Time to shed dreams for reality in Palestine

Violence in the Occupied Territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip is increasing with each passing day. Israel has now introduced the use of tanks to blast away Palestinian houses and ground attacks are becoming more frequent. Helicopter gunships are rocketing Palestinians from the air while tanks and bulldozers are firing and demolishing from below. Palestinian activists are also being assassinated in cold blood as part of Ariel Sharon's deliberate policy to weaken Palestinian resistance. There is no end in sight to this mayhem.

But as the fighting rages, some bitter facts are becoming clearer. The most important of these is the inability, or sheer helplessness of the Palestinian leadership to control the chain of events, or even direct them towards a coherent goal. Yasser Arafat is yet to come out with a clear strategy in wake of the collapse of negotiations with Israel and the downfall of Ehud Barak. It is almost as if Palestinians ran out of ideas after Camp David. This intellectual drought, for lack of a more appropriate term, has already begun to take its toll on the movement.

No one seems to know where Arafat is headed. No one has any idea, least of all himself, of how he is going to tackle Sharon and his shoot-first policy. In normal days such policy paralysis could have been explained away in general terms, but in the given situation it stands out in stark contrast to the clear aggression of Sharon and the equally clear response from the Palestinian street. Arafat is caught in the crossfire, not knowing whether to duck out, or face the situation.

He cannot afford to duck, not if he wants to survive politically. But in order to face the situation and get a grip on it, Arafat needs to make some tough decisions. These decisions will have to define his stance on the peace process, on engaging with Sharon, on the intifada and on America's role. They however need to be based on realities, howsoever bitter they might be. What then are some of these realities?

First is the virtual demise of the Oslo Accords. Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon have done their bit to kill it. Arafat too has chipped in generously by his vacillations. The land for peace principle lies in ruins. The concept of an independent Israeli state as envisioned at Oslo is also in its terminal stage.

With the foundation for negotiations a wreck, there is little sense in trying to build a new structure on it. In a sense, the final sprint for a deal just before prime ministerial elections in February marked the apex of the talks process. The two sides, leaning across over two cliffs separated by a deep chasm, barely touched fingers. Then they slipped and plunged into the depths. There is no crawling back.

Which brings up the next reality. With the talks process in tatters, Sharon is now in a position to dictate new terms and conditions. If Barak failed to reach a deal, there is no way that Sharon can. He doesn't have any intentions to do so, and neither the required political will. There is nothing left to talk about, and Arafat should realise this. Unless new rules of the game are established and fresh parameters chalked out, Arafat and his men should harbour no hopes that a negotiated settlement of the conflict is possible. Days of diplomacy seem numbered.

This is confirmed by the third reality: the changed U.S. role in the equation. The era of Clinton-type heavy engagement is over. Barak and Arafat reached where they did because they were pushed by Clinton. On their own they might not have even got half way. Clinton is gone and with him America's policy of hands-on involvement. Bush administration's refusal to "force peace" is a clear indicator that if any movement has to take place on the peace front, it has to be self-generated. With one party least interested in doing so, there is little chance of a meeting of leaders, let alone meeting of minds. Arafat has to come to terms with the fact that he is on his own, and that he can no longer look towards Washington for tough decisions.

This is compounded by the fourth reality: external political support for the Palestinian issue is not likely to increase more than its present level. Arab states have done what they can, which means talking tough and opening their wallets. There will be more meetings, more condemnations of Israel and more warnings to America, but to expect anything beyond this would be unrealistic. In the brutal game of global power politics, this is the optimum support that these states can give. They do not seem to have any other choice.

The balance sheet for Arafat then looks something like this: No more talks, no more concessions from Israel, no more help from America and no significantly greater level of support from allies. A depressing scenario, but a realistic one.

This being so, where does Arafat go from here? First of all, he should articulate a new line which does not draw strength from the Oslo process. It can be a line of peace, or a line of resistance, but whichever one it is, it needs to be unambiguous, cogent and decisive. The first tangible benefit will be that the intifada will acquire a direction and a defined purpose. Palestinian men, women and children cannot keep on dying without a clear end in sight. Freedom is the ultimate goal, but the road to freedom needs to be defined. This should be priority number one.

Second, there should be a concerted effort to unify the Palestinian struggle and synchronise efforts to achieve results. Oslo divided Palestinians. Hamas went its own way, Hezbollah fought its own war with Israel and Arafat jumped onto the American bandwagon.

A decade later, they have the opportunity to come back towards each other. Hezbollah has proved its point by driving Israel out of South Lebanon, Hamas is seeing an increasing number of Palestinians and Arabs agreeing with its line, and Arafat stands alone after being stripped of the legitimacy which Oslo had bestowed on him. With Sharon controlling Tel Aviv and Bush showing a lesser degree of concern about the situation, Palestinian can forge a united front. This will entail compromises, but time has never been better for such compromises. Arafat must grab them.

Lastly, Arafat must decide how far he is willing to go in dealing with Sharon. A unilateral declaration of independence might invite Israeli reoccupation of Palestinian territories. It may lead to military escalation, and even war involving neighbours. But the consequences of not doing anything are not too pretty either.

The worst thing that Arafat can do is to call for an independent state comprising all Palestinian territories including Jerusalem, but negotiate for compromises. This strategy did not work with Barak and it certainly is not going to work with Sharon.

At the end, there is of course the inevitable question: is Arafat up to all this? He has his share of critics who believe that at this stage in his life, he cannot make radical decisions. The great survivor that he is, Arafat is capable of making tactful choices, but are they also wise ones? It is no secret that his presence suits all "vested interests".

He is considered a "safe" bet because there is nothing secret or unpredictable about him. Israelis know how to deal with him and Americans know what to expect from him. A new leader could up