New Afghan strategy won't succeed as it stands drifting off course

Despite eight years of occupation, military intervention and developmental funding this year has been the worst in terms of the security situation for the Afghan people and the American and the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force. General Stanley McChrystal has admitted this, as did US President Barack Obama in his West Point address, which provided America and its fatigued Western allies with an exit strategy, provided they can get the implementation right. It would provide an opportunity for the Afghan people to mitigate their long suffering if they are empowered to resolve their own problems.

The occupation of Afghanistan was suffered rather than supported in the region. It is, however, now clear to all that this occupation and that of Iraq have increased terrorism and extremism worldwide — as Pakistan, the most affected country, has found to its cost.

For Pakistan, the new policy provides a complex challenge which requires a deliberative consensus-backed policy response to turn it into an opportunity rather than adding to the internal pressures it already faces. The rest of the region is, essentially, on the sidelines apprehensive of its inability to affect an outcome with serious implications.

The most important task is that the issues should be clearly framed, not just in a reactive manner to the still-evolving Obama policy but according to the realities on the ground.

Obama's latest policy vision is still dominated by the military surge, though couched in terms of protecting Afghans. For the people developmental surge and political reconciliation surge do not yet carry the same weight. There has to be a recognition that, particularly with the additional 30,000 to 35,000 troops that will take the foreign forces near to the Soviet troop level, bringing stability to Afghanistan can only be achieved by Afghans through an efficient army composed of all ethnic groups, less corrupt governance and through using the traditional decentralised Afghan tribal structure. This needs to be supported by American/Nato forces who should for the foreseeable future maintain an over-the-horizon capacity for targeted military intervention.

The pivotal role of Pakistan gives it an opportunity to forge a closer relationship with America, provided that there are no detrimental developments and Pakistan is not made a scapegoat for the failure of the eight years of occupation. Otherwise, mounting public and other pressures may force the government to end cooperation on Afghanistan with America, whatever the economic cost.

Pakistan must make its red lines clear. The extra troops in the south and southeast of Afghanistan should minimise collateral civilian damage, or they will drive more Taliban elements into Pakistan. There is the threat of drone attacks being extended into Balochistan and of American troop excursions into Pakistan to deal with alleged Al Qaida safe havens straddling the border and the demand that Pakistan take on all Taliban factions simultaneously. Al Qaida, with probably less than 200 operatives in the region, is not a locational threat but an ideological movement feeding off American policies — including support for Israel's occupation of Palestinian land. It is worth emphasising that no actionable intelligence has ever been shared with Pakistan by America on any Al Qaida haven in Pakistan.

Pakistan has taken on the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and internal terrorism and cannot open up other unnecessary fronts at a time when in Afghanistan America is calling for dialogue and reconciliation with all parties. Pakistan, which has 25 million Pashtuns — more than Afghanistan's total population, cannot afford to alienate them as well as their crucial support for internal reconciliation and a new dispensation. Pakistan should also begin fencing its border with Afghanistan and insist on returning the more than 2.4 million Afghan refugees.

There has to be a common international and regional understanding on the basic framework for Afghanistan. First of all, the physical occupation of Afghanistan must end — though interventional capacity to counter terrorist threats should be retained by America. Only then will the Afghans be forced to deal with their own problems in their traditional manner of both decentralised structures, consultation mechanisms and occasional military confrontation. Secondly, this should lead to empowerment of all Afghan ethnic and other factions including the Pashtuns, who cannot expect to dominate as before but must be given the stake they deserve to bring them onboard. Thirdly, the Afghans must choose their own form of government and those who will lead it. Fourthly, no country should use Afghanistan or its territory to try to destabilise any of its neighbours. American policy in Afghanistan should include inhibiting any such attempts.

Pakistan, for its part, must prioritise political stability, robustly continuingly to combat terrorism and ensure peace in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan . Then even a somewhat unfriendly Afghanistan would pose no threat.

Obama's new policy on Afghanistan is unlikely to succeed unless it is modified and implemented to bring all Afghans and Pakistanis onboard.

Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder is a retired Pakistani diplomat currently on the faculty of the National Defence University.The opions expressed are his own.