Comment: Yemen and the war on terrorism

Against some odds, the government of Yemen has managed to balance contradictory policies that strengthened ties with key partners, even if it weakened its internal bases.

The Yemeni economy, the real measure by which a government's performance is gauged, was not performing as well as many anticipated. Will this change or will Sanaa face the ire of its citizens on both the political as well as economic fronts?

A few weeks after the General People's Congress (GPC) won a clear majority of seats in parliament last April, President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced a cabinet reshuffle. The affable Prime Minister, Abdul Qader Bajamal, as well as the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, finance, oil, defence and information all retained their posts.

As in the past, the entire cabinet was composed of GPC members, although Bajamal announced that Sanaa's war on terrorism would not be fought at the expense of domestic needs.

Given the large disparity in parliament, 250 seats for the GPC versus a mere 46 for the Islamist opposition Islah Party, and 30 seats for several other groups, Saleh and Bajamal were in a very strong position to usher in fundamental changes that would address the country's economic shortages. Instead, and largely because of outside pressure, they concentrated on terrorism.

Yemen, the ancestral homeland of Osama bin Laden, has been under pressure from Washington since the September 11, 2001 attacks to crack down on presumed Al Qaida activists. Many were killed. Many more were arrested.

In early November 2003, Sanaa arrested Mohammed Hamdi Al Ahdal, also known as Abu Issam Al Makki, Al Qaida's highest-ranking leader in the country and an alleged co-conspirator in the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole in Aden.

Confrontation

Al Ahdal is under interrogation but it is not clear whether American officers are participating. Still, other alleged terrorists were extradited to the United States, including Moham-med Ali Hasan Shaykh Al Muayad, Imam of the main mosque in Sanaa, and his companion Yahya Zayed, further illustrating the close collaboration between the two countries.

By virtue of its location, and historical ties with Saudi Arabia, the war on terrorism has also witnessed systematic improvements of ties with Riyadh.

Bajamal saw to it that Saudi and Yemeni relations, almost always mired in difficulties, improved substantially during the past year. For example, in mid-September 2003, the Kingdom's deputy interior minister, Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin Abdulaziz met with President Saleh in Sanaa to discuss the hand over of seven Saudis suspected of being members of Al Qaida.

Both countries cracked down on opposition figures after several suicide attacks killed dozens of Saudis and Yemenis. Last July, Sanaa and Riyadh exchanged at least 15 prisoners, although exact numbers were probably higher.

According to Saudi sources, Bandar Abdel Hakim Al Ghamdi, one of seven Saudis that Yemen extradited, is an alleged member of the cell that carried out the May 12 attacks in Riyadh.

Still, for every confrontation and arrest, the Bajamal government opted to err on the side of caution. By agreeing to release 146 men suspected of links with Al Qaida, for example, Sanaa acknowledged that its policies must include both carrots and sticks.

According to Yemeni sources, last month's release of 92 Islamists was authorised "after they swore not to attack non-Muslims or foreign embassies in Sanaa." A further 54 Al Qaida suspects who had earlier surrendered to authorities, were ostensibly pardoned because of time served, lack of evidence against them, or simply to limit the political damage with key tribal leaders.

For Sanaa, the releases and pardons "crown(ed) the policy of the president to settle ideological problems through dialogue."

Nevertheless, Yemen remains one the most heavily armed societies in the world – with an estimated 60 million weapons in the hands of its inhabitants – even if it ranks near the bottom of most socio-economic indicators. In October 2002, a group of donors allocated $2.3 billion in economic aid to combat poverty, but stringent IMF conditions have slowed the actual disbursement process.

Consequently, Sanaa's dependence on foreign aid continues unabated, even if salvation may well come once Yemenis gain full control over the land. Such a worthy battle may finally address Sanaa's requirements and limit, perhaps even eliminate, its violent legacy.

Joseph A. Kéchichian, author of several books, is an expert on the Gulf and Middle East affairs.