Will Europe ever put forth a unified face inside Nato?

The future of the transatlantic relationship has become a European Obsession. Americans are more relaxed on the issue. It is only natural that it should be so. America has a well-defined geo-political vision, while its role in the transatlantic relationship is clearly that of a leader. The same cannot be said about Europe.

The old continent continues to be divided over the future of its security and defence policy, while the bitter-wounds suffered in the diplomatic onslaught preceding the war on Iraq remain wide open. Will Europe ever recover and put forth a unified face? The question is daring, but precedent suggests there is reason to believe it will.

A far more interesting question is: will Europe attempt to rebuild its shattered face inside Nato (as it has done so many times before), or will it opt for an independent structure putting forth to the Americans a new framework for the Transatlantic relationship? While all in Europe agree that it should augment its security and defence capabilities, they disagree on how to do it.

The French, the Belgians, and Luxemburg (Germany doesn't really fall into this club even though a few weeks back it partook of a join defence summit with the three) and a few others, think Europe ought to look outside the Nato framework to erect a functioning ESDP. Britain, Spain, Holland, and Italy disagree. As do most of the newcomers. They are wrong to.

Beyond his Gaullist tendencies, and his neurotic allergy to an American-administered global order, Jacque Chirac has a point or two when he says Europe ought to build a "European" defence and security pillar independent of Nato; though he is still dead wrong when he dwells on developing Europe into a challenger to the U.S. As it often happens, Chirac then is right for many of the wrong reasons.

Here's the problem with the Nato approach as a way of reviving the transatlantic relationship. For one, Nato is too heavily dominated by the Americans. Anyone familiar with the Nato decision-making structure will come to understand that. This is a "non-starter" for a Europe increasingly interested in playing a heavy-weight.

Second, Nato is becoming increasingly political. It today matters as little, and probably less, to the Americans as it does to the French. Ever since the Kosovo experience Americans regard Nato as a club where military decisions are lawyered to death by politicians with conflicting interests.

On top of it all, Kosovo proved an operational nightmare. Americans now go to Nato subsequently. Of secondary importance to Washington, Nato then cannot be the principal link holding together the transatlantic partnership.

Unless of course, the Europeans are supposed to forever play a subservient role. This is another "non-starter." Europeans are not prepared to do America's dishes forever. Nato, on the other hand, particularly America's new-found relationship with the alliance, offers no serious alternative.

Third, Nato's commitment to expansion "far and beyond" is diluting the transatlantic strategic culture. Already with the addition of seven former Communist states into the alliance, any talk of a common strategic vision is but mere rhetoric. In constructing America's support base for an attack on Iraq, Rumsfeld was able to split the European Nato community into "new" and "old."

This provided Washington with enough political coverage to go after Saddam; with enough Nato members committed so as to give Washington the option of pulling the alliance into Iraq at a latter stage; and just enough opposition to give Bush reason for side-stepping the alliance altogether in the war-fighting phase.

With new enlargement scheduled to push Nato into the Balkans and Central Asia, these divergences amongst strategic cultures are only poised to grow. All the more reason for why Nato is a poor framework for redefining the transatlantic partnership.

Nato, however is not irrelevant. To the contrary. Its future lies in dealing with overarching common treats like terrorism, WMD, hermetic regimes, and status-quo challengers, as well as, in spreading stability and security into Central Asia through its "open-door" policy. These are important roles, and Nato will have to remain committed to up-keeping its military capability.

Then there is also a more subtle, but more fundamental difference between Europe and America which often gets overlooked. The fact that Europe and the U.S. agree on many issues does not annul the fact that there are fundamental issues upon which they disagree. Namely, they disagree on the role of force in a security posture. Americans are keener on using it early. Europeans, while not by principle anti-military, tend to oppose using it at all.

And it's not just a matter of capabilities either. Many claim that if Europe invested more into its military capabilities, it would be keener on using this vector. These critics while correct in their assumption are wrong in their proposition. Europeans will simply not match their American partner in military spending: in fact they won't even come close.

The European emphasis is elsewhere, as is the European wallet. So really, telling Europeans to spend more is another "non-starter." The focal point of a European security and defence doctrine will almost certainly be elsewhere - perhaps more focused on diplomatic persuasion or conflict prevention and management techniques.

The geopolitical picture suggests differences too. Americans are less affected by the high-profile geo-political game being played today on the Eurasian continent. Europe on the other shares a border with both Russia and Central Asia, and must therefore learn how to mange its relations with both.

Containment and pre-emption vis-à-vis these are not options Europeans can or necessarily want to count on. Rather, Europe's security is directly dependent on how functional the EU-Russia-Central Asian triangle will be. So really, a strategic partnership with a strong Russia is indispensable for European security. America on the other hand is likely to resist a strong Russia.

Not to mention that once Russia builds itself into a global energy superpower, and once China translates its economic boom into global political clout, Europe will serve as a supply of ponds which Russia, China, and the U.S. will use in implementing individual geo-political strategies. Unless of course Europe can build itself-up to parallel the three.

A strong America, strong Russia, and a weak Europe would unequivocally spell disaster for Europe. Already, Brussels is finding it difficult keeping it together. And so far, it has only to deal with a manipulative Bush administration.

If Putin were to exert equal pressure, Europe's days as a common entity would be numbered. Nato does not provide the framework which Europe could use to guard against these pressures, while simultaneously develop into a global player.

Having said that, there are two main problems with the current transatlantic structure: (one) it doesn't allow for Europe to structure a defence and security posture suitable to its needs, abilities, and priorities, and (two) it is based on a framework which is increasingly political in nature, diluted in coherence, and systematically side-lined by its strongest member.

So for Euro