Neighbours' itch, owner's burn

Battle lines in the Arab world were clearly drawn in 2008, dividing the region into “moderate'' and “conservative'' camps.

The “moderates'', headed by Saudi Arabia, include Egypt, Jordan and the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority — all of them strongly backed by the United States.

The “conservatives'', headed by Syria and Iran, include Hamas, Hezbollah and, more recently, Qatar, and Turkey to a lesser extent. Being tossed around in this political game are Iraq and Lebanon, which are ruled by a combination of moderates and conservatives.

The roots of what has been taking place in the region since 2006 can, however, be traced directly or indirectly to Iran and its “cold war'' with Saudi Arabia and the outgoing George W. Bush administration in the United States.

Iran is determined to establish and maintain itself as a regional superpower, challenging pro-Western states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, foiling peace talks with Israel and exporting the Islamic Revolution by empowering Shiites of the world. Riyadh, Cairo and Washington are determined to foil the Iranian agenda at all levels and at any cost.

The battle started in Iraq after 2003, dragged into Lebanon from 2006 to 2008 and reached Gaza in 2008-09.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt are feeling uneasy about the dramatic rise in Iran's influence in the region through proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

They are now worried that if Hamas survives the present onslaught, Egypt will have an Iranian satellite at its doorstep — Gaza.

Iran realised that neither Israel nor the US was satisfied with the results of Lebanon 2006. The Iranians reasoned that Israel was seeking another round in Lebanon, to remedy its injured pride and restore the deterrent abilities of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).

Hezbollah was still a problem before America, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Each wanted to see it erased for different reasons.

The Bush administration feared the success story of Hezbollah would inspire similar military organisations to emerge in failed states such as Somalia, Pakistan and Iraq.

The US State Department wanted to be rid of Hezbollah because it had embraced the Saudi Arabia-backed March 14 coalition in Beirut, which was seeking to wrestle Lebanon from Iranian influence.

The Pentagon wanted the war of 2006 because it was toying with the idea of a US war on Iran and wanted to see just how powerful the Iranians were.

Saudi Arabia wanted the war to succeed and so did the March 14 coalition because Hezbollah had an agenda different from theirs, which scared off investors and kept the country in war mode with Israel.

All these players were not satisfied that Hezbollah won the war of 2006 but for practical reasons realised that nobody could wage another war in Lebanon, certainly not a ground invasion.

The outgoing Bush administration cannot deal with so many loose ends in the Middle East — Hezbollah, Syria, Iran and Hamas.

Hezbollah has proven too difficult to chew. So have Syria and Iran, meaning that the only vulnerable party for the final stage of Bush's war on terror, would be Hamas.

Many analysts argue that the ongoing war in Gaza is the second phase of the Lebanon war of 2006. Israel has got a chance to strike a traditional enemy with brute force.

Iran has gotten a chance again to flex its muscle — to show the fighting abilities of Hamas, which it has bankrolled since the international community boycotted the Palestinian Territories after the party's electoral victory in 2006.

It would be a message to the incoming Barack Obama administration on how much trouble Iran can stir in the region if the US decides to continue the policies of George W. Bush, vis-à-vis Tehran.

It is also meant to create an intensified atmosphere in the region, making peace talks between Syria and Israel next to impossible.

Iran was not happy about the indirect talks between Syria and Israel, which started in mid-2008, fearing that any deal would be at Tehran's expense.

It was not pleased when the Syrians opened channels with the US by welcoming Nancy Pelosi to Damascus in 2007, or when the Syrian foreign minister met Condoleezza Rice in Sharm Al Shaikh.

Iran was equally upset when Syria went to the Annapolis Peace Conference, despite objections from Tehran.

Some radicals in Iran were already afraid that if Syria signed the peace agreement, it would be difficult for them to maintain Hezbollah in South Lebanon.

The easiest solution would be to foil these talks indirectly, by inflaming the situation in Gaza.

Besides these, it would be yet another chance for Iran to score a point in its cold war with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iran is betting on Hamas surviving the war in Gaza, and emerging “politically'' victorious.

Hamas cannot win the war militarily but if it survives, it can boast of having stood up to the massive Israeli war machine and claim a victory similar to the Hezbollah's in Lebanon in 2006.

All parties would then be forced to sit with it and negotiate an opening of the Rafah Crossing, which was closed after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007.

According to the 2005 Rafah Agreement, the crossing would be monitored by the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Israel, and the European Union.

Now that the Palestinian Authority no longer controls Gaza and the Europeans have withdrawn, any new agreement would have to be with Hamas, offering de facto recognition of the party and legitimising its rule in Gaza.

The war between Iran and Saudi Arabia was evident in Iraq after the downfall of Saddam Hussain in 2003.

