Iran's strategic ploy

In GCC-Iran relations, there are a number of critical issues, which are crucial for both sides. These issues are the products of geography and history, as well as the result of the divergent national and strategic interests of the two sides.

However, unlike other examples of conflicts in the international political arena, the GCC-Iran conflict has one vital element missing.

In recent history, the Iran of the Shah and then its successor, the Iran of the clerics, has invested considerable effort and money in building power and influence centres inside some of the Gulf Arab states, and certainly inside other Arab states.

Iran has sought to harness the support of the Shiite community, or a part of it, in certain Gulf Arab states, to back Iranian political and strategic objectives.

In general terms, Iran has scored considerable success in its attempt to utilise the card of sectarian loyalty and make this loyalty superior to other loyalties.

No doubt, the great majority among the members of the Shiite communities in the Gulf states have never deviated from loyalty to their own country and to their Arab identity, and have never suffered from a conflict of loyalties. In short, they have no other loyalty superseding their loyalty to their country and to their Arab nationality.

For this majority, Iran has been, and still is, a Persian state which competes and is in conflict with its Arab neighbours. It is a state that has its own national interests which, in many areas, contradicts and is in conflict with Arab national interests.

They see no political dimension in their sectarian identity and they have never considered the need to develop sectarian loyalty or, by extension, loyalty to Iran or its political objectives.

Since the success of the Iranian revolution, the regime has tried to project Iran as the mentor, promoter and protector of Shiite interests and, indeed, of the Shiite population around the world.

Fifth column

Today, this self-proclaimed status of Iran as the leader and protector of the Arab Shiite is the main instrument of Iranian interventionist policy in internal Arab affairs.

It has been said that Iranian intelligence with the help and support of the state's religious institutions has succeeded in mobilising a ‘fifth column' in some Gulf Arab states.

This very tiny minority of citizens has allegedly accepted to serve the interests of a foreign state. With such a ‘fifth column', Iran possesses a strategic advantage over most of the Arab states.

Going back to the opening argument that the GCC-Iran conflict has some vital elements missing, we could say that the balance in this conflict is missing.

Iran is able to effectively act from within Gulf Arab societies, but the GCC states do not have the ability to redress the balance. This one-way interventionist policy has made these societies vulnerable vis-a-vis Iranian objectives.

The equation in this issue is clear. The more Iran becomes weak, the more it is going to utilise the sectarian card to gain influence and achieve its objective of destabilising Gulf Arab societies.

No doubt, for reasons relating to the nature of Bahraini society, Bahrain represents the ‘fault line' in this confrontation. Other Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with small Shiite minorities could be equally targeted.

At the same time, the people of Iran have been protesting against a regime which has shown no respect for human rights, a regime which has dealt harshly with any demand for reform and has never recognised the right of any opposition to exist.

Finally, no one should, or could, deny the right of the people — irrespective of their ethnic, religious, or sectarian origins — to demand respect for their human rights and to ask for political and economic reforms. But such justified and fair demands should not be hijacked by a tiny minority which is wearing the cloak of ‘Gulf citizenship'.

Dr Mustafa Alani, is the Director of Security Department, at the Gulf Research Centre.