An agreement of convenience

After lengthy negotiations, a security agreement between Iraq and the United States was approved by the Iraqi parliament in November. Theoretically, the agreement strengthens the claim of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki that his government was able to assert a greater measure of sovereignty than it had been able to do before, secure concessions from the United States while still getting the benefit of American security support.

The agreement theoretically provides an orderly framework for ending the occupation, but not right away. It requires American forces to withdraw from Iraqi cities, towns and villages by June 30, and to leave all Iraqi territories by December 31, 2011. Moreover, it provides for Iraqi supervision of American military missions in Iraq. The US military will theoretically need Iraqi permission before carrying out any military operation in the country.

The agreement cancels the legal immunity enjoyed by private security firms operating in Iraq. It also provides for weakening the legal immunity from prosecution enjoyed by American soldiers in Iraq in so far as it asserts Iraqi jurisdiction over crimes committed by American soldiers, but only when off base and off duty. Finally, the agreement seems to have extracted a commitment from the US not to use Iraqi territory to launch military operations against another neighbouring country.

Opponents of the agreement in Iraq, particularly the Moqtada Al Sadr movement and its bloc in parliament, denounced the agreement as prolonging the occupation, and demanded an immediate end to American presence in Iraq.

Condemned

The Iraqi National Socialist Party condemned the agreement: "The party condemns the agreement," a statement read, "that is prolonging the US occupation and warns of its grave consequences on Iraq's destiny in particular and the Arab nations in general".

In the US, critics claimed that the Bush administration made far too many concessions which changed the balance of power in the country and limited the freedom of action of the American military.

At first sight, the agreement seems to reflect some important concessions from the Bush administration; all the more so because Bush repeatedly resisted the idea of a timetable for withdrawing from Iraq. He also reportedly wanted some 50 military bases in Iraq and the agreement ostensibly provides none.

In reality the advantages that accrue to the Bush administrations from the agreement far outweigh the concessions made to conclude the agreement. This is particularly so when we consider the context of the concessions. President-elect Barack Obama had committed himself to ending the war and withdrawing all American troops within 16 months. Bush is leaving office and his opposition to a timetable for withdrawal became irrelevant. But the Bush administration managed to turn this irrelevant concession into an effective instrument of negotiations to secure the agreement.

The first and most obvious of the advantages obtained by the Bush administration is that the agreement effectively legalises the occupation. The UN mandate which governs the American occupation of Iraq was set to expire on December 31, and Bush needed a legal cover to end the war (the defining event of his presidency), but not American influence, in an orderly fashion.

The agreement limits the freedom of action of the US military only on paper and Washington is free to denounce the agreement by giving the Iraqi government a one-year notice. And even if the US breached the agreement shortly after it came into effect, what can the Iraqis to do? Launch a military operation against the US military to force them to comply?

The agreement was more the product of convenience between the two governments, than a binding treaty between two sovereign nations. This is evident from the fact that it is called a Status of Force Agreement, and not a treaty, which would have had to be debated and approved by the Senate.

Vague language

The loose nature of the agreement is attested to by the vague language which lends itself to different interpretations without technically violating the agreement. American officials were reported in The New York Times as saying about the deadlines for withdrawing American troops, that "the text of the agreement included language that made those dates less than rigid deadlines".

This will raise contentious issues particularly if the situation on the grounds changes in any substantial sense. US officials are already debating ways to bypass the restrictions provided for in the agreement. Even Obama's commitment to withdrawing American troops within 16 months was tempered by his concomitant commitment to leaving some American forces to protect the biggest American embassy in the world and to carry out special missions. Clearly the US influence in Iraq is not about to end anytime soon.

The Iraqi people will decide the ultimate fate of the agreement in a referendum scheduled for next July. In the meantime, innocent Iraqi people continue to die. The Iraqi body count organisation reported that for the month of November, 482 civilians, including 31 children, lost their lives.

Professor Adel Safty is Unesco Chair of Leadership and President of the School of Government and Leadership, Bahcesehir University, Istanbul. He is author-editor of 14 books including From Camp David to the Gulf, and Leadership and Democracy, New York, 2004.