Lack of insight pushes Middle East into crisis and chaos
In reviewing the speeches of the late Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, he consistently reiterated that the resistance and its arms were solely meant to protect the people of southern Lebanon. Yet, despite these repeated assertions, the people of the south have fled their homes, uncertain of where to go. Moreover, the assassinations of Hezbollah leaders, even those concealed in fortified strongholds, further add to the complexity of the situation.
The ongoing war in Gaza and Lebanon today has proven that the Iranian regime is losing its last strongholds. It has also become evident that the cultivation of militias in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, and the isolation of other Palestinian factions while embracing Hamas, are merely tools.
It has been repeatedly heard that the creation of militias on Arab territories is to save Iran from fighting on its own land. With calculated strategy, Iran attached the cause of “Palestine and its liberation” as a banner, yet the result has been widespread bloodshed in Gaza, displacement in Lebanon, and the reckless endangerment of lives.
Should we look back at history to understand how much we lose by not learning from our experiences? In 1990, the late Dr. Fouad Ishaq Al Khoury, a sociology professor at the American University of Beirut, published a concise yet insightful booklet titled “The Military and Governance in the Arab Countries”.
His keen observations, now more relevant than ever, should be revisited amid the deadly conflicts in both Gaza and Lebanon. With a bit of imagination, one could easily apply the conclusions of his study on Arab military regimes to today’s militant groups. As we examine the outcomes of wars between Israel and certain Arab nations under military rule, the parallels with the current fighting militias are strikingly similar.
Adopt modern technology
The booklet reviews the history of the formation of Arab armies, the social backgrounds of their members. It offers a remarkable sociological analysis that warrants reflection. What stands out to today’s reader are the core ideas the author highlights, which, in my view, revolve around two key ideas: first, the use of weapons by military forces, and second is the concept of victory and how it is communicated to the public.
Regarding the first central idea, Al Khoury argues that the Arab army is the first sector in the modern Arab state to adopt modern technology. However, this technology is predominantly imported, and there is little correlation between the importation of advanced weapons and the overall technological advancement within society.
In other words, the effective utilisation of such technology requires the proper training and qualification of personnel. He further affirms that importing weapons, no matter how modern and effective, does not mean possessing military technology within the importing country.
Technology is an act of production, a facet of modern culture grounded in science, while importation signifies dependence. The production of weapons represents sovereignty, whereas importing them signifies reliance on others. This central idea was starkly illustrated recently when the explosions of pager devices and walkie -talkies sparked chaos in the streets, homes and markets across Beirut and other parts of Lebanon, claiming lives and causing severe injuries, including the loss of eyes and limbs.
The gap between Al Khoury’s insights and last week’s pager and walkie-talkie explosions in Beirut spans 34 years only — a period marked by squandered opportunities, persistent neglect, the replacement of armies with militias, and a populace inundated with political illusions.
Al Khoury’s second central idea explores how the concept of victory and defeat is framed. Drawing from the outcomes of the wars with Israel before 1990, he argues that Arab armies were deemed victorious by their leaders, even when they lost territory.
He adds: “As long as the army endures and the regime remains intact, the people must feel reassured.” Within this context, if the army is replaced with militias, the assertion holds true: as long as militia leadership persists, the loss of land and the lives of individuals do not disturb anyone.
Examining the previous text in light of the current events in both Gaza and Lebanon, one can observe a strikingly similar outcome: the crucial factor is the persistence of militia leaders, who symbolise “steadfastness,” regardless of the loss of tens of thousands of lives and massive destructions, the fall of more territories under new occupation, and displacement of people.
As we examine the outcomes of wars between Israel and certain Arab nations under military rule, the parallels with the current fighting militias are strikingly similar
Third-generation equipment
In this context, the notion of steadfastness strays from its original intent, not only among militia leaders but also, unfortunately, among a broad segment of the population. Many “believe” that the mere survival of the militia leadership constitutes a “victory over the enemy,” despite the loss of territory.
No one sells you cutting-edge military technology; what you purchase is often second or even third-generation equipment. The most advanced technology is considered a “state secret.”
Even in the current conflict between the West and the East in Ukraine, despite the media’s portrayal of a strong intention to assist, what the Ukrainians receive is primarily second-rate military technology. This raises the question: what can one expect to acquire if they are sourcing technology from the open market?
What we lack today is a clear understanding of our own capabilities, as well as an awareness of the strengths of our opponent. This ignorance serves as the root of the numerous tragedies we are witnessing.
Mohammad Alrumaihi is an author and Professor of Political Sociology at Kuwait University