Chakwal Diary: An election alliance to beat all others

"He's still tight with us in the war against terror and that's what I appreciate. He understands that we've got to keep Al Qaida on the run... and I appreciate his strong support."
President Bush about his friend General Musharraf.

No, the strongest alliance is not between the Quislings of the Q League and General Headquarters. It is not between this or that political party. Dominating the national as much as the election scene is the strategic partnership between the Bush White House and the Musharraf Presidency.

Everything else in Pakistan is subordinate and secondary to this overwhelming equation.

Only the very gullible will be taken in by the mild queasiness the State Department every now and then expresses about General Musharraf's cavalier treatment of such things as the constitution.

Cutting through the fog it should be clear even to non-conspiracy theorists that the Americans are backing Musharraf to the hilt. Why? Because he is their man and his presence at the helm of affairs remains vital to the Americans' unfinished business in Afghanistan.

Who else could match the zeal of the Pakistan army in keeping such a watchful eye on the Pak-Afghan border, largely at American behest? Which other country would have given such a free run to the FBI and other American agencies to set up shop within its borders and help catch, again with unmatched zeal, America's putative enemies?

No wonder American officials are so effusive. "We think they are doing a very splendid job in the very difficult tribal areas... I was able to again thank President Musharraf and his very excellent army and the police forces."

This from the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, after meeting Musharraf in Islamabad last week. In New Delhi he didn't meet the prime minister or couldn't. No such problem here in Islamabad where the usual red carpet for American officials, no matter their status, was rolled out for him.

Now comes the clincher, General Tommy Franks' rather candid statement at the Bagram air base in Afghanistan that over time the 'war against terrorism' may need to be extended beyond the frontiers of Afghanistan. To Iran or the states of Central Asia? You must be kidding.

The country that fits the job description can only be Pakistan. His next sentence made this clear: "The relationship we have with states surrounding Afghanistan will permit us over time to do (this) work."

Pakistan has a strong claim to being the strongest American client in the region. Karzai of course is the most obvious puppet. But then he can't take care of his own security. How can the Pentagon entrust him with anything bigger?

From Islamabad have come furious denials: there was no need for American or other foreign troops to enter Pakistan in pursuit of the elusive shadows of Al Qaida, the implication being that Pakistan's own troops were sufficient for the job.

But a peep into the Pentagon's thinking has been provided. Pakistan is being thought of as a possible theatre of future operations. Pakistan had better be on its guard. There is a Punjabi saying that the friendship and enmity of the police are equally bad. You lose out in both ways. Is it more dangerous to be America's friend or its enemy?

Yet the cruel paradox remains that for all its back-bending services, Pakistan has not received the recognition and appreciation it deserves. Look at Israel, fixed firmly and permanently in the eye of American favour. Look at Pakistan, treated so shabbily. Dollops of aid, yes, patronising words of praise, certainly, but hardly adequate to the great services Pakistan's military rulers have rendered.

Look at the way Pakistan is treated. In deciding between India and Pakistan in recent months it is India that the U.S. has favoured and Pakistan on whom it has leaned. Every time an American official comes calling Pakistan has to put up with lectures on cross-border infiltration. Not a word about the fundamentals of the Kashmir dispute.

Am I suggesting that Pakistan be treated like Israel? Well, we have graduated to a class of loyalty where our services should be put at par with those of America's closest allies. For such services, why not Israeli wages? But we remain stuck in the scullery, just next to the servants' quarters.

Consider again the mellifluous phrasing of Armitage's latest certificate of approval: "I was able to again thank President Musharraf and his very excellent army and police forces." Any red faces in the higher echelons of command? I doubt it. We took care of such minor matters as injured honour or qualms of conscience a long time ago.

There is no denying the national security apparatus's extraordinary talent for excess. In the heyday of Pakistan's Afghan involvement this apparatus oversold the extent of its prowess. Just as it oversold the capabilities and implications of the country's nuclear programme.

In the aftermath of September 11 the same establishment has undersold Pakistan, allowing itself to be fobbed off with small change.

Any surprises in this? Hardly. The pattern is depressingly familiar and consistent. What did Pakistan get for being the major factor in the American-sponsored coalition (back in the Eighties) which fought the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? What did it get for acting as the bridge between the U.S. and China in 1971? What did it get for being America's most allied ally during the Cold War when anti-communist alliances were all the rage and Pakistan was a member of CENTO and SEATO?

It's the same story again but no matter. By going the whole hog with the Americans in their "war on terror" Musharraf ended his international isolation.

At the end of it all Pakistan may be left wondering what it has got for its pains but Musharraf's own position as an internationally-accepted leader has been secured. Collective confusion, individual gain.

No doubt gaffes like the referendum have been committed, acting upon bad political advice being one of this government's foremost problems. Open-heart surgery has been done on that sorely-abused document, the Pakistan constitution.

But Musharraf has got away with them because of two decisive factors: the command of Pakistan's divisions and American approval. This is a deadly combination, proof against all forms of domestic opposition.

Imagine if Musharraf had been Robert Mugabe. He would have been dragged over the coals for much less.

The bargain then is this: external dependence, internal autonomy. We are your devoted fellow-travellers abroad but leave us free to do what we want at home. This has always been American policy in the Middle East towards its Arab allies. It has been American policy towards Pakistani strongmen in the past and it is the American approach to Musharraf now.

The October elections are just a blip on the U.S.'s radar screen. The Americans want them to take place not so much for the sake of the Pakistani people – such altruism not entering imperial calculations – as for keeping their friend Musharraf on a short leash. It helps to have a friendly strongman in place. But it also helps to keep his power circumscribed so that he does not step too far out of line.

The U.S. wants a dem