ISI a convenient scapegoat

Whenever military commanders fail to achieve their stated objectives, intelligence agencies are convenient scapegoats for their operational shortcomings, and it is likely that Pakistan's Afghan policy will be hung on just such a convenient peg.

U.S. President Carter's "de-humanising" of CIA in favour of high-tech did not cater for the present "war on terrorism" waged against a technologically backward country like Afghanistan. During Reagan's term, CIA's William Casey, one-time agent of the OSS, CIA's predecessor agency, turned this policy around 180 degrees, running the war in Afghanistan with help from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The ISI coordinated logistics and operations with the Afghan Mujahideen, with officers and men on "Extra Regimental Employment" (ERE) duties, from Pakistan's elite commando brigade, Special Services Group (SSG) taking part in actual fighting.

The SSG prides itself in wearing the winged dagger and having the universal motto of Special Forces everywhere, "Who Dares Wins". Having done two SSG tenures, prime product General Pervez Musharraf is presently SSG's Colonel-in-Chief whose about turn on Pakistan's Afghan policy occurred concurrently with his replacement of the ISI chief.

Raised from 19 Baluch (the former 17/10 Baluch) at Cherat, a hill station not far from Peshawar, dedicated CIA and U.S. Special Forces personnel trained Pakistan's SSG as part of U.S. "Military Aid to Pakistan" Programme (US MAP).

Among the instructors were the famed Chuck Lord, Robert Buckley, Robert Dunn, Maj Murray, Lt Hicks, Sommers. Pakistani SSG officers travelled to Fort Bragg and Fort Benning for advanced training. Robert Dunn knew most SSG personnel by name, having spent almost his whole life in this area. Casey chose him to be CIA's Operations Chief for the Afghan War.

Pakistan remained aloof from Afghan affairs in the years preceding 1973. Bhutto's toppling of the ANP-led Provincial Governments in NWFP and Balochistan in early 1973 frustrated leaders like Ajmal Khattak who went off to Kabul. Sardar Daoud who had overthrown his cousin, King Zahir Shah, was only too happy to foster the Afghan dream of a greater Pakhtunistan.

Marri and Mengal tribesmen, trained by the KGB/KHAD combine in Afghanistan, carried out an armed insurrection for several years in Balochistan. Pakistani students (belonging to elite families none of whom were Baloch) studying in UK were recruited under the cover of "consultants" to supply guns, ammunition and information.

The ISI deliberately gave them a long rope to trace their local contacts. This "magnanimity" ran out after a clash at Sabtalang near Kohlu, where most were hauled up and "re-educated" by ISI and eventually forgiven their youthful "indiscretions".

Bhutto mandated Maj Gen Nasrullah Babar (then IG Frontier Corps and later Governor NWFP) to pay the Afghans back in the same coin. The first trainees were many young Afghan doctors and engineers rabidly against the monarchy and the Soviets successor influenced government of PM Sardar Daoud Khan. Among the "rebels" were Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the late Ahmed Shah Masood.

CIA and friendly states in the region funded hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars and supplies to the major (nine) Mujhahideen factions, some directly but mostly through ISI. Funds were skimmed off but only at the very top.

The money that did flow through went mostly to favourite Mujhahideen commanders along with supply of arms and equipment. Illicit sales of arms and equipment by the recipient Mujhahideen and by a handful of corrupt, unscrupulous intelligence operatives did take place.

To whom was $100000 or thereabouts transferred from then BCCI Karachi to bank accounts in Canada almost on a daily basis uptil mid-1988? Why is a government committed to accountability not hauling up the beneficiaries who live in affluence, and in positions of influence, while the tarnishing of the name and reputation of the Pakistan Army goes on, many of whose valiant sons lie in unmarked graves across Afghanistan?

By the time, the Taliban had chased the interim government out of Kabul in 1996, the ISI's intelligence potential had gone into decline, diminishing drastically on the ground, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On becoming Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), Zia's long-serving DG ISI, Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman handed over charge to Lt Gen Hamid Gul. The new Persian-speaking DG ISI's visions were of a crescent of Pan-Islamic countries across Central Asia but he came to grief at Jalalabad. He was eased out of ISI by then PM Benazir Bhutto in early 1989 into commanding a Corps.

Lt Gen SR Kallue, a retired officer, was brought in to head the ISI, essentially as an anti-coup mechanism. When the time came he badly failed his mentor. Some of the ISI's own detachments were used under his nose to topple Benazir Bhutto in early August 1990.

Gen Aslam Beg, the then army chief immediately moved his DG MI Asad Durrani to handle both ISI and MI concurrently for some time. Asad Durrani lasted a year before the new PM Mian Nawaz Sharif requested the new Army Chief, Lt Gen Asif Nawaz for his then favourite, Lt Gen Javed Nasir, the Army's Engineer-in-Chief as DG ISI. Despite his heart being in the right place, Javed Nasir attempt to create Pakistan's place under an Islamic sun, almost got Pakistan declared "a terrorist state".

Between Kallue and Javed Nasir, Afghanistan slid down the priority ladder. Lt Gen Hamid Gul was prematurely retired by Asif Nawaz. Soon after Gen Asif Nawaz's demise, the new COAS Gen Waheed Kakar sent both Lt Gen Asad Durrani, and Lt Gen Javed Nasir home for violating the channels of command. Gen Waheed mandated the DG MI, Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi (presently Federal Minister for Communications), not only to cleanse the ISI of "Islamists" but to rein in the "jihadis" in Kashmir.

Qazi went at the ISI like a knife through butter, bringing in another artillery officer Maj Gen Iftikhar (presently Lt Gen (Retd) Iftikhar Governor NWFP) to handle the External Wing. The ISI's priceless intelligence network was dismantled, all the Afghan veterans were posted back to the Army, most headed into retirement. By 1995, the ISI had been totally purged, except for a handful of favourites, no officer who had physically served in Afghanistan remained in ISI.

Lacking either Afghan or combat experience, the ISI hierarchy developed an inferiority complex that made them petty, including ordering the surveillance of those patriots who had fought so hard for their country, risking life and limb without asking for reward or recognition.

Incidentally, the new hierarchy took the credit for creating the Taliban, whereas the Taliban were an indigenous self-made creation, later adopted by the ISI for support.

Unlike other intelligence agencies like CIA, RAW, MI-5, etc the ISI is not a career service. Civilian operatives do not rise beyond field grade (ie. equivalent of a major), never get involved in policy-making.

Majors and above are rotated from the Pakistan Army for two to three years, during the Afghan War they did longer tenures. Successive DGs ISI starting with Lt Gens Akhtar Abdur Rahman, Hamid Gul, SR Kallue, Javed Nasir, Asad Durrani, Javed Ashraf Qazi, Nasim Rana, Ziauddin, Mahmo