Interview: 'The real test of the recent truce will be summer next year'

Pakistan Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali's Eid ceasefire last week has raised hopes once again that India and Pakistan are moving into negotiation mode. But experts here – both military and strategic – are sceptical.

Brahma Chellaney, with the think-tank Centre for Policy Research (CPR) in New Delhi feels that the ceasefire is but an interlude before the next rupture takes place, another false dawn. Following are excepts of the interview.

Gulf News: Does the ceasefire offer by Pakistan mark a substantial change in India-Pakistan relations? Or is it just going to be another false start?
Brahama Chellaney: The ceasefire allows both nations to take the high moral ground without either side giving up anything. What has been achieved is the easy part — a ceasefire from the onset of winter when in any case, blizzards in Siachen bar fighting and snow along the Line of Control makes infiltration arduous. The real test would be whether the ceasefire would hold through the next summer, when weather greatly facilitates cross-border activities. The experience the world over is that it is easy to announce a ceasefire but difficult to maintain one in the face of violations. When a violation takes place, the blame game overwhelms the original intent in declaring truce.

Is Prime Minister Vajpayee's peace offer made in April this year a rhetorical ploy or is India serious about mending fences with Pakistan?
Ever since becoming prime minister, Vajpayee has been been fixated on peace with Pakistan. The Lahore Declaration in early 1999 was his best and most promising effort. Unfortunately, war in Kargil followed. Another peace effort by Vajpayee also backfired when in May 2001 he announced a surprise invitation to General Musharraf for talks in Agra.

Vajpayee's fresh peace overture to Pakistan in April this year appeared motivated by international events – his personal revulsion against US unilateralism and his consequent desire to build greater strategic room for India regionally. The key question is: What made the military regime in Islamabad suddenly reverse course at this point and accept a ceasefire largely on Indian terms? If the factor that prompted Islamabad to suddenly reverse course can be identified, it deserves to be bolstered.

What are America's stakes in India-Pakistan entente?
The US is exerting strong pressure on Musharraf because of the resurgence of the Taliban in southeastern Afghanistan and the Pakistani passport found on the body of one of the bombers in Istanbul. There is also concern in Washington that some of the foreign fighters making their way to Iraq are coming from the Pakistan-Afghanistan belt. Musharraf has been rattled by the tough Chinese talk on Pakistani terrorism and by Tony Blair's hard-hitting words on Kashmir as a "battleground" in the global war on terror. It could be a move to buy time.

Are you saying the Pakistan ceasfire offer is a temporary respite?
Musharraf would very much like Vajpayee to travel to Islamabad for the planned Saarc summit. If Vajpayee doesn't go, the summit would collapse. But if Vajpayee goes, it gives Pakistan an opportunity to hold direct talks with him on bilateral issues – something Islamabad has been seeking for long. So between now and January, Islamabad can be expected to do nothing to queer the pitch for the visit.

Will the economic advantages of Saarc convince India and Pakistan to put behind their mutual hostility and distrust?
Saarc is a stunted process that holds little promise of turning into a dynamic institution encouraging economic integration among the nations of South Asia. India is the only nation that shares common frontiers with the other Saarc member-states, while they are united in their concern over India's size and dominance. Given this element, India can hardly advance its interests in the Saarc framework. It's ironical Vajpayee should be keen to visit Islamabad.