Comment: Kuwait and its many promises

When Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait in 1990, the country's exiled rulers promised that genuine democratisation would be created once the country was liberated from occupation. Although much has been accomplished in the decade since, few of the many pledges materialised.

Still, in the aftermath of dramatic changes in Iraq, Kuwaiti leaders are reluctant to introduce sorely needed political reforms.

Kuwait restored its elected majlis (parliament) after liberation, but continues to hesitate in granting suffrage to women and the bidoon. The dilemma facing the bidun jinsiyyah (stateless persons) is far more complicated, because these neglected Arabs could potentially represent an important constituency.

The vast majority of the bidun - although born in Kuwait - cannot produce papers tracing historical residency. Consequently, they are denied citizenship, and without legal proof, are also denied basic entitlements that Kuwaiti "nationality" grants.

Ironically, most Kuwaiti bidun proved their loyalty during the 1990 Iraqi invasion, when they stayed put and defended the country.

While a few sided with Iraqis, and others opted to stay because returning without papers would have jeopardised life-long earnings, legions joined the resistance. Denying such "patriots" basic rights is unfair and may, in the long-term, create additional political difficulties.

Today, past promises to these long-term residents are in abeyance, and some suggest that they do not factor in Kuwait's future residency and citizenship plans. Yet, with "democracy" on everyone's mind in Washington, what are Kuwait's options?

Kuwait welcomed the forced removal of Saddam Hussain from power, as it was a forgone conclusion that the country would host a majority of US and British forces.

Compared to other Gulf states, a more extensive segment of the Kuwaiti population supported the war, with some die-hard journalists calling on the leaders to redirect overseas investments toward the US and its allies.

It should come as no surprise that Kuwait will probably write off most of Iraq's debt, one of the main causes of the 1991 war. Kuwait is also poised to provide financial and material assistance both to Western forces deployed in the country and Iraqis.

Still, the Kuwaiti willingness to pursue pro-US views is largely based on the Al Sabah impression that they are vulnerable, despite undeniable success in removing their hegemonic nemesis in Baghdad.

Kuwaitis know that even without Saddam, Iraqi grievances against them will need to be guaranteed by US power. Equally critical for the Al Sabah is that no Iraqi government should emerge to "hijack" their own pro-US posture.

For Kuwaitis, an American tilt towards Baghdad would severely obstruct a decade-long effort to disregard Iraqi complaints about the treatment of Kuwaiti minorities, including the bidun and the Shiites. Although the Shiites comprise less than 30 per cent of the population and are better off than their co-religionists in other GCC states, they continue to face discrimination.

The Al Sabah know that the Iraqi claim to Kuwait predates the 1990 occupation, and that most Iraqis are certain that London unfairly detached Kuwait from Iraq after World War I.

How this interpretation will translate into policy is too early to determine, but Kuwaitis must ask themselves whether Washington would always defend the country's territorial integrity, if Iraq's government is democratic as well as pro-US.

When Peter Carlson of The Washington Post recently asked Sheikh Ahmad Fahd Al Sabah, Kuwait's minister of energy, whether the country could become a democratic country, the official replied that Kuwait was already a democracy.

Carlson persisted: "But what about that deal where the emir appoints his brother prime minister?"

Sheikh Ahmad responded: "This is the institution that was approved by the Kuwaiti people..."
Reportedly, he then paused, and added: "I don't know about the future." This telling exchange may well be illustrative of the need to strengthen democratic institutions rather than simply be satisfied with regional changes.

Joseph Kéchichian, author of several books, is an analyst on Gulf and Middle East affairs.