Tel Aviv: Israel's nuclear policy was conceived spontaneously when a young deputy defence minister, Shimon Peres, was confronted by President John F. Kennedy at the White House about the Jewish state's rumoured ambitions to become a nuclear power.
Peres's response, "I can say to you clearly that we shall not introduce atomic weapons into the region. We will certainly not be the first to do so'', became a tagline repeated for decades to signal the country's self-imposed "no comment" on its reported nuclear capabilities.
This week, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert sought the cover of Peres's now-famous quip after the Israeli leader seemed to inadvertently acknowledge Israel's nuclear weapons, apparently confirming what has been taken for granted for decades by much of the world.
In an interview with German television, Olmert sought to portray Iran as reckless while placing Israel alongside the accepted nuclear powers. "Iran openly, explicitly, and publicly threatens to wipe Israel off the map," Olmert said while visiting Germany. "Can you say that this is the same level, when you are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as America, France, Israel and Russia?"
The uproar that ensued in Israel and abroad highlights the fragility of one of Israel's most finely tuned defence policies, a doctrine of nuclear ambiguity that has enabled Israel to deter foes for decades in a region with only one alleged nuclear power.
But as the possibility of a nuclear Iran looms, some are arguing that Israel may need to rethink that very policy.
"The ambiguity so far has been useful, and we have never threatened the region with a nuclear catastrophe. But sometimes there is no way out of it," says Shlomo Aronson, a political science professor at Hebrew University. "When Ahmadinejad talks about wiping Israel off the map, this may mean the end of Iran, too.''
But an atomic Iran would require a change in Israel's longstanding policy, say some experts. A region with more than one potential atomic power calls for a more explicit form of deterrence.
"In order to make a situation that existed in the cold war, that existed between the US and Soviet Union, you need that both sides threatened by each other," says Michael Karpin, an author of a history of Israel's nuclear programme, "otherwise the side that doesn't make the threat is weaker. For a balance of terror so that both sides don't use the bomb, you need to know that the other side has the bomb."
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