Muddled Afghan policy

At first glance, US President Barack Obama's new Afghan policy seems to be the result of a typically half-baked exercise.

To say that the US can deploy its troops in embattled Afghanistan and also set an 18-month time frame for the beginning of a withdrawal is clearly unrealistic.

Those who are well aware of the complexities surrounding the battle to secure Afghanistan know well that there are no short-term fixes there. Indeed, an 18-month time frame to put in place an Afghan army and security structure to replace foreign troops is nothing short of a pipe dream.

Moreover, delivering a double-edged message to Pakistan, offering cooperation on one hand while also threatening retaliation if Pakistan, in Washington's assessment, does not step up its efforts against militants on its soil, is simply an ill-advised move.

Interference

Tough messages are best delivered in private. In a country in which anti-American sentiment is already strong, this US message will only be seen by ordinary Pakistanis as yet another unfriendly gesture and evidence of more direct interference in the country.

The combined effect of Obama's policy speech, delivered after weeks of so-called detailed consideration, has left many with the impression that Washington's plan hovers somewhere between ambivalence and a superficial understanding of a complex situation.

Among the key downsides of a US troop surge, one is that the Taliban, who are from Afghanistan, will simply find it to their advantage to melt away into the population while keeping up some of their attacks, to keep US troops on their toes.

It is even possible that the Taliban may allow a period of relative calm to give the US the illusion of success. Once Washington moves ahead and withdraws its troops, the Taliban could easily come roaring back with a vengeance to take charge of large parts of Afghanistan in ways not seen before.

Another downside is the extent to which the US will be able to extricate itself from the Afghan muddle, having stepped up its troop presence with the hope of stabilising the country. The danger is that once the fire of conflict is stoked further, the US may not be able to pull out of Afghanistan without suffering heavy losses.

An additional danger is that the US, through its ambivalence towards Pakistan, will not succeed in either making friends in a country that holds the key to stabilising Afghanistan.

Already angered by growing evidence of US intrusion, many ordinary Pakistanis will simply not be sympathetic to the consequences of Washington's troop surge. This will especially be the case if the US is seen to be stepping up its aggression inside Pakistan. By stepping up drone attacks or even contemplating limited strikes by its troops at sites suspected to be Taliban hideouts, the US risks alienating Pakistanis further.

Infrastructure

An additional complication stems from the need to create a larger infrastructure for logistical supplies for US troops inside Afghanistan. This will no doubt depend on more supplies being transported by truck through Pakistan.

Already, such trucks have been targeted in scores of attacks by the Taliban and their sympathisers. It is likely that an expanded supply line will increasingly draw the attention of the Taliban and provoke further attacks.

Having found a number of gaps in Obama's approach, it is essential to also note a few pointers towards a qualitatively new way of addressing this issue. Having already identified Pakistan as the key player in stabilising Afghanistan, it is also important to note that Washington cannot realistically hope to succeed in the central Asian country without involving Islamabad as a key ally.

A new approach towards a new beginning in Afghanistan must also recognise that there are no short-term means of resolving this muddle, years after the conflict began. It is extremely unrealistic to think that the US can extricate itself from this conflict in less than two years.

Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.