Lebanon's broken road to victory

Even if it was not a "divine victory", the war that lasted from July 12 to August 14, 2006 was an accomplishment nevertheless because Hezbollah managed to thwart Israel's intentions to wipe out the only Lebanese militia that has resisted occupation for almost two decades.

The war shattered the methodically crafted image of an invincible Israel and put Hezbollah on a roller coaster, fostering a feeling of patriotism among the Lebanese. It also created fresh opportunities to break the deadlocks that have stifled Lebanon's economy.

By all estimates, the Hezbollah militia had planned to engage in a small skirmish by raiding an Israeli patrol.

They killed eight soldiers and abducted two others, hoping to force a prisoner exchange or test waters on behalf of Iran.

In the words of Secretary-General Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah was surprised by the large-scale war that followed, which seemed to be aimed at not only destroying the militia's offensive military capabilities, but also at creating new realities on the ground.

The month-long war led to the deaths of 1,900 Lebanese (including 600 Hezbollah fighters) and 160 Israelis, including 117 soldiers. The Israeli decision to attack civilians and to target Lebanon's infrastructure was equally devastating.

An estimated 80 bridges were destroyed. At least 30 major targets — such as the Beirut harbour, as well as the city's international airport — suffered heavy damage. Power stations that fed the electrical grid were routinely bombed. The destruction of storage tanks at the Jiyah power facility and the leak of an estimated 15,000 tonnes of crude oil created the largest oil spill in the history of the Mediterranean Sea.

Many roadways, water and sewage treatment plants, fuel stations, commercial structures, schools, hospitals and private homes were indiscriminately bombarded. More than a million Lebanese citizens were displaced as thousands of dwellings were destroyed. International experts estimate the damage to the Lebanese economy to be above $7 billion or roughly 30 per cent of the country's GDP.

As opposed to the Israeli air force's 12,000 combat missions, its navy's 2,500 shells and its army's 100,000 plus ammunition, Hezbollah fired close to 4,300 rockets, most of which carried a 30-kilogram warhead over a 30 kilometre range. More than 4,000 Israeli civilians were seriously injured while 43 were killed during the 34-day confrontation. Over 350,000 civilians were evacuated from Israeli border towns as rockets fell on Nahariyyah, Safed, Afula, Maalot, Tiberias and even Haifa.

Hundreds of sophisticated anti-tank missiles destroyed or severely damaged up to 50 Merkava tanks. To put it mildly, this was an unparalleled confrontation that severely upset the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government, which never recovered from it. In a devastating assessment — the so-called Winograd Commission Report — Olmert was severely criticised.

Hard-won gains

The government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora — with full Hezbollah backing — secured a ceasefire through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This critical mandate beefed up the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from a few thousand observers to a 15,000 combat-ready force drawn from leading Western countries such as Belgium, France, Italy and Spain among others. Though Resolution 1701 gave Israel the reassurance that Hezbollah would not be allowed to operate south of the Litani River, and that its primary goal was to protect Israel from Hezbollah, one of its salutary features was the deployment of Lebanese Army units to the south after almost a 40-year absence.

Resolution 1701 further stated that the Shia militia would be disarmed, no new arms would be deployed — except to boost the Lebanese military — and that clear border demarcations would finally be drawn between Lebanon and its two neighbours. In the year since the resolution, no changes have been recorded in any of these clauses. Hezbollah refused to hand over its weapons to the government and Syria continued to arm its allies, including Al Qaida-backed groups that challenged authorities at the Nahr Al Bared refugee camp. Israel, for its part, denied the UNIFIL or the Lebanese Army permission to deploy in the occupied Sheba'a farms.

Even if Resolution 1701 served Israel well, the war secured Israel's respect for Hezbollah because it has been the only Arab force to have inflicted serious damage on the Jewish state, both militarily as well as politically.

For the Israelis especially, with Israeli Minister of Defence Ehud Barak promising a "return to deterrence", any decision to wage war can no longer be justified. Moreover, with an international financial commitment to Lebanon — most recently an $8 billion portfolio negotiated at the Paris III talks — Israel will have to justify putative military behaviour to its Western allies.

Failings of the victory

Though Hezbollah recorded undeniable success on both the battlefield and the regional checkerboard, it also suffered from serious political confusion which has prevented it from harvesting concrete benefits from its quest for power.

Two fundamental but linked challenges illustrate the deadlock: domestic schisms and foreign alliances.

Almost always oppressed, many Lebanese Shiites rallied behind Nasrallah as a champion of their cause. Hezbollah parliamentarians have done well in various governments, but have been questioned about their commitment to the law.

After the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, some have questioned Hezbollah's sense of justice. Beholden to their Syrian and Iranian allies, Hezbollah leaders have used every tactic to delay approving an international tribunal which would probe the alleged culprits. This blunder besmirched an otherwise model agenda. Hassan Nasrallah benefitted from Rafik Hariri's generosity when the latter was alive but concluded his Syrian and Iranian alliances were more valuable after his death. Sayed's inconsistencies appeared to many as if he picked the wrong allies, for no aspiring nationalist leader can survive in Lebanon if he places foreigners ahead of his fellow citizens.

Alternative religious leaders

This judgment is buttressed by the emergence of gutsy religious leaders, especially among Muslims. They reject the status quo created by Hezbollah and openly call for strengthening the 1943 Lebanese co-existence pact as amended in the 1983 Ta'if Accord.

