Cure the Lebanese disease

Once more, Lebanon is in political crisis. This time, we are told, it pits "Syrian- and Iranian-backed" Shiite parties (Hezbollah and Amal) and the Christian faction led by Michel Aoun against the "Western-backed" Christian, Sunni and Druze groups that support the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

These very descriptions - citing one external backer or another as a mark of political identification - illustrate the fundamental problem Lebanon must overcome. Call it the Lebanese Disease: Rather than sorting out their differences internally and addressing the fundamental injustices at the heart of their disputes, the Lebanese constantly look to outsiders to gain an advantage over their rivals.

Naturally, any advantages thus gained are short-lived, for both the Lebanese and their foreign backers. In the end, the only result is greater popular suffering and instability in Lebanon and the entire Middle East.

Only the Lebanese can cure themselves of this disease, but a bit of enlightened self-interest on the part of the "Western backers" -primarily the United States and France - would greatly help. It may seem counterintuitive, but the best hope for American interests in the Middle East is not to isolate and minimise Hezbollah, but to further integrate it politically, socially and militarily into the Lebanese state.

For one thing, it is harder today to suggest to Lebanese nationalists that Hezbollah is simply a mindless proxy for the Iranians. Throughout the Middle East, religious extremism and Arab nationalism are becoming identical, with the former becoming the only effective means of pursuing the latter.

This is true of the Sunni extremists in Iraq and throughout the Arab world, as well as of the Shiite extremists of Hezbollah in Lebanon, whose resistance to the Israelis, clearly motivated at least in part by a desire to support the Sunni Palestinians, has paradoxically made them a hero of the Sunni Arab street.

On the other hand, the potent demonstration of Hezbollah's ability to resist Israeli forces gave many Lebanese nationalists, even Sunnis, a new desire to preserve the radical group in the service of all Lebanon.

Farsighted leadership

Given a more farsighted leadership, these two factors could have given the Lebanese an impetus to forge a new political compact for the country. In sum, if Hezbollah were given a greater stake in Lebanon, it would progressively become more Lebanese.

Which brings us back to the barricades now dividing the centre of Beirut. All sides are indulging themselves in an orgy of historical recrimination and stoking fantasies that they can achieve their goals through confrontation. Not only would a civil war be a disaster for all Lebanese, but among the ever-present foreign backers, the United States would lose most.

Tacitly encouraging civil war is seldom wise and particularly when the side with which one is affiliated cannot win. It should be obvious that American - and Israeli - interests are best served by a unified Lebanese state that has clear control over its people and its territory. We now know that Hezbollah is not going to be eradicated nor its influence reduced.

So the only way of making the Lebanese government accountable is to encourage the progressive, moderating integration of Hezbollah into the political, social and military fabric of the state.

How could Washington help this happen? Well, for one thing, we should give up talk of greatly enlarging the multinational force in southern Lebanon and convince the Europeans to do likewise.

A far more genuine American commitment to Lebanon would focus on helping the parties to come up with a reasonable formula to redress the under-representation of Shiites in the power structure while getting greater government control over Hezbollah's war-making capacity.

Make no mistake: Hezbollah is no friend to America. As a former US intelligence officer, I know there are a few accounts yet to be settled with that organisation. But Washington will never achieve its objectives in the Middle East - including its obligation to ensure Israel's long-term security - unless it puts emotions aside and deals realistically with facts on the ground. Like it or not, Hezbollah is one of those facts. A less-than-pliable but strong government in Lebanon would be far preferable to no real government at all, which is what we have now.

Robert Grenier, a former director of the CIA's counterintelligence centre, is a security consultant.