Did Geagea break Lebanon’s two main political blocs?

Beirut: It took nearly two years of patient work but Samir Geagea finally secured from his traditional rival, General Michel Aoun, a 10-point commitment — modestly dubbed mutual understanding between the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) to uphold the 2005 Cedar Revolution—in exchange for an endorsement of Aoun’s candidacy to the presidency of the republic.

In doing so, Geagea buried the two existing March 8 and 14 coalitions, did it at his headquarters (and home) in Ma‘arab, and telegraphed to everyone that he was the key leader who determined the fate of the nation.

Of course, Geagea might fail in bringing Aoun to the presidency but the strategic moves were clear, especially after the results of the April 23, 2014 election results, when the March 14 candidate received 48 votes (out of 128), the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) contender, Henri Hélou, 16 votes, the Phalange Party chief, Amine Gemayel, one vote, while 52 votes were cast blank, and seven were voided because they included the names of dead leaders with 4 absentees.

Although the March 14 candidate stood his ground during the 34 convocations since then, March 8 officials, led by Hezbollah, boycotted each and every session, thereby preventing a quorum. What that effectively meant was a freeze in parliament with dire consequences for the country. Impossible conditions emerged as March 8 insisted that only Aoun would be considered, though it was a mystery why Hezbollah did not elect the FPM representative since a mere majority was necessary to secure the votes starting with the first of 34 assemblies.

In the event, by now breaking the deadlock that many believed was imposed by Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two leading regional powers that held Lebanon’s political future in their hands, Geagea emerged as the one who held the nation’s future in his hands.

Whether the Lebanese Forces representative was livid at the former prime minister and nominal spearhead of the March 14 movement after Sa’ad Hariri jettisoned his own candidate, Geagea, in favour of the Marada Movement deputy Sulaiman Franjieh, will never be known. Likewise, Geagea’s opposition to the PSP’s Walid Jumblatt, whose betrayal on April 23, 2014 prevented his outright election, was also problematic. In the event, the PSP’s king-making credentials with 16 votes were now null and void, since a LF-backed Aoun candidacy ought to render the PSP votes irrelevant.

It was too early to know which way the winds would now blow and whether Aoun might garner the required 65 votes to become president. What was undeniable, however, was the commitment Geagea secured from Aoun and that was nothing short of a presidential programme that upheld the state and its army.

Sitting next to Aoun at the LF chief’s residence north of Beirut, Geagea hammered that the two men and their respective parties stood for a strong and independent Lebanon and while neither mentioned Hezbollah or the latter’s involvement in the five-year-old civil war in Syria, they accepted the premise that only the Lebanese Army must take complete control of the country’s security. He went further when he underscored that both the LF and FPM “respected the Constitution and wanted a free, sovereign Lebanon with strong institutions, in compliance with the National Charter and the Taif Accords”, both of which are increasingly questioned by Hezbollah that wants a new constitutional convention.

Geagea’s words, presumably backed by Aoun, were veiled criticisms of Hezbollah and it remained to be determined whether Aoun would bid his time and first be elected before he too jettisoned the 2006 Mar Mikhayel memorandum of understanding that was meant to take the general to Baabda Palace. Aoun saw that opportunity wither in 2008 when Hezbollah accepted General Michel Sulaiman at the Doha Conference and, once again, in 2014 when Hezbollah and the rest of the March 8 coalition could only guarantee a boycott, not an election.

On January 18, 2016, Aoun signed on to the new arrangement, aware that the road to the presidential palace passed through Ma‘arab. The notice was ignored by Sulaiman Franjieh who met the Maronite Patriarch Mar Bisharah Al Ra‘i after the Ma‘arab joint news conference. Franjieh tweeted after his meeting with the cardinal: “I am still going ahead with my candidacy for the presidency.” It was unclear how that could be.