After sectarian skirmishes in early 2007, Hassan Nasrallah issued a religious ruling forbidding the killing of fellow countrymen. Lebanon's top Sunni clerics issued a similar religious edict, and Maronite Christian clerics called for a "truce among the nation's sons". It seems that this religious prohibition to engage in fighting fellow Lebanese and against attacking private and public property — which was not issued at the height of the 15-year long civil war (1975-1990) — was a direct consequence of the 2006 war.

Yet, more important than decrees or statements issued by carefully vetted councils, courageous religious clerics such as Mufti of the Republic Mohammad Kabbani or Mufti of Mount Lebanon Mohammad Ali Jouzou were openly critical of other clerics.
Even Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, the nominal head of the Maronite Church, intervened to secure an "honours pact" among various Christian groups claiming metaphysical certitude in their obtuse political agendas.

The new military

Perhaps the most important consequence of the 2006 war was the transformation of the Lebanese military that went from being a confessional outfit into becoming a genuine defender of national unity.

Its commander, Major General Michel Sulaiman, painstakingly transformed his institution into a professional group that was able to settle internal disputes. Indeed, one may confidently surmise that if Lebanese leaders fail to agree on a new president later in the year, or indefinitely postpone the establishment of a transparent and working government that will focus on reconstruction and development, the army will intervene to restore order.

In the meantime, chances are that Prime Minister Siniora will govern with proven consistency until September 25, 2007, when Speaker Nabih Berri has scheduled a constitutional conclave in parliament to elect a new president. Any efforts to thwart that process will most likely see General Sulaiman — perhaps propelled to become a contender to the post — openly intervene to protect the Lebanese government and ensure fair elections. Chances are that Hezbollah and its Aounist supporters will step up and support both the legality and the will of the majority until the next parliamentary elections to be held in 2009.

Imminent dangers

This does not mean that Lebanon is out of danger. In fact, the result of the 2006 war has been a full-fledged power struggle. For the first time in the history of Lebanon, secular and religious leaders alike are competing to display renewed patriotism, even if the Lebanese only perceive the army as its sole guarantor. Because the army engaged the Al Qaida-inspired group Fatah Al Islam at the Nahr Al Bared refugee camp and rejected Nasrallah's mistaken red line warning, it gained the added respect and gratitude of a wary population.

In the aftermath of this devastating situation, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon will probably be regularised and this might even force a massive a restructuring of the outdated 1969 Cairo Accords that permitted Palestinians to carry weapons in Lebanon. Few should be surprised if the Lebanese Army eventually emerges as the sole legitimate military force in the country. In fact, few can now object to a legitimate army that defends the country and protects its citizens.

The other danger facing Lebanon is a potential clash between Israel and Syria to separate Damascus from Iran and revive the Syrian peace track. A putative assault on Syria and Iran will strip Hezbollah of its financial and military backers and obligate it to compromise with Lebanese partners.

In fact, Hezbollah leaders have never recovered from the lack of direct assistance from their allies in 2006, which may yet persuade them to seek a political victory when they will voluntarily perceive fellow Lebanese as partners rather than rivals.

Rise in patriotism

It is often mistakenly assumed that the "wisdom" of the Lebanese lies in trying to outsmart their differences. Indeed, one may easily fall into such an analytical trap, which concludes that Lebanese factions compete with each other to destroy the "State" and eliminate its intrinsic ability to resist all foes. On the contrary, like most "civilised" nations that have experienced civil wars, foreign invasions and Manichean interventions to serve larger interests than those envisaged by a culturally emancipated society, democracy in Lebanon has endured for six decades.

Therefore, one can legitimately argue that the 2006 devastation strengthened its battered institutions and rekindled its patriotic fervour. To cavalierly dismiss such gains is a denial of reality.

The 2006 war will most likely be remembered for its devastation and horror, including the legacy of millions of cluster bombs dropped by Israel between August 11 and 14. Yet it will also be remembered for its contribution to the rebirth of genuine patriotism. Lebanon is a long way from a permanent settlement with its indomitable neighbours, but its quest for peace and development stay strong. There are still too many party flags but the national flag is increasingly viewed as more than a symbol. It can, once again, become an emblem of its peaceful unity among all confessional stripes to preserve the blood shed by patriots under the immortal shadow of its watchful Cedar.

Gory trail to glory

• July 12, 2006 — Hezbollah guerrillas attack an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) patrol killing eight soldiers and capturing two others. A full-scale war ensues.
• Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert describes this as an "act of war" and holds the Lebanese government responsible. The IDF launches air and artillery attacks on southern Lebanon, widely considered the stronghold of Hezbollah
• July 13 — Israel begins an air and naval blockade against Lebanon and bombs Beirut International Airport. Various other installations are attacked, cutting off southern Lebanon from Beirut.
• July 30 — Qana witnesses one of the worst wounds of the war. The Israel Air Force's offensive on the village resulted in a three-storey building collapsing, killing 91 Lebanese refugees sheltered there. Israel claims that rockets were being fired from houses in Qana
• Attacks continue from both sides till August 14 with no letdown in hostilities.
• August 12 — Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah agree to a United Nations ceasefire that would commence on August 14.
• August 14 — Ceasefire comes into effect based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. However, attacks and counter-attacks continue.
• August 27 — UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan calls Israel's continuing blockade on Lebanon "an infringement on [Lebanese] sovereignity".
• September 7-8 — Israel lifts aviation and naval blockade.
• September 22 — Hezbollah leader Sayed Hassan Nasrallah holds a victory rally and says Hezbollah is stronger than it was before July 12, 2006.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.