The Israeli and American attacks on Iran — along with Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel — marked one of the most turbulent moments in an already unstable Middle East. The Israel-Iran War that lasted for 12 days between June 13-24, 2025, posed the most serious threat to Arabian Gulf security and to the national security of each GCC state since the end of the Cold War.
All GCC states condemned Israel’s attack on Iran and, to varying degrees, denounced the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, viewing them as a serious violation of Iranian sovereignty and a threat to regional security. Neither the GCC states nor Iran desire a collapse of the fragile ceasefire established on June 24 or a return to hostilities.
The Iranian attack on Al Udeid Air Base on June 23, 2025, though symbolic, carried the most serious message Iran could send to the GCC states: that the Gulf’s military infrastructure, closely tied to Western networks, is viewed as an integral part of the strategic equation in times of escalation. Despite the Iranian president’s later apology for the attack, Iran must start taking confidence-building measures with its neighbours and commit to ensuring that such a serious breach of the sovereignty of any GCC state is never repeated.
Despite the bitterness surrounding Iran’s attack on Qatar, the key lesson of the Israel-Iran war appears to be the urgent need to restructure relations between the two shores of the Gulf. This restructuring would prevent such incidents from obstructing the rapprochement that had begun to emerge in GCC-Iran relations before the war — a path that we believe represents the most solid guarantee for Gulf security.
Unlike the 2015 negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s desire now aligns with that of the GCC states to reach a new nuclear agreement that would spare the region further turmoil and instability resulting from the potential renewal of dangerous confrontations between Iran (and its allies) on one side and the US and Israel on the other. In addition to Oman’s good offices between the US and Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are also playing a role in facilitating message exchanges, communications, and de-escalation efforts between the two sides.
Sustained diplomatic engagement between the GCC and Iran is essential to maintain open channels of communication and address mutual concerns. This engagement represents a pragmatic approach to easing tensions, preventing escalation, and promoting regional stability. In short, renewed diplomatic efforts — based on mutual respect and shared interests — could pave the way for a more stable and cooperative regional future.
However, continued diplomatic engagement requires that Iran transforms into a normal state that maintains cordial relations with its neighbours and abandons its previous behaviour that has destabilised the region. This conduct has long caused diplomatic crises with GCC states and has included supporting movements and militias in Arab countries, interfering in the internal affairs of GCC states, and engaging in military escalation in Gulf waters.
Moreover, Iran and the GCC share a mutual interest in countering the “Clash of Civilisations” narrative, which implies an inevitable conflict between the West and the Muslim world. The development and spread of this narrative have long been troubling for both Arabs and Iranians. Both parties, even independently, have consistently rejected the thesis and its implications. They remain jointly committed to defending their cultures and countering Western and American tendencies to stereotype and demonise Middle Easterners and Muslims. The GCC states and Iran also share deep historical, social, cultural, and religious ties that bind the Arabian Gulf together.
Strategically, the GCC and Iran have overlapping interests in maritime security, energy, and trade. A primary shared concern is the security of maritime routes critical for the export of goods and energy resources, on which both populations heavily depend. Although only Iran has occasionally issued rhetorical threats against maritime commerce, the repercussions have been harmful, not only to the economies of the eight Gulf countries but to global trade more broadly.
The GCC and Iran also share a strategic interest in the production and pricing of oil and gas. Collectively, they have the potential to serve as a global energy hub. Iran remains a significant trading partner for several GCC states, particularly the UAE and Oman. The UAE has historically been Iran’s largest trading partner within the GCC and ranks as Iran’s second-largest trading partner globally.
Together, Iran and the GCC could emerge as a key economic corridor connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa, especially through their participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Gulf-sponsored Development Road project. China has signed comprehensive strategic partnerships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and strategic partnerships with Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Iraq.
More importantly, the Gulf region faces shared environmental threats, including climate change, water scarcity, sand and dust storms, biodiversity loss, air pollution, and nuclear risks. The Regional Organisation for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) — currently inactive — is the only joint body addressing these challenges. ROPME includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
Given the shared challenges and overlapping opportunities on both sides of the Gulf, there is an urgent need for a fresh perspective on GCC-Iran relations — one that acknowledges the historical, cultural, and strategic common ground as a foundation for cooperation. Moving beyond rivalry and zero-sum thinking, a more stable and secure future for the region depends on a cooperative approach rooted in mutual interests, reframing the relationship as a partnership between neighbours.
Mohammed Salem AlSalmi is a Senior Researcher and Head of Research & Advisory Sector at TRENDS Research & Advisory
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