Comment: Warnings of a former counter-terrorism czar

Richard A. Clarke, the former counter-terrorism czar for both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, has written a powerful book – Against All Enemies – that is already a running bestseller. It is not an easy read even if it can be easily read and identifies key Gulf actors as potential dilemmas for the United States.

To be sure, Clarke indicts the current Bush Administration – among others – for failing to heed his preventive recommendations prior to 9/11, and purports to identify putative enemies. A long list of "what I recommended," flavours the book, and time will tell whether his warnings had any merit.

Although the subject of immense controversy in Washington, Clarke's prose goes beyond partisan rhetoric, postulating that the US almost always reacts to terrorist activities.

The only exception to this general rule in recent years, the author posits, was President Clinton's decision to bomb Iraq in 1993 after it was discovered that the former regime in Baghdad attempted to assassinate President George H.W. Bush in Kuwait.

Perhaps that is the case, but as Senator Robert Byrd eloquently asserted, "the dangerous doctrine of preemptive war, which the president unveiled in September 2002, has failed."

One can make a long list of "interventions" around the world, now topped with the war for Iraq that, everyone agrees, was an application of the so-called Bush Doctrine.

Moreover, while powerful actors grant themselves license to openly intervene in global affairs, wiser authorities are now calling on Washington to "get out of the business of running Iraq." Still others see opportunities.

Perceptions differ, of course, but as the latest ill-advised decision – to go after Al Sadr – illustrates, the price tag for "preventive war" can be very high. And irrespective of motives, the choice to break Al Sadr's power before June 30, was made out of fear – that the popular cleric might derail the largely cosmetic transfer of authority.

Many believed that Ayatollah Ali Sistani would approve of this latest operation, but even if he were, the consequence for Iraq and the region were not worth the risks.

What unites Al Sistani to Al Sadr and all Iraqis is their common opposition to occupation. What unites the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims is a common dislike of empire. It is in this realm that Clarke goes awry.

He commends Arab Gulf States, including the regime of Saddam Hussain, when they stood with the United States against Iran, and condemns them for not doing enough to smash religious extremists.

He courageously applauds the work of the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan when the Soviet Union was swamped in its own quagmire, but finds little value in any of their efforts after the fall of communism.

He wonders whether it was a misjudgment to have involved the Saudis in Afghanistan and laments the loss of Stinger missiles that migrated to Doha. On the later issue, he reveals that the missiles quickly became inoperative, when their unique batteries expired. One wonders, therefore, what the entire ruckus was all about when Congressman Tom Lantos referred to Qatar as a "speck of a country"?

Clarke acknowledges much of the assistance that GCC States extended over the years and provides tidbits of information that make for fascinating reading.

He lambastes George W. Bush for engaging in a new crusade in Iraq and recommends that the only way to stop Al Qaida is by forging new alliances with friendly Muslim countries.

All of this is interesting because Clarke is an insider who identifies complex intra-departmental plays (CIA vs. FBI vs. NSC vs. DOD vs. State, etc…) that reveals just how convoluted policy-making is.

Naturally, it gets worse when the men at the top are ideologically motivated – who want to "do" Iraq – and care so little for any nuances that may have been institutionalised over the years.

Clarke believes that the war for Iraq was a colossal mistake but insists that Saudis and other Gulf States cannot remain in denial. Presumably, they will need to address the ills that confront the so-called civilised world, or they will perish as well.

In the end, Clarke is correct that "there have been far more major terrorist attacks by Al Qaida and its regional clones in the thirty-months since September 11 than there were in the thirty months prior to that momentous event."

The question that remains is whether any of these were reactions to specific political or military steps taken by the coalition of the willing.

Joseph Kéchichian is an analyst on Gulf and Middle East affairs and an author of several books.