Iran's opposition is still alive

 The crushing of demonstration and the mass arrests that followed do not appear to have produced the effect desired by the authorities. Nor did the show trials, accompanied by some real or concealed defections by mid-ranking leaders of the opposition, lead to the ‘end of the story' as demanded by supreme guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

That the authorities appear unable to arrest the movement's three best-known figures, former prime minister Mir Hussain Mussavi, former president Mohammad Khatami and former parliament speaker Mahdi Karrubi, could also be regarded as an indication of its strength.

No one expected the opposition to come up with a party structure in four months.

In any case, an opposition so broad and so diverse cannot be pressed into a single organisational framework. Even if we believed official figures, those who voted against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad numbered almost 14 million while a further 12 million who did not vote could not be regarded as supporters of his administration. No one could claim that such a huge segment of Iranian society could be compressed in a single party.

Nevertheless, the impression that the opposition is drifting cannot be avoided. Its strategy appears to consist of ordering demonstrations on some key dates. The next one will be on November 4, the anniversary of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by militant ‘students'. The movement's leaders look like men who hold a number of winning cards but do not know how to play them.

Torn between residual, and at times nostalgic, attachment to the myths of the Khomeinist revolution, and rational realisation of its fundamental contradictions, they do not know whether they are in or out of a system that is fast becoming anachronistic, to say the least.

The troika pretends that it wants to return to ‘the era of true Khomeinism' just as in the 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR spoke of ‘return to true Leninism'. However, Mussavi, Khatami and Karrubi are intelligent enough to know that no such ‘return' is possible. Iran should move beyond Khomeinism.

Political suicide

Nevertheless, we should not expect the troika to denounce Khomeinism publicly. For them, such a move would be tantamount to political suicide. What they could do, however, is develop rational policies and positions on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues, offering a credible alternative to Ahmadinejad's positions.

In domestic politics, the opposition must demand a new election law to end the government's total control of the process. Another key demand should be that all political parties be allowed to function freely. A third demand should be for the recognition of free trade unions.

Ultimately, no opposition could succeed without securing the support of the working people, especially in such strategic industries as oil, transport and metallurgy.

The opposition must also develop a position on Ahmadinejad's economic policies, including his privatisation programme that is designed to transfer much of the public sector to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

That policy has angered many in the traditional bazaars and among the new urban industrialists.

Ahmadinejad's decision to wound down a system of subsidies that started almost 50 years ago may be economically sound but is bound to hurt millions of the poorest Iranians.

The opposition must offer an alternative if it is to maintain its mass base.

On foreign policy, the opposition must say something about the policies and postures that could lead to sanctions and war, despite US President Barack Obama's efforts to reach an accommodation with Ahmadinejad.

The opposition should draw the people's attention to the fact that Iran is being ostracised and turned into a global bogeyman. The opposition has at least 40 supporters in the Majlis, (parliament) and should use them to vocalise alternative domestic and foreign policies.

Though purged from many parts of the government, pro-opposition figures are still present in many key offices, including the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Council. There is little doubt that a good part of the military also sympathise with the opposition.

Ultimately, Iran may need a new departure in history, as did the USSR of the 1980s. The troika now active in Tehran cannot think in terms of so dramatic a transformation. By history, temperament and, perhaps, even political conviction it tries to be a loyal opposition, a kind of ‘shadow-cabinet' within the regime.

Such a position may not solve Iran's fundamental problems. But it could help ease tension, curb the radical faction's irrational exuberance, and, in time, participate in the transition to a people-based system of government.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.