royal return, would fear that the descendants of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, would also make their demands for a political role in Tehran.

Although their relations with Saddam are not cordial, they would prefer to deal with him, as they had done since 1979, than to deal with a pro-U.S. regime.

At least, the Iranians and Saddam find a common enemy in the U.S. - something that would vanish in the case of Ali's assumption of the throne.

In such an isolated environment, Sheriff Ali has one potential regional ally - Jordan, which is ruled by King Abdullah II, a distant cousin whom he probably has never met. The Jordanian royals, who have historically backed the Iraqi Hashemites, did so in periods of tranquillity or when the monarchy was better situated than it is today.

The Hashemite family in Amman, since the passing of King Hussein, has lacked proper leadership and suffered one setback after another.

Throughout his reign, the late King Hussein used to personally interact with the Jordanians, mingle with their youth, and journey to their camps to have Arabic coffee with their elders.

Himself a Bedouin at heart, Hussein "spoke the language of the Palestinians" and knew how to pull their strings when needed. Lacking his father's charm, ability, and connections, Abdullah has increasingly alienated himself from his subjects.

Rather than hear out their worries and encourage them by words yet contain them by action, Abdullah took an outright aggressive policy that damaged his reputation. Hussein used to promise the Jordanians a better life, yet never gave it to them.

Abdullah has failed at promising, and failed at giving. It would be too difficult, in fact impossible, for him to sell the Jordanians a scenario that markets the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the imposition of a U.S.-backed leader.

Hashemite credibility, due to Abdullah's latest refusal to break ties with Israel as the Palestinian onslaught continues, is at its worse in years. The Hashemites can barely support their own throne in Amman and would not stick their neck out for a Hashemite regime in Baghdad.

In the past, both regimes synchronised with one another in a regional bid to create Hashemite hegemony over an Arab kingdom in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. These dreams died out when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958 and it is unlikely that they will re-appear today.

Also, if a Hashemite regime were to be re-imposed in Baghdad, some Hashemite royals in Amman see themselves as more worthy of the post of king than Sheriff Ali. His cousin Shariff Ra'ad, the grandson of Faisal I's youngest brother, is also a survivor of the 1958 monarchy, and although living in Amman ever since, has laid claims to the 44-year old lost throne of Baghdad.

Nevertheless, despite all setbacks, Sheriff Ali seems confident that the days of Saddam Hussein are numbered. He has appeared frequently on Arab satellite channels and said that Washington will not seek to prop up a puppet regime in Baghdad, but rather, "would let the Iraqi people chose fo