The Iranians received the downfall of the Baath party with open arms because it eliminated a traditional foe and gave rise to their Shiite proxies in Iraq.

Iraq soon became a puppet state for the mullahs in Iran, ruled by the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shiite coalition that had strong ties to decision-makers in Tehran.

Two consecutive prime ministers, Ebrahim Al Jaafari and Nouri Al Maliki, had received Iranian support and financial assistance to bring down Saddam, during their days in the underground.

Another ally, Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, leader of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), commanded the UIA while a young rebel, Moqtada Al Sadr, pledged to create a theocracy in Iraq, based on the Iranian model.

Al Sadr commanded the Mahdi Army, a strong grassroots militia, while Al Hakim headed the Badr Brigade — an Iranian creation that had fought Saddam in the 1980s.

These leaders pushed for a collective punishment of Iraqi Sunnis for having produced Saddam, through laws such as de-Baathification.

They worked to purge the Iraqi police and security forces of Sunnis. Saudi Arabia stepped in, financing Sunni tribesmen and political parties such as the Iraqi Accordance Front and the Islamic Party to prevent Iraq from becoming an Iranian satellite.

Despite their calls for rapprochement with Iraqi Sunnis, none of these leaders were really interested in bringing the Sunnis to power and they all looked the other way when the Iraqi Sunnis objected to the execution of Saddam or to the rising influence of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade at the expense of armed Sunni groups that were linked to Saudi Arabia.

Adding insult to injury, UIA leaders even toyed with the idea of creating an autonomous Shiite district in southern Iraq, similar to the Kurdish one in the north, which would keep Iraqi Sunnis in central Iraq — with no oil. By 2006, it was clear to Saudi Arabia that it could not challenge or even curb Iranian influence in Iraq and to win its cold war with Tehran, Riyadh had to look elsewhere.

The second phase of the Iran-Saudi Arabia cold war erupted in Lebanon, in the aftermath of the Israeli war of 2006, and more recently, in Beirut in 2008, when Iran-backed Hezbollah clashed with the Saudi Arabia-backed March 14 coalition of parliamentary majority leader Sa'ad Al Hariri.

The Saudi Arabians, according to sources in Hezbollah, almost wanted the war of 2006 to root out the organisation.

They criticised Hezbollah's behaviour, claiming that its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was an “adventurer'' — words that were frowned upon by Damascus and Tehran.

Hezbollah emerged victorious from 2006, boasting a larger army that was better-equipped, and took to the streets of Beirut calling for the downfall of the pro-Saudi Arabia Cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

Prolonged tension and withdrawal of Hezbollah ministers from the Siniora Cabinet did not solve the crisis.

Saudi Arabia pushed Siniora to stand firm. Iran did the same with Hezbollah. When Siniora tried to launch a coup against Hezbollah's telecom network in May 2008, Nasrallah ordered his men to the streets, wrestling control of the Lebanese capital from militias loyal to Al Hariri.

The battle for Beirut, which went in Tehran's favour, ended in six hours, proving how powerful Iran was in Lebanon.

While Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to clash in Lebanon and Iraq, tension was brewing between Syria and Egypt.

Syria-Egypt relations seemed to deteriorate after a recent meeting of Arab ministers of foreign affairs in Cairo.

Syria sounded critical of Egyptian diplomacy in trying to mend fences between Fatah and Hamas.

Foreign Minister Walid Al Mouallem said mediating states (referring to Egypt) should stand at arm's length from the Palestinian factions and not favour one over the other.

That was seen as a clear reference to what the Syrian press described as Egyptian favouritism towards Fatah.

Egyptian semi-official dailies such as Al Ahram and periodicals such as Rose Al Youssef snapped back with fiery front page editorials against Syria, accusing Damascus of preaching Iranian positions vis-à-vis the conflict in Palestine.

The Syrian ambassador to Cairo gave an interview to the London-based Al Quds newspaper, acknowledging that bilateral relations had deteriorated “from bad to worse'', accusing Egypt of fabricating the latest crisis with Damascus.

The ambassador explained Syria's position, saying Egypt was trying to bring Hamas and Fatah to the negotiating table in Cairo, without setting a timetable.

This was resulting in repeated delay, he added, pointing out that a rapprochement must be reached before President Mahmoud Abbas's term ended (on January 9, 2009).

Abbas is seeking another term in office; which Hamas refuses. Egypt supports the Palestinian president and so does Saudi Arabia.

Syria has linked its support to consensus between Fatah and Hamas. The latest crisis is only a cover-up for earlier tension between the two Arab capitals.

The real problem — besides different viewpoints on the Palestinian issue — is Syria-Saudi Arabia and Syria-Lebanon relations.

Looking for old glory

Egypt has been eager since the mid-1990s to recapture its former role as “big sister'' in Arab politics.

