US–Iran conflict enters new phase of political attrition

During the initial months of the Iranian-US conflict, Washington’s primary objective was to weaken Tehran’s military capabilities and strengthen deterrence.

On the other hand, Iran sought to raise the costs of the conflict by targeting maritime navigation and energy infrastructure across the region, while demonstrating its ability to prolong the conflict.

Today, however, as the conflict enters its fifth month, the two opponents are faced with a different dilemma.

The United States has partially achieved its key military objectives, such as degrading Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, weakening Iran’s air defence network, reducing Iran’s naval threat and limiting Tehran’s ability to reconstitute its forces.

Despite these military gains, at the strategic level, the United States has fallen short of compelling Iran to fundamentally alter its regional behaviour.

Tehran, on the other hand, has been relatively successful in raising the costs of the conflict globally, yet it continues to face mounting economic and military pressure that makes sustaining an open-ended confrontation increasingly costly.

The question being asked today is not, “Who will win the war?” but rather, “Who will determine the terms for ending the war?” The answer increasingly lies in what can be described as the phase of political attrition.

Political attrition is a phase in which the objectives shift from destroying the opponent’s military capabilities to undermining its political will, economic resilience, diplomatic position and negotiating leverage.

Thus, both sides aim to shape the political conditions under which any future settlement will be negotiated, rather than seeking decisive battlefield gains.

Contradictory situation

This dynamic explains what may appear to be a contradictory situation. While the United States and Iran exchange threats, they continue to signal the possibility of returning to negotiations.

The Donald Trump administration has indicated that it is willing to reach a new agreement if the right conditions are met. While Iranian officials deny engaging in negotiations, they have not ruled out indirect channels of communication or regional mediation.

This contradiction is intentional. It reflects a recurring pattern in crisis management, as military and media escalation are used to improve each party’s negotiating position rather than to trigger a full-scale confrontation.

Yet, as the conflict enters the phase of political attrition, escalation and diplomacy are no longer viewed as contradictory paths. Rather, they have become complementary instruments of the same strategy. Each side seeks to maximise pressure on its opponent while preserving the option of negotiations to shape the terms of any future settlement.

Evolution of US strategy

The US-Iran conflict’s transition to the political attrition phase is also reflected in the evolution of US strategy. During the initial stages of the conflict, Washington’s primary focus was on direct military deterrence. More recently, however, the Trump administration appears to be taking a more comprehensive approach by integrating military power with economic sanctions to further isolate the Iranian regime financially, while keeping open the option of negotiations on a new settlement. This approach reflects the US pursuit of intensified pressure on Tehran without enduring the costs of a full-scale war. On the other hand, Iran is seeking to demonstrate its ability to endure such political, economic and military pressure and negotiate any new settlement from a relatively strong position.

Another indicator of the political attrition phase is the growing role of regional actors in mediating the conflict. As mentioned earlier, neither the US nor Iran seeks a full-scale confrontation. Thus, third parties have become increasingly important in containing escalation while preserving channels of communication.

Although the political attrition phase can lower the risk of a full-scale war, it simultaneously creates the conditions for prolonged and unpredictable geostrategic competition. As long as Washington and Tehran are unwilling to make substantial concessions, the conflict is more likely to remain characterised by periodic crises, economic coercion, cyber operations, proxy activity and calculated military incidents. Thus, rather than settling the conflict, political attrition institutionalises it.

Consequences for regional countries

Another risk is that the uncertainty that comes with the political attrition phase carries consequences that extend beyond the two opponents. Regional countries remain exposed to unpredictable escalation, especially those whose economies and security rely on stable maritime routes and uninterrupted energy exports. Likewise, global markets continue to react not only to military developments but also to political messages from both sides.

Thus, the political attrition phase should not be seen as a less risky phase in the conflict. On the contrary, a prolonged conflict in the absence of a clear political framework increases the possibility that a single miscalculation, unintended military incident or proxy escalation could undermine conflict-containment efforts and trigger a full-scale war.

In addition, the absence of military operations does not necessarily indicate stability. Rather, it signals a shift towards a more complex and enduring form of conflict in which political endurance, economic resilience and diplomatic influence become as important as military deterrence.

In conclusion, the US-Iran conflict is no longer defined by military operations, but rather by a prolonged competition over political influence and strategic endurance.

The transition to political attrition reflects both sides’ recognition that military deterrence alone is not enough to achieve their long-term objectives. Thus, the future path of the conflict relies to a large degree on both sides’ ability to sustain political, economic and diplomatic pressure while shaping the conditions of any future settlement.

Whether the political attrition phase ultimately leads to a negotiated settlement or a renewed cycle of escalation will largely depend on how effectively both the United States and Iran manage the fine balance between coercion and diplomacy.

Sara Al Neyadi is a Senior Researcher at Trends Research and Advisory