As international attention focuses on the antics of a Palestinian president trying to gain some sort of sovereignty over the small Arab islets under Israeli occupation in the West Bank, Hamas is keeping a steady course in the statelet of Gaza and has really no reason to go to vote in the January 2010 Palestinian elections.
Staying the course in Gaza, like elsewhere, means maintaining political power that by extension involves safeguarding a military monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
After Hamas won the January 2006 elections in a fair and democratic manner, Fatah was blistered by its defeat and denied Hamas' victory.
Hamas' takeover of Gaza in June 2007 and ousting of Fatah affiliates was a reaction to Fatah's proud but vain attempts to gain control of the crossing points with Israel. Knee capping was a technique used by Hamas against Fatah.
In whatever remains of Palestine, history has a stained sense of justice and an even more jaded sense of humour. During the first intifada, Fatah, led by its strongman Mohammad Dahlan in Gaza, famously "shaved beards" of captured Hamas fighters.
Just as Hamas was in a sense seeking revenge in June 2007 for Fatah's misdemeanors, so Hamas is now confronted by a more extremist brand of militancy. Just like Fatah before them, Hamas has been going into mosques to evict armed men disgruntled at how power is being wielded.
One such group goes under the banner of Jund Al Islam, or the Army of Islam, which was essentially led by a belligerent young man named Mumtaz from the southern Gaza Dugmush clan.
Previously, Fatah negotiated and bribed family clans; now Hamas simply puts them back in their place. The Helles family in northern Gaza was also subdued in the aftermath of Hamas' crackdown against civil disobedience, illegal trade and as a general gesture of showing who is boss in the Strip.
Unlike Fatah, Hamas is now confronted with the Salafists, who were heavily involved in the Iraqi insurgency. The Salafists have ties to Al Qaida and criticise Hamas for not implementing Sharia and for not declaring Gaza an Islamic emirate.
When Hamas cracked down on their mosques in August 2009, the Salafist group, known as Jund Ansar Allah, or the Army of God's Companions, supposedly used suicide bombings as a means to a higher end — a first-ever in inter-Palestinian fighting.
Though Hamas succeeded in quelling the Salafists and killed Abdul Latif Mousa, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah, Hamas remains preoccupied with its popularity in Gaza.
Having come to power democratically in 2006, and having maintained and consolidated that power militarily, Hamas has been able to bring more transparency to what little business there is and more security to what remains of the cities. However, the Israeli and international boycott continues to strangle the 1.5 million Gazans.
Hamas is not delivering on a political deal with Fatah; and Fatah is floundering further.
Hamas' priority is above all to stay its course in Gaza, quickly and efficiently subduing internal dissent, slowly and steadily biding political time, waiting for Fatah, Israel and the international community to realise that power-sharing is the only formula.
Power-sharing is based on inter-Palestinian reconciliation and an agreed-upon national unity government. Hamas and Fatah were close to reaching such an agreement earlier this autumn, which would have increased the chances of participation in the upcoming elections, but once again external forces intervened.
The US prefers to not see a Hamas-Fatah tandem emerge because that would mean sharing a security structure that it has funded and trained with the Islamic movement. .
Hamas, however, could accept up to 5,000 Fatah police inside Gaza. However, without access to the West Bank and no end to the blockade in sight, the war against Hamas continues with consistent Israeli bombings along the Egyptian border to impede the unstoppable tunnel trade and in Gaza to target Hamas leaders.
It also seems convenient for Israel to have a perpetual enemy at the gates.
Why participate in a system that excludes you? After having won the democratic game last time around, rather than vote again Hamas will wait now.
The curious claims that the Palestinian National Authority will dissolve without President Mahmoud Abbas is all smoke to hide his weakness in the West Bank; and whether or not Salam Fayyad or Dahlan follows suit in Ramallah will not change Israel's security domination.
What is most surprising to most observers — even cynics are dismayed — is the speed at which US President Barack Obama and his administration folded to Israeli demands, particularly regarding the controversial issues of illegal Jewish colonies on occupied Palestinian territory.
Hamas can rightly ask: what about reconciliation with the Arab-Muslim world, Mr Obama?
- Stuart Reigeluth is editor of revolve-magazine.com
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