Nothing achieved that better than serving as mediator in Palestine's internal disputes.

Cairo never hesitated to welcome or court the former president Yasser Arafat, believing that this would restore its tarnished image in the eyes of ordinary Arabs after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978.

After Arafat's death in 2004, President Hosni Mubarak tried relentlessly to bring Hamas and Fatah to the negotiating table in Cairo.

Hamas had traditionally been Syria's sphere of influence, and the Syrians felt threatened by Mubarak's venture into territory it considered its own.

While Mubarak clearly favoured Fatah and its president Abu Mazen, he needed to court Hamas as well to satisfy Egyptians, given Hamas's popularity in the country.

Hamas welcomed the Egyptian initiative but did not listen to Mubarak, seeing him as an extension of Western influence in the Arab world, more so even after his latest refusal to open the Rafah Crossing.

Mubarak accused Syria, in private, of sabotaging his efforts, in collaboration with Iran.

Egypt's real problem lies with Tehran rather than Damascus. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 singled out former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat as one of its enemies, for having signed peace with Israel in 1978.

Iran suspended relations with Egypt in 1980 and named a street in honour of Sadat's assassin in 1981.

Relations improved, however, in terms of bilateral trade and political coordination under Sadat, only to come to an abrupt end after the Islamic Revolution.

When they hit rock bottom in 1979, Syria had cut its diplomatic relations with Egypt and was building bridges with Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini.

Syria managed to strike a balance between Cairo and Tehran throughout the 1990s, when it enjoyed excellent relations with the West.

It maintained its links with Iran through Hezbollah in South Lebanon.

The Egyptians are furious about Iran's support for Shiite proxies in Iraq wrestling for power with the proxies of Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh and Cairo feel threatened by the rise of what Mubarak calls, “Shiitification'' in the Arab world.

They are angry with Syria for strengthening ties with Tehran at the expense of its formerly strong relations with Cairo and Riyadh and support Lebanese statesmen such as Sa'ad Al Hariri, who is anti-Iranian.

Mubarak sent shockwaves throughout Iran when he appeared on Al Arabiya TV in 2006 and said that the Shiites were more loyal to Iran than they were to their own countries.

Adding to Egyptian worries, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps test-fired nine long-range missiles. Last summer, Iran announced the launching of its first communications satellite, with plans to build a spy satellite by 2015.

The country illegally opened two administrative offices on the occupied Abu Mousa island of the UAE, angering not only the UAE but the entire Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League.

As if that were not enough to scare off sympathisers, Iran has created more tension with its Deputy Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mohammadi saying Arabian Gulf states and their rulers would soon face a crisis of legitimacy.

Last September, a senior member of the ruling National Party in Egypt accused Iran of assassinating Ihad Al Sharif, Egypt's former ambassador to Iraq, in 2005.

Al Ahram ran a front-page story claiming that the assassination was aimed at “cutting off the legs of Egypt'' from Iraq.

Because of all this, Egypt is furious about Iran's meddling in the Arab world and angry with Syria for being that country's friend in the Middle East. In 2007, Egypt tried, with Saudi Arabia, to court Syria by treating it with royalty at the Arab summit in Riyadh.

Mubarak's contention was that Syria would only be encouraged to disengage with Iran if it felt welcome and secure in the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt tried to mend relations with Damascus, when both countries called on it to withdraw from Lebanon (at the request of the US).

They never forgave Assad, however, for his unwavering support for Hezbollah and Iran in the 2006 war in Lebanon, when he announced that those who did not support the resistance in Lebanon “were half-men''.

Syria, however, had plenty to gain from keeping its channels open with Tehran and refused to accept dictates from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Its main problem was with Riyadh for the support it gave Sa'ad Al Hariri, the parliamentary majority leader in Beirut, who accused Syria of killing his father in 2005.

In 2007-2008, Syria pursued a “heading East'' policy, improving its relations with countries such as Russia, Malaysia, China and India.

In the neighbourhood it invested in relations with Turkey and Qatar, telling the world that it did not need Riyadh and Cairo because they were linked with a US agenda in the Arab world.

In March 2007, Europe began sending signals that it wanted to reconcile with Syria when Javier Solana, the first European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, came to Damascus, offering a series of incentives in exchange for finding a solution to the Cabinet and presidential crises in Lebanon.

The foreign ministers of Spain, Denmark, France and Great Britain followed, making the Syrians all the more less interested in a rapprochment with Cairo.

As a result of Syria's attitude, Mubarak and King Abdullah did not show up at the Arab summit in Damascus in March 2008, further angering the Syrians.

Last July, when Bashar Al Assad went to Paris for the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, he had a “mild handshake'' with Mubarak. Egypt, which could not unleash its anger on Iran — out of fear — continued to do so at Syria.

Dr Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.