Book Review of ‘Lebanon: A History’

William Harris, who teaches politics at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, and who knows Lebanon well, understands it even better. In this extensive and detailed survey that spans 14 centuries, the author tackles the country’s innate complications, closing with an ardent look at contemporary developments.

Although the book’s strength lies in Part One, which provides near-perfect discussions of the emerging communities between 600 and 1291 along with the all-too-critical roles played by the Druzes (1291-1633) and mountain lords (1633-1842), readers will find Part Two, which covers modern times, to be especially informative. Much of what Harris recounts has been told before, but his contribution stands out in linking this rich past with the apparent appetite to self-destruct in the 1975-1990 period.

The still-unsettled civil war, and the ensuing devastation inflicted by Syria — which was forced to withdraw in 2005 and is now imploding — shaped Lebanon more than anything else, even if few citizens acknowledge it. During three long and painful decades, Damascus took its revenge for the French creation of the “Grand Liban” by insisting that it, that is Syria, commanded Lebanon. Of course, the approach faltered in 2005, as Syria’s partners — Hezbollah and Iran — refused to acknowledge nascent changes that acted as the precursors for the Spring 2011 uprisings that shook the entire Arab World.

To his credit, Harris devotes an entire chapter to what he terms as the “Broken Lebanon”, assessing the consequences of the post-1975 period and the devastating Israeli invasions (yes, there were several) and occupations. Under the author’s sharp eyes and sharper pen, the Syrian hegemony between 1990 and 2005 makes for quite a sophisticated reading. Harris frankly reports how then vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam “let slip that if Greater Lebanon could not function, the answer was not shrinkage to Mount Lebanon but Syrian absorption of everything” (page 257). Inasmuch as president Hafiz Al Assad shrewdly pretended that two independent states existed side by side to cajole Washington and other Western powers, he toyed with Beirut, even if he seldom accepted the neighbour’s separate writ. It fell on his successor, President Bashar Al Assad, to finally exchange diplomats in 2009 — as any two sovereign countries might do — under tremendous foreign pressure.

Still, and long before his present internal preoccupations, Bashar Al Assad tested and, some will argue, is continuing to test, Lebanese leaders, acolytes and foes alike.

Harris correctly highlights how internal Lebanese divisions, of the sectarian as well as political varieties, allowed for such insolence. His conclusion about the Maronite Christians, for example, is harsh, believing that the they reached the level of “indignant impotence” (page 258), even if one man in particular, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, held the community together and earned, at least from the Sunni community, the label “conscience of the country”. Harris is equally critical of Sunnis and Shiites and derides them both, concluding that the assassinated former prime minister Rafiq Hariri peeved the Shiites because, ostensibly, the poorest were further neglected. Yet, if Saudi influence guided and financially rewarded the pillars of the Sunni community, few could deny that Iran played an identical role with the Shiites and, in the case of Hezbollah, armed the party to fight various regional proxy wars.

Given the internal divisions, which were masterfully manipulated by Damascus between 1990 and 2000, it was no wonder that Beirut sank even deeper to the present crisis. The Syrians disarmed all of the militias, except for Hezbollah, allegedly because of its role against the Israeli occupation. Yet, what was more devastating than such pedantic decisions, were the myriad political and military manipulations that gave Damascus carte blanche over Lebanon’s destiny.

Syria’s overt hegemony ended in 2005, though the years since highlighted deep divisions across the board. Beirut was now in limbo, awaiting the Special Tribunal for Lebanon sponsored by the UN Security Council to start the Hariri assassination trial, along with the undetermined fate of its neighbour. It also weighed the Iranian quest for domination over the Shiites, and prayed that Hezbollah would astutely redefine itself to avoid yet another war. Nearly 15,000 international troops guarded the southern frontiers with Israel as any error would have been perilous.

Harris stops his narrative with the Walid Jumblatt-orchestrated 2011 coup de tête (hotheaded decision) that led to the fall of the national unity government led by Sa‘ad Hariri. Lebanon survived only to experience another void as the head of the Progressive Socialist Party sensed his Druze nation’s vulnerability in the scheduled parliamentary elections. In 2013, Beirut has faced several challenges, including a near-total collapse of the judiciary, and Harris links cross-sectarian dimensions to better explain present convulsions. While not a failed state in the classic sense of the term, Harris confirms that Lebanon faces serious challenges that threatens its unity.

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian is the author of the recently published “Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia” (London: Routledge, 2013).