Iran revolution is not about to implode

The troubles that have followed the Iranian presidential elections have been generally misread by the Western press and policymakers. What we have witnessed was not a frustrated East European-style 'colour revolution'; nor was presidential candidate Mir Hussain Mousavi's movement an uprising of liberal Westernised sympathisers against the principles of the Iranian Revolution - albeit there were surely some who are hostile to the Revolution amongst his supporters.

Rather, what we have been witnessing is a power struggle - between factions of the 'old guard' clergy who all initially assumed power in 1979 - that erupted into public view in the recent election campaign. As that dispute is settled over the coming months, we can expect big changes in the top ranks of the power elite. But the revolution is not about to implode.

The essential dispute centres around prominent clerics, mainly former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who have sought to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ability to pursue his populist attack on their privileged position. They also have sought to diminish the political weight of the Revolutionary Guard, which they see as increasingly at odds with their interests.

This faction of the elite is deeply threatened by Ahmadinejad's assault on their personal wealth, and by his claims that it was these senior clerics' pursuit of their own narrow self-interest, at the expense of ordinary people, that is the root cause of Iran's economic woes.

It was this group of powerful clerics that stood behind the Mousawi challenge to Ahmadinejad. It was Khatami who was designated by this faction to propose to Mousawi that he stand for election; it was Khatami who initially offered the opposition leader the umbrella of their powerful political standing at the center of Iran's elite.

Thanks in no small part to this blessing, Mousavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, could credibly campaign on the platform of their revolutionary credentials. Their quarrel, they made clear, was with Ahmadinejad and his conduct of government.

Mousavi's casting of his mission as one of restoring the revolution to its original ideals was not only an internal message; it was also replayed widely in the Arab media. But the West seemed to be hearing and hoping for something else: that he was challenging the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The extent to which Mousavi intended to send this signal and benefit by leveraging Western support is unclear. But that perception has opened Mousavi and his prominent backers to the risk of severe repercussions internally in the wake of the post-election turmoil.

Indeed, it is on the basis of such allegations that Hussain Shariatmadari, the influential editor of the conservative Kayhan newspaper, has called for both Mousavi and Khatami to face trial.

Paradoxically, the Western understanding that Ahmadinejad is a tool of the clerical leadership who stands with the repressive Revolutionary Guard and Basij (the popular militia) against reform could not be more wrong. It was Ahmadinejad who campaigned against the wealth and self-interest of some of the clerical elite. Mousavi was more closely allied to those interests.

The West should also understand that there are clerics in both Qom and Tehran, some of whom despise Ahmadinejad himself, who nonetheless share his view that some senior clerics have failed to actualise the spirit of the revolution in their lifestyles.

What we are dealing with here is a complex struggle over the future course of the revolution. It is a struggle for the future vision of Iran that is overlaid by deep personality differences that in turn arouse deep passions.

For now, it is clear that a powerful determination has emerged in the wake of the election to exorcise the Rafsanjani-Khatami circles from the establishment, fuelled by a growing popular anger as the evidence of their external links to the West is being carefully examined. Rafsanjani himself, who is well aware of the dangers of becoming isolated and excluded from the circles of power, is now walking a tight rope.

On July 4, he was quoted as saying that the election crisis reflected a power struggle at the "highest levels of the system". In a carefully worded statement, he warned that any "awakened consciousness" could not be ignored, but also spoke of the need to safeguard revolutionary institutions. Though one step removed, his Kargozaran party has gone further, calling the election results "unacceptable" as a result of "massive election fraud."

The impact of these recent events on Iranian foreign policy is likely to be the opposite of what Western commentators have foreseen. It is not likely that the Revolutionary Guard, which is under the control of the Supreme Leader, will be paralysed, but rather the reverse.

Despite hopes in the West, an end to the revolution is not in sight. More likely is a counter-reaction that will lead to the isolation of Mousavi and his associates as popular forces allied with Ahmadinejad seek to inject new stimulus into the revolution by cleansing it of the corrupted elements of its old guard.

- Global Viewpoint, 2009

Alastair Crooke, a former British intelligence (MI6) agent, heads the Conflicts Forum in Beirut.