Comment: Baath Party's legacy gains momentum

Between 1968 and 2003, Saddam Hussain stood at the top of an institutional pyramid that rested on two pillars: the Iraqi military and the Baath Party.

Both crumbled as Baghdad fell on April 9. Surprisingly, US administrators formally abolished the only two working organisations shortly thereafter, ostensibly to eradicate visible remnants of the old regime. De-Baathification was the order of the day even if no alternatives existed to replace them.

Seven months later, the Coalition Provisional Authority is actively seeking to reintroduce elements of the former military into Iraq's newly created army, if for no other reason than to ensure a modicum of internal security. There is little talk of the Baath Party but it may well be useful to ask whether some technocrats who served in the party – especially in the bureaucracy that managed various institutions on a day-today basis – must now return as well to ensure sorely needed internal stability.

Founded in 1943 in Damascus, the Baath promoted Arab unity with a Soviet-style socialist party structure, before Britain and France granted independence to Iraq and Syria. Ironically, party ideologues – both Sunni Muslim and Orthodox Christian – opted for secular initiatives, and bitterly fought with rival communist parties throughout the Middle East. The Iraqi and Syrian branches also fought with each other before retrenching into their respective political cocoons.

Excesses of the regime

Dominated by Sunni Muslims, the Baghdad branch ruled a country that has a Shiite majority, which rejected and continues to oppose a separation of church and state. It ruled Iraq for several months in 1963, was crushed by a counterrevolutionary movement, but returned with a vengeance on July 14, 1968. After the "coup," Saddam Hussain altered the original Baath ideology and cracked down on regime opponents.

On May 16, 2003, the top US civilian administrator, L. Paul Bremer, issued a decree barring top-ranking Baath Party members from any public position. US forces purged anyone with Baath contacts in holding posts in universities, hospitals or even minor government appointments because, allegedly, many of its leaders were responsible for the excesses of the regime.

Initial reports insisted that 15,000 to 30,000 party "officials" would be banned from ever participating in any American designed Iraqi government.

The idea to abolish the Baath Party probably originated in the so-called "Free Iraqi Fighters" led by Ahmed Chalabi. For various reasons, including his desire to fill the political vacuum that was created by a collapsing regime, Chalabi was in a hurry, and actually persuaded his optimistic backers that cleaning up all Baathists would take a mere six weeks. It has not.

Today, Chalabi and many of his appointed colleagues within the Iraqi Governing Council have fallen out of favor, especially as a sustained resistance to the US-led occupation emerged. Is the Baath Party responsible for this opposition? Has it, in fact, withered away when L. Paul Bremer so decreed?

Of the top 55 wanted Baathists, 15, including Saddam Hussain, remain at large.

Under the circumstances, stabilising Iraq is likely to be difficult, as the party's legacy of guerrilla-style resistance – a surprise to some – gains momentum. The Baath will probably haunt Iraqi politics for a while as along as the unpopular occupation continues.

It is for this reason that the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council recently announced that it would study the reinstatement of some Baath Party members to their previous jobs. Most believe that a new regime, no matter how closely aligned with the United States, will still heavily depend on "Baathists" to manage the country.

Joseph Kéchichian, author of several books, is an expert on the Gulf and Middle East affairs.