China and Philippines navigate complex maritime tensions
Philippines’ exit from Spratly Islands signals intricate dynamics amid China’s claims
The Philippines coast guard cutter BRP Teresa Magbanua, one of the largest vessels in its coast guard fleet, left Spratly Island’s Sabina Shaol recently, after months of standoff with the Chinese.
Manila deployed the ship to the feature in April after a large amount of crushed coral was discovered there, sparking concern in the Philippines and its allies that China aims to build an artificial island.
The South China Sea is a vital waterway, where in addition to China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei also have overlapping claims in some parts.
China’s claim expressed through the nine-dash line lays sovereignty over 90 per cent of the South China Sea (SCS) bringing it into direct conflict with other claimants, the US and its allied western powers. The SCS seabed is said to be full of energy and fisheries. It is arguably the most important shipping corridor in the world.
Most recently, however, confrontations between China and the Philippines have raised fears of a wider conflict over the sea that could involve the United States and other allies. These powers conduct ‘freedom of navigation’ operations in the SCS, which China considers a breach of its sovereignty.
Great power rivalry
In April this year the Philippines deployed Teresa Magbanua in the Sabina Shoal.
In June China introduced new maritime patrol regulations in its China Coast Guard Order 3 authorising its Coast Guard to detain foreign vessels for up to 60 days if it suspects them of illegally entering what China considers to be, its territorial waters.
Philippines hosts nine US military bases under a visiting-forces agreement with US. They have an agreement with Australia. A similar pact with Japan was signed in July.
Manila’s territorial claims over SCS may be legitimate, but aligning too closely with the US carries the danger of Filipinos becoming collateral damage of great power rivalry, says Peter Chang, research associate at the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya.
While he cobbles military alliances, President Marcos understands that he “cannot go to war” over SCS and will “talk to China consistently with a firm voice.” While none of the Philippines partners are likely to take China on directly, they can only hope to make it a little hard for Beijing, if the push comes to shove between the two countries.
Notwithstanding international law or The Hague rulings, China has as much claim on SCS as Britain has on Falklands, France has on Tahiti or the US has on Guam or Hawaii.
Anyone with sense of history should understand that China cannot be a great power unless it holds the key to its ‘front door’ and that is SCS. It cannot afford to leave control of the sea in the hands of powers averse to China’s rise.
It is perfectly natural for rising powers to become more assertive as they gain influence. China is no exception.
Sajjad Ashraf served as an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore from 2009 to 2017. He was a member of Pakistan Foreign Service from 1973 to 2008 and served as an ambassador to several countries.