There’s still a path forward with Taliban

United States President Donald Trump is taking a lot of criticism for abruptly cancelling talks he had hoped to sponsor between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan at Camp David. But he was right to do so — his announcement sent a signal that the Taliban must demonstrate in far more concrete ways a commitment to a peaceful negotiation to end nearly two decades of war.

The movement’s name itself simply means “students” in Pashtun, and it is a movement that learnt about taking and using power — enough to dominate Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Russian-backed central government before 9/11. Taliban leaders facilitated and protected Al Qaida and provided support in the attacks against the US.

The new peace agreement thus far, painstakingly negotiated by US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad — a skilled former ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations — was between the US and the Taliban only. The Camp David meeting was supposed to be a turning point, wherein the Afghan government of President Ashraf Gani and the Taliban could come together, echoing former US president Bill Clinton’s bringing together of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the government of Israel in 2000, also at Camp David. (That attempt, too, died stillborn.)

The deal on the table reportedly included a US withdrawal of its 14,000 troops, including a down-payment of around 5,000 leaving within a few months after the accord was completed. The Taliban were to provide guarantees that there would be no return to creating “safe havens” for groups like Al Qaida and Daesh (which is rising in prominence within Afghanistan).

Full ceasefire

There was also a provision to free thousands of Taliban prisoners being held by the Afghan government. All of this was to be cemented with a prolonged ceasefire — and it was that portion of the agreement that the Taliban failed to honour, continuing their attacks and killing another US service member last week.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo evidently continues to believe that there is a path forward for the talks. But the Taliban have been consistent in their loathing of the US-backed government in Kabul, calling its leaders “stooges” and at times refusing to even begin a conversation with hit until all US troops have left. How can this go forward?

First, the US needs to recognise the Taliban for what it is: A deeply unpopular theocracy with brutal norms of behaviour (particularly against women and girls) that aren’t going to change anytime soon. Instead of using the Ronald Reagan line about the Soviet Union, “trust, but verify”, with the Taliban, Washington must “verify, then trust”. That means demanding a full ceasefire for at least a six-month cooling-off period before beginning any US troop withdrawal.

Role of Pakistan

The US should also be willing to keep a minimum level of troops in the country for a significant period of time, and to finance the Afghan security forces. Casualties to US and allied troops are likewise far below what we experienced a decade ago. The Afghan security forces are taking 95 per cent of all casualties, and the Nato mission is in support, not in the lead — providing training, logistics, intelligence and some limited special-forces and air operations. Washington also needs to recognise the role of Pakistan, and continue to pressure the Pakistanis to encourage the insurgents to come to the bargaining table.

Most insurgencies end not on a battlefield or at a formal surrender, but in a negotiation. There is still time to avoid a Vietnam-like outcome, with helicopters lifting off the roofs of Afghan government buildings ferrying off the survivors. A better model is the end of the insurgency in Colombia in the mid-2010s, in which the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] rebels came in from the jungle after five decades, stacked their weapons peacefully and were given the opportunity to compete in free elections.

If the Taliban are unwilling to accept a peaceful outcome, the US should walk away from the table. Artificial deadlines would be a tragic mistake. The Nato allies should continue to support our Afghan partners with a limited military mission and sufficient funding to keep the military pressure on the Taliban. That is the only path to a lasting and just peace.

— Washington Post

James Stavridis is the former supreme allied commander of Nato and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.