The age of contained conflict is over. The Iran war is spiralling out of control

On July 20, Iranian strikes hit a power and water desalination plant in Kuwait. Firefighters battled the blaze while several power generation units were forced offline. About 470km away, in Bahrain, a hostile drone attacked the Kingdom’s air defence systems, targeting the civil air navigation equipment and overflight air traffic within the Bahrain Flight information Region. While officials said traffic was unaffected, Iran wished it to be so.

Days earlier a satellite and early warning station in Qatar was attacked. According to the Ministry of Interior a child suffered a minor injury from a falling shrapnel after intercepting the missile. In the same stretch, Jordan found itself amid several rounds of drones and missile fires. Early warning sirens and plumes of smoke took over the vibrant city of Aqaba, as strikes targeted US military positions in the country, killing several American troops.

Meanwhile the Iranian backed Houthis in Yemen opened a new front in the war, announcing a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, closing the Bab Al Mandab Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea, to Saudi-flagged and Saudi-bound shipping. By July 22, the threat had become action: the group claimed an attack on two Saudi oil tankers transiting through the Red Sea, setting both ablaze.

Five countries, five close allies to the United States, have all borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliatory attacks this week, whether from Iran directly or the proxies fighting in its orbit.

What ‘contained’ used to mean

The regional order that held for the past two decades relied on a fairly consistent logic. Wars stayed largely within defined geographic bounds, contained by international agreements and managed by international alliances.

Meanwhile, Iran built and backed proxies across the region, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen to various militias in Iraq, precisely so that its rivalries with the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states could be fought at arm’s length rather than head-on. Direct strikes between Tehran and Washington were rare, and even when they happened, they were carefully calibrated to avoid triggering a wider conflict.

Gulf States caught between a close ally and an unpredictable neighbour learned to live with a certain background level of tension that never quite tipped over into open conflict on their own territory. It was not the type of peace and de-escalation the region wanted but it was survivable, and it gave space for the region’s economies to function despite the risk sitting under the surface.

The battlefield has expanded

Today however, the war no longer stops at military or commercial targets. Look past the list of the capitals and sectors attacked, and you will see a pattern emerging. Water plants, civil aviation, and commercial shipping are being drawn into the equation one after the other and the consequences of it are being absorbed by countries who are not actually party to the conflict.

Much of that pattern started with Iran. Its repeated attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, following its closure of the waterway, is what pushed Washington to respond in kind. In a post on Truth Social, President Donald Trump vowed to “bomb and destroy” Iranian bridges or power plants for every ship targeted in Hormuz. On X, Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi answered, describing Iran’s defence doctrine as an eye for an eye. He warned that any attack on its infrastructure will trigger more attacks and only “expand the war”.

Ceasefires are not ceasing the fire

In the span of about 100 days the United States and Iran have ratified two separate agreements intending to halt hostilities. The first was a two-week ceasefire reached in early April through talks mediated by Pakistan. The second was more ambitious - a 14-point memorandum of understanding signed in mid-June aiming to move beyond a temporary ceasefire by establishing a broader framework for de-escalation. It included re-opening the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the US naval blockade on Iran, and setting out a roadmap for sanctions relief.

Yet, both agreements collapsed within weeks. The memorandum collapsed due to unresolved disagreements over freedom of navigation through Hormuz, and its collapse was followed by a new cycle of strikes, broadening the scope of the conflict and diminishing the chances of going back to the negotiation table.

Hence, if there is one thing to be learnt from this war it is that agreements today are becoming short-lived pauses between rounds of confrontation. None are rested on firm foundations, nor are they addressing the issues fuelling the conflict. Even negotiations have shifted from seeking a lasting settlement to buying time and preventing the next strike.

This is a habit that is not confined to the Iran track alone. This week in Washington D.C. President Trump met the Lebanese leader Joseph Aoun at the White House. During their discussions Trump pledged to support Lebanon. However, he offered no timeline for the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon despite facilitating a trilateral framework earlier in June promising to do so.

The pattern keeps recurring - agreements are signed, pledges are made but the mechanisms that would ensure their implementation are always left unfulfilled.

The longer this cycle continues, the higher the costs become for all sides involved, and the more difficult it becomes to contain the escalation itself. The United States, which has sought to contain the Iranian conflict while maintaining military pressure, is already facing growing financial and strategic burdens. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told a Senate committee this week that the Pentagon requires nearly $70 billion in additional funding for the war in Iran. Which underscores how quickly a conflict initially framed around limited objectives can evolve into a prolonged and a costly military commitment.

What does this mean for the Gulf?

If this war has exposed anything, it is that the Gulf is no longer distant from the way regional conflicts are fought. The repeated targeting of shipping lanes, air navigation systems, energy facilities, and water infrastructure highlights a dangerous erosion of the boundaries that once limited the impact of regional conflicts. It demonstrates how quickly a confrontation between two sides can extend beyond the battlefield, effecting essential services, creating risks for civilian populations, and disrupting countries that are not involved in the conflict.

This cannot become the new norm. Civilian infrastructure and non-belligerant states should not become instruments of confrontation nor tools of retaliation. The Gulf states have invested heavily in building resilient economies, advanced infrastructures, and regional connectivity. Preserving these gains requires ensuring that future conflicts do not normalise attacks on assets that serve millions of civilians and underpin regional security.

As efforts continue to bring the war to an end, Gulf states should have a voice in shaping what comes next, not only to prevent a repeat cycle of this crisis, but also to ensure that future regional disputes do not once again spill over onto those who are not part of them.

Shamma Ahmed Alqutbah is a Researcher at TRENDS Research & Advisory