Iran's poll won't affect its ties with Syria

Next Friday, 46 million Iranians will cast their votes in Iran's 10th presidential elections since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Iran's rising regional influence and the standoff with the West over its nuclear programme have generated worldwide interest in the upcoming elections. There has been a lot of speculation about the candidates, their world views and the impact they are likely to have on Iran's foreign policy. Given the significance of Syrian-Iranian ties, all eyes are on the elections.

Many seek answers to questions such as: Would Syrian-Iranian relations be affected by the possible departure of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? Would the ascendance of a more moderate leader - such as Mir Hussain Mousavi or Mehdi Karroubi - change the fundamentals of the Syrian-Iranian alliance? What if Ahmadinejad was re-elected? Would that help maintain the special relationship between the two countries, and their presidents? What would Syrian-Iranian relations look like if the other conservative candidate, former Revolutionary Guards chief Mohsen Rezai, was elected? These questions are hypothetical indeed, but all political analysis is done on hypothetical grounds.

Yet, regardless of who wins the elections, it is clear that relations with Syria are unlikely to undergo fundamental change. The factors that have contributed to the establishment, endurance and stamina of the Syrian-Iranian alliance have nothing to do with the domestic conditions of the two countries. If the case was otherwise, then Syria and Iran would have been sworn enemies rather than allies. The ideological outlook of the two governments, for example, should act as a source of tension between the two countries. The Arab nationalist government in Damascus would naturally find itself at odds with the religious Shiite nationalistic government in Tehran.

The internal politics of the two countries do not therefore help us to understand their relationship. Realpolitik, the regional balance of power and threat perceptions are the raison d'être for strong Syrian-Iranian ties. Over the past three decades, these factors have proven to be the unshaken pillars of the most effective partnership in the Middle East.

Indeed, the Syrian-Iranian alliance gained strategic importance after Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, but that was mainly due to increasing Western pressure to 'change the behaviour' of the two countries. Before that, the Syrian-Iranian alliance was purely defensive and sought to minimise risks and maximise gains in an inhospitable regional environment.

From a Syrian perspective, drifting towards Iran was a matter of necessity more than a choice. Iran compensated for the loss of Egypt in the Arab-Israeli balance of power after the Camp David Accord. It also compensated for the lack of Arab economic handouts, halted after the Iran-Iraq war. The shared animosity towards the Saddam Hussain government provided one more reason to consolidate this alliance. Iran also proved to be useful in Lebanon, especially after the Israeli invasion of 1982, the establishment of Hezbollah and the revival of the Shiite community. In addition, strong ties with Iran enabled Syria to present itself as an indispensable intermediary channel between the Arab Gulf states and Iran. Damascus used this channel to enhance its military capabilities and achieve strategic parity with Israel, while supporting its weak economy through aid from the Gulf states and/or Iran.

From an Iranian perspective, relations with Syria were extremely important to prevent the Iraq-Iran war from turning into an Arab-Iranian conflict or a Sunni-Shiite divide. Syria's contributions to Iran's war effort were also valuable. Syria closed the Iraqi Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline, depriving Saddam of an important financial resource. Syria was compensated with cheap Iranian oil. Had Syria chosen to stand by Iraq, it could have not only weakened Iran's position, but also closed the circle on the venerable revolutionary government in Tehran. Syria was viewed by Tehran as a primary partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict, offering Iran a symbolic political role in the central cause of the region. The occupation of Iraq increased Syria's importance to Tehran, giving it vital access to most of the region's problems. Through Syria, Iran could use its regional influence as a bargaining chip once its nuclear programme became an issue for the US.

Maintaining this alliance has not always been an easy business, however. Damascus and Tehran have at times been at pains to hide disagreements. The religious government in Tehran and the secular government in Damascus have had difficulties justifying their relationship domestically. The two countries are also at odds over a number of regional issues. While Iran supports federation in Iraq, Syria stands against it. Iran prefers a weak, Iranian-friendly, Shiite-dominated Iraq. Syria, by contrast, seeks a relatively strong, secular Iraq with a clear Arab identify. In Palestine, Iran supports Hamas and armed struggle to further its interests and influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, while Syria supports the organisation as part of its struggle against the Israeli occupation of Arab territories. The two countries also disagree over security arrangements in the Gulf. Syria stands for non-proliferation, while Iran continues to enrich uranium.

Regardless, the Syrian-Iranian alliance has survived all sorts of difficulties over the past three decades and is likely to endure, no matter who wins the presidential elections in Iran.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations at the